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Introduction
Depression or low mood is a concept that is familiar to most of us. However, a proportion of 
people go on to develop enduring low mood or clinical depression, whom this essay will be 
referring to. The essay will first describe what is meant by clinical depression. The cognitive 
behavioural and psychoanalytic approaches to depression will then be discussed. Due to the 
large subject area, particular aspects of these concepts will then be addressed, regarding the 
similarities and differences of these two approaches. The cognitive behavioural concept will 
cover the theory behind Beck’s cognitive therapy, and the psychoanalytic concept will include 
the early work of Freud, to the work of object relations theory (Bowlby), to focus 
predominantly on the object representation approach by Blatt. Finally, the empirical status of 
these two models will then be evaluated, referring mainly to the theoretical status, not the 
therapeutic evidence.
The Diagnostical and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders -  4th Edition (DSM-IV, 
American Psychiatric Association, 1994) classifies a major depressive episode as five or more 
of the following symptoms being present in an individual for at least two weeks: -depressed 
mood; loss of interest in activities; significant weight change; sleep disturbance; psychomotor 
agitation or retardation; fatigue or loss of energy; feelings of worthlessness or excessive guilt; 
diminished ability to think or concentrate; and recurrent thoughts of death, recurrent suicidal 
ideation with or without a plan. Depressed mood or loss of interest must be one symptom.
Lifetime risk for major depression is almost is almost double for females (20%) compared to 
males (12%) and 5% of the population are affected at any one time (Sturt, Kamakura, & Der, 
1984: cited in Williams, 1997). A quarter of people are depressed for less than a month, but 
about 22% of cases will remain depressed two years later (Keller, Klerman, Lavori, Coryell, 
& Endicott, 1984: cited in Williams, 1997). Depression also has strong links with suicide 
(Beck, Hollon, Young, Bedrosian, & Bundenz, 1985: cited in Williams, 1997). Given that a 
major government target is to reduce levels of suicide (The Psychologist, November 1999), 
understanding and treating the condition in the current health service is vital.
Cognitive behavioural concepts
The cognitive behavioural approach developed primarily from Ellis’ Rational Emotive 
Therapy and Beck’s cognitive therapy (Rachman, 1997). I have chosen to focus on Beck’s 
approach, which was primarily developed as a model for understanding and treating 
depression. It is the standard cognitive behavioural approach used by most clinical 
psychologists and it is claimed to have widespread clinical acceptance (Hollon, DeRubeis, &
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Evans, 1996). Therefore when the cognitive behavioural concept is mentioned, this will refer 
to Beck’s cognitive therapy, unless otherwise stated.
Beck proposes that a person’s negative thinking or “negative cognitive triad” maintains 
depression, where a depressed individual has a negative view of themselves, the world and 
their future (Beck, 1991). Thoughts relevant to this triad appear suddenly and almost 
spontaneously. With the less severely depressed patients, these thoughts appear to be on the 
edge of consciousness. In more depressed patients they are more conscious and repetitive 
(Beck, 1991), for example thinking “I cannot cope”. These thoughts often seem quite 
plausible and are often accepted as true. Negative thoughts lead to a further depressed mood 
and to confirmation of the thoughts (Fennell 1989). These thoughts interact with the variety 
of symptoms mentioned by DSM-IV.
Beck’s model proposes that Negative Automatic Thoughts (NATs) are based on assumptions 
or beliefs formed from experience, possibly childhood. A person is said to form assumptions 
or schemata about themselves and the world, which help to organise their perception and 
determine and evaluate behaviour (Beck 1967, 1976: cited in Fennell, 1989). In depression, 
dysfunctional assumptions are formed from negative experience, which can be “extreme” and 
“resistant to change” (Fennell, 1989). An example would be someone who believes “I am 
useless.” These assumptions can lie dormant, until critical incidents, such as rejection activate 
them and subsequent NATs.
Schemata influence and are influenced by a variety of biases in thinking (Beck, 1991). These 
include selective abstraction (drawing a conclusion from one of many sources of information); 
overgeneralisation (drawing a negative global conclusion from a single event); and 
magnification and minimisation (exaggerating negative events and playing down positive 
ones) (Davison & Neale, 1998). Beck proposed that a negative cognitive shift results in 
depression, where positive information is filtered out and negative information referring to the 
self is readily accepted (Beck, 1991).
The empirical emphasis from behavioural concepts has been incorporated and has led to an 
importance of conducting outcome research (Rachman, 1997). This is through setting 
homework in between therapy sessions, aiming to produce positive cognitive shift through 
disconfirmation of beliefs.
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Psychoanalytic concepts
Psychoanalytic theories of depression centre on ambivalence around aggression; loss; and 
self-esteem (Bateman & Holmes, 1995). Freud (1917) saw loss as central to depression. He 
compared depression (melancholia) to mourning and argued that melancholia was mourning 
pathologised. Depression is also a reaction to the loss of a loved object, a person or 
otherwise. Smith (1999) describes the hatred as unconsciously turned inwards. The 
individual unconsciously identifies themself with the lost object and attacks themself with the 
hatred for the loved object that has left them or let them down. Current loss in the person’s 
life activates experiences of earlier loss that may be real or symbolic (Freud, 1917).
Bowlby’s work on attachment theory has been valuable to understanding the influence of 
early experience on present interpersonal relationships in depression. Bowlby (1969: cited in 
Klerman, Weissman, Roundsville, & Chevron, 1984) proposed that humans have an innate 
survival instinct to form attachments. Attachments provide protection and nurturance. When 
bonds are formed or disturbed, intense emotions are evoked, such as hate or love. People are 
vulnerable to impaired interpersonal relationships if attachment does not develop early and 
vulnerable to depression when attachment bonds are disturbed.
These psychoanalytic themes have an important influence in the ideas advocated by Blatt 
(1974). It is this psychoanalytic approach to depression that I have chosen to focus on. Blatt 
(1974) maintains that with depressed patients there is an inability to retain a feeling of contact 
with the object when it is no longer present, “object representation”. He suggests two types of 
depression, anaclitic and introjective, with different impairments in object representation. In 
anaclitic depression, themes of dependency and helplessness are evident (Blatt, Quinlan, & 
Chevron, 1990). There is a fear of losing the object and the gratification it can provide. 
Object representations revolve around direct, physical, need-gratifying contact with the object. 
This is differentiated from introjective depression, where there is concern not for the loss of 
the object, but loss of the object’s approval, love and acceptance (Blatt, 1974). Perfectionistic 
tendencies are utilised to win approval by achieving excessive standards (Blatt & Maroudas, 
1992). They are intensely self-critical and feel guilty when they fail. In line with Bowlby’s 
work, parental failure to provide dependable nurturance, care and support and excessive use of 
control, criticism and disapproval are linked with depression (Blatt, 1995).
Interpersonal relationships are seen as crucial in the psychoanalytic approach. The interaction 
of the individual’s past and present relationships maintains the depression.
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Similarities and differences between the concepts
Cognitive behavioural and psychoanalytic concepts of depression have many similarities, 
which is hardly surprising, considering Beck’s training in psychoanalysis. At a general level, 
both consider cycles maintaining depression. In the cognitive behavioural model, it is 
negative thinking, whereas in psychoanalytic models it is the cycle of relationships.
Both concepts include experience as an important influence on the present situation. In 
psychoanalytic concepts, the external world becomes internalised, such as past relationships 
with parental figures (Blatt et al., 1990). Experience of loss of a loved object can affect 
present relationships through unconscious mechanisms. Feelings of hatred directed towards 
the self are projected outwards to other people, who then introject or take in this hatred and 
pass feelings of hatred and aggression back towards the individual (countertransference) 
(Bateman & Holmes, 1995), continuing the cycle of maladaptive relationships. In the 
cognitive behavioural concept, experience is seen as important in the formation of beliefs or 
assumptions used to make sense of the world (Beck, 1991). This easily compares, to the 
psychoanalytic concept. Cognitively, the individual is just trying to make sense of the early 
relationships. Loss of a parental figure or a loss of affection from a parent could be 
interpreted as that person not loving them, that it is their fault that their parents left them or 
don’t love them. This could then give rise to the dysfunctional belief, “I am useless”. Saffan 
(1990) argues “interpersonal schemas” of dysfunctional assumptions of low self-worth and 
attributing personal blame for negative events may have arisen from inconsistent maladaptive 
experiences with early attachment figures. This is similar to the working models of 
attachment (Bowlby: 1973, cited in Collins, 1996). Saffan (1990) considers the “interpersonal 
schema” as selecting information from interactions with attachment figures to predict and 
increase the likelihood of securing relatedness with those figures.
The difference arises with the importance placed on early experience, in relation to the 
necessary intervention point. In the cognitive behavioural concept, the present situation needs 
to change. Present negative thinking maintains depression (Beck, 1991). Patients are aided to 
identify NATs and to challenge them with a personal rational response. In psychoanalytic 
concepts, therapist insight for the patient into how past interpersonal relationships may be 
influencing present ones, including the therapeutic relationship, is used.
Linked with this is the level of accessibility to those processes underlying depression. In 
psychoanalytic concepts, feelings of hatred towards the lost loved object are repressed into 
unconsciousness. The client is unable to access these feelings. Through analysis the
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unconscious themes emerge. In the cognitive behavioural concept, schemas are on the border 
of consciousness and are accessible to clients through therapist guidance (Beck, 1991). Beck 
(1976: cited in D. A. Clark & Steer, 1996) acknowledges that not all cognitive processes are 
conscious and vary in levels of accessibility. Altogether, distinctions between cognitive 
behavioural and psychoanalytic concepts of conscious accessibility are rather unclear.
A biological explanation of the level of consciousness has been proposed, suggesting that both 
concepts represent different pathways in the brain to the amygdala. The amygdala is 
increasingly accepted as being involved in emotional processing (LeDoux, 1995). Fonagy 
(Fonagy and Wolpert, 1999) suggests that the unconscious psychoanalytic concept could 
represent processing from the thalamus to the amygdala and the cognitive behavioural concept 
processing from the cortex to the amygdala.
There also appear to be clear similarities where personality vulnerability factors are 
concerned. Psychoanalytic theorists have found it useful to divide depressed individuals into 
two interpersonal constructs. Blatt (1998) describes individuals who are highly dependent on 
other people, requiring security (anaclitic depressives) and those who require a high level of 
autonomy and have high levels of self-criticism (introjective depressives). Beck (1996) has 
also made this differentiation between sociotropic and autonomy dimensions of personality. 
Those people high on either dimension when encountering a relevant stressor will be prone 
towards depression. A patient high in sociotropy is excessively dependent on others, so when 
rejection by another individual is experienced or perceived, depression is likely to follow. 
For the autonomous patient, when autonomy is jeopardised through failure and perceived lack 
of self-worth, depression is likely. According to Blatt and Maroudas (1992), the difference in 
views is that Beck considers a person to be vulnerable to both personality stressors, whereas 
Blatt suggests one vulnerable type or the other.
The cognitive behavioural approach could be considered to differ, by predominantly focusing 
on the depressed individual and largely ignoring the environment. There are no suggestions 
of the unconscious influences of projection or transference from psychoanalytic concepts. 
Beck (1991) addresses criticisms like this (e.g. Coyne and Gotlib, 1983), by suggesting that 
interpersonal difficulties in depression may be linked to the possible irrational and biased 
interpretations people make around the depressed individual. For example, the wife of a 
depressed husband who is seeking reassurance for his wife’s love for him could interpret his 
dependent behaviour as wanting to control her. The wife may then become more distant, 
which the husband interprets as his wife not caring about him.
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Empirical support for cognitive behavioural and psychoanalytic models
There has been widespread therapeutic evidence for the efficacy of cognitive behavioural 
approaches in treating depression (Dobson, 1989: cited in Beck, 1991). However, the 
“efficacy of any treatment can only be regarded as consistent with, not confirmatory of, its 
theory,” (Altshuler, 1984). Indeed Bandura (1978: cited in Altshuler 1984) suggests that the 
efficacy “may have more to do with the positive gratification and support provided, than with 
the modifications of cognitions and schemata posited by the theory.” Despite therapeutic 
evidence, it seems important to consider the empirical support for aspects of the cognitive 
behavioural model. On the other hand the psychoanalytical approach has been criticised for 
its inability to be scientifically testable. Wolpert (Fonagy and Wolpert, 1999) explains that, 
“the ideas are so vague and all-inclusive that it is not possible to test them and thus show 
whether they are right or wrong.” To what extent is there evidence in support of the cognitive 
behavioural approach and is there any evidence to support the psychoanalytic concepts? 
Moreover, what are the distinctions and parallels between the evidence for both models?
Comparisons
Research from both theoretical sides has one major common supporting theme, loss in 
depression. In the cognitive behavioural model evidence comes from the content-specificity 
hypothesis. Psychoanalytic models look more at early experience to see whether there were 
experiences of loss in depressed individuals, together with current ones.
The content-specificity hypothesis suggests that the pattern of thinking is specific to certain 
psychological disorders (Beck, 1991). Thoughts in depression are related to loss, defeat and 
deprivation, whereas in anxiety they are linked to danger and threat (Beck, 1991). Ingram 
(1990: cited in D. A. Clark & Steer, 1996) suggests that if the negative cognitive content in 
depression is similar in anxiety disorders, then it would be dubious to focus therapy on the 
cognitive aspects of depression, rather than on other non-cognitive factors. Beck, Brown, 
Steer, Eidelson and Riskind (1987) found support for the content-specificity hypothesis using 
the Cognition Checklist (CCL). Depression patients scored higher on the depressed (loss- 
defeat) subscales than anxiety patients, who conversely scored higher on the anxious (danger) 
subscales.
Loss also appears to have common empirical support in the relation of suicide to depression. 
In cognitive behavioural models, depressed individuals have a loss of hope (hopelessness) 
about the future (Dohr, Rush, and Bernstein, 1989), associated with high levels of suicide 
(Beck, Kovacs and Weissman, 1975: cited in Beck, 1991). Beck, Brown, Berschwick,
13
Adult Mental Health Essay
Stewart and Steer (1990: cited in Beck, 1993) found that in a study of out-patients using their 
Hopelessness Scale, those with the higher scores were eleven times more likely to commit 
suicide than low scorers.
As far as psychoanalytic models are concerned, empirical support for actual loss comes from 
Brown and Harris (1978). In a study of depressed women, 35% had lost their mothers before 
their eleventh birthdays, compared with 13% of controls. Oatley (1988: cited in Coyne and 
Whiffen, 1995) found that 90% of severe events in the lives of people with depression 
involved loss.
Kaslow, Reviere, Chance, Rogers, Hatcher, Wasserman, Smith, Jessee, James, and Selig 
(1998) found that depressed individuals who attempted suicide were more likely to report loss 
in childhood together with recent loss in adulthood than non-attempters. However, research 
suggests that it is not the death of the parent itself that leads to vulnerability to depression, but 
the quality of parenting in general, preceding or succeeding the loss (Klerman, Weissman, 
Roundsville, and Chevron, 1984).
Recently, both models have been looking at the role of personality factors as a vulnerability to 
depression. Beck (1983: cited in Beck, 1991) considers the influence of sociotropy (need for 
intimacy, dependence and nurturance) and autonomy (need for independence, goal 
achievement), whereas Blatt and Maroudas (1992) consider anaclitic depressives and 
introjective depressives. Recent research has produced mixed results. Segal, Shaw, Vella, 
and Katz (1992) in a longitudinal study looking at predictors of relapse found significant 
congruency between depressives who were self-critical and achievement-related adversity and 
some congruency between dependent depressed people who experienced interpersonal 
adversity. However, the interaction of achievement-related adversity and self-criticism only 
accounted for 10% of the variance (Coyne & Whiffen, 1995).
Contrasts
The cognitive behavioural model has largely concentrated on providing evidence to support 
the proposed negative cognitive shift, which suggests the negative cognitive triad about: the 
self; the world; and the future. Eaves (1982: cited in Beck, 1991) found that 97% of 
depressives were correctly separated from control subjects on .the Automatic Thoughts 
questionnaire (Hollon & Kendall, 1980) and no control subjects were wrongly identified as 
depressed. Hollon, Kendall and Lumry (1986: cited in Haaga et al., 1991) found that negative 
thinking was found across a range of depression, including unipolar, bipolar, reactive and
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endogenous. Depressed individuals also appear to have more negativistic, self-critical 
thoughts than non-depressed controls (Blatt, Quinlan, & Chevron, 1990); have enhanced 
recall for depressed-content adjectives (Derry & Kuiper, 1981) and report lower levels of self­
esteem (Lewinsohn et al., 1981). The negative view of themselves is also greater than 
recovered depressives (Bradley & Matthews, 1988) and even themselves when no longer 
depressed (Myers, Lynch, & Bakal, 1989). From a treatment perspective, Teasdale and 
Fennell (1982: cited in Beck, 1991) found that active negative thought reduction led to 
decreased negative affect in depressed patients. The evidence for negative thinking about the 
world appears to be far less extensive, with the only study cited in Haaga et al. (1991) 
suggesting that depressed individuals score higher on the world subscale of the Cognitive 
Style Test (CST: Blackburn, Jones & Lewin, 1986). However, further studies have suggested 
that not all types of depression will have the negative cognitive triad (Engel & DeRubeis 
1993: cited in D. A. Clark & Steer, 1996; Abramson, Metalsky & Alloy, 1989).
There is also a substantial amount of evidence to support the cognitive biases or distortions, 
which Beck (1991) differentiates into three categories: perception, recall and interpretation. 
As far as perception is concerned, depressed individuals have been shown to have lower 
thresholds for briefly exposed negative information. Gilson (1983: cited in Beck, 1991), 
found that in a test of binocular rivalry, where scenes are presented separately to each eye, 
depressed individuals were more likely to perceive negative scenes than controls. Support 
even comes from non-psychological studies. Blackburn, Roxborough, Muir, Glabus and 
Blackwood (1990) found that depressed individuals were more efficient at processing 
negative verbal stimuli compared to controls. Bradley and Matthews (1988) showed that 
depressed subjects had a biased recall of negative adjectives.
While there appears to be significant amounts of support for the cognitive model, there is also 
doubt. Beck (1993) suggests that the key test of the cognitive model is in its predictive 
validity. Beck (1967: cited in Segal et al., 1996) emphasises vulnerability factors in 
depression to be constant, enduring differences in basic assumptions and attitudes. However, 
there seems to be a lack of empirical support for these dysfunctional beliefs as vulnerability 
factors (Miranda, Persons, & Byers, 1990). Particularly concerning, is the research suggesting 
that not all depressed people display negative thinking (Abramson et al., 1989) and that those 
who went on to develop depression were no more likely to display negative thinking style 
than those who did not (Lewinsohn et al., 1981). Furthermore, depressed people in remission 
could not be differentiated from control subjects on the basis of dysfunctional beliefs (Hollon
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et al., 1986: cited in Haaga et al., 1991) and that as individuals recover from depression, so 
their dysfunctional attitudes abate (Silverman, Silverman, & Eardley, 1984).
However, recent research has provided a possible explanation for these contradictory findings. 
The mood activation hypothesis supports the view that dysfunctional attitudes are a 
vulnerability factor for depression, however their accessibility depends on mood state and are 
therefore only evident in depressed mood (Miranda et al., 1990). They demonstrated that 
previously depressed individuals showed elevated levels of dysfunctional attitudes in an 
induced depressed mood, however controls did not, even though they were in a negative mood 
state. This would seem to fit with previous suggestions by Beck (1976: cited in D. A. Clark & 
Steer, 1996) that although they are stable structures, their level of accessibility varies. 
Previous work on diurnal accessibility, for example D. M. Clark and Teasdale (1982) 
demonstrated that depressed individuals recalled more negative autobiographical memories at 
times of the day when they were more depressed.
The mood activation hypothesis (Miranda & Persons, 1988) has important implications for 
relapse in depression. Not only does it suggest that just low mood may activate the 
dysfunctional attitudes and commence a downward spiral of ruminative thinking, but that 
patients with recurrent episodes of depression may be very sensitive to any mood changes. 
Minor changes may activate these assumptions which are very close to threshold, due to 
repeated activation. Once activated, depression related processing incorporates other 
processes, such as decreased behavioural output (Segal et al., 1996). Teasdale (1993: cited in 
Teasdale, Lloyd, & Hutton, 1998) suggests a more general level of schema representation: the 
Interactive Cognitive Subsystems framework. In a depressed mood, different representations 
become more tightly bound together, such as self-worth and the approval of others or success 
on personal tasks. Teasdale et al., (1998) found that depressed patients gave positive stronger 
associations with worth and success or approval than controls. Mindfulness Based Cognitive 
Therapy based on this updated theory already has positive outcome studies (Teasdale, Segal, 
Williams, Ridgeway, Soulsby, & Lau, 2000). The idea is to disengage oneself from resulting 
negative thoughts and prevent the downward spiral of negative thinking, rather than changing 
thought content, as in cognitive behavioural approaches. It has been shown to be most 
successful for people with three or more episodes of depression, which is extremely important 
if one episode is seen to sensitise subsequent episodes (Post, 1992).
Psychoanalytic concepts have focused primarily on interpersonal relationships in depression, 
in particular early relationships being re-inacted unconsciously in the present. This is
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considered as a result of internalising the hatred towards the presumed lost object and 
projecting these feelings to surrounding people. Several studies have shown that depressed 
adults are more likely to have childhood experiences of family discord, parental neglect, 
rejection and abuse (e.g. Orvaschel, Weissman, & Kidd, 1980: cited in Klerman et al., 1984). 
Also, recent evidence demonstrates the impact of transference. Andersen, Glassman, Chen, 
and Cole (1995) found that when participants encountered four fictional people, one of who 
resembled a significant other, then information they learnt about those people was confused 
with information they filled in from their representation of the significant other. They suggest 
that significant other representations are easily accessible, as they are “rich, intricate, 
personally important, and affectively laden.”
In present adult relationships, enduring depression may evoke friction, frustration and 
withdrawal, rather than empathy and support (Klerman et al., 1984). Powers and Zuroff 
(1988) investigating self-criticism in depression, have suggested evidence for the maintenance 
of depression in terms of interpersonal behaviour. They found that people interacting with 
self-critical participants rated them as poorly maladjusted individuals, despite giving them 
overt reassurance during interactions. Their subtle disparaging responses may provide the 
depressed individual with mixed messages, weakening the individual’s sense of worth and 
lead to further self-criticism in the attempt for reassurance. Stack and Coyne (1983: cited in 
Powers & Zuroff, 1988) suggest that intense self-criticism together with other symptoms of 
depression can lead to overt rejection and avoidance. The overt self-criticism is suggested to 
have developed from interactions with parents who were excessively, neglectful, controlling, 
critical and abusive (Blatt, 1995). Berlin (1985: cited in Blatt, 1995) found that a group of 
excessively self-critical women linked their self-criticism to their perfectionistic standards 
developed from their perfectionistic parents. Blatt (1979: cited in Blatt, 1995) reported that 
self-criticism was correlated with recalling parents as less nurturing and affectionate; and 
more controlling, inconsistently showing their love and setting excessive standards to achieve 
(McCranie & Bass, 1984: cited in Blatt, 1995). Nevertheless, Burchill and Styles (1988: cited 
in Vetesse & Mongrain, 2000) failed to find affective negativity in depressed peoples’ 
relationships. Vetesse and Mongrain (2000) differentiated dependency and self-criticism. 
Immature dependency (neediness) was associated with higher levels of depression and 
criticism from others than mature dependency (connectedness). However, overall, self-critical 
patients expressed more self-denigration and received more negative feedback.
The evidence so far cited is reliant on cross-sectional self-reports from depressed individuals. 
It is hard to exclude personal bias affecting the information about parents, especially with the
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recall bias for negative information in the cognitive behavioural research (e.g. Derry & 
Kuiper, 1981). Frost, Lahart, and Rosenblate (1991), suggest that it is unclear whether parents 
set excessive standards or whether children perceive their parents as setting excessively high 
standards. For this reason, Block and Gjerde (in press: cited in Koestner et al., 1991) question 
the findings of McCranie and Bass, (1984) suggesting a correlation between self-criticism and 
more controlling, inconsistent parents.
However, longitudinal research supports associations between parental rejection and excessive 
authoritarian control before the age of 8 and depression as a young adult aged 18 (Gjerde, 
Block, & Block, 1991: cited in Blatt, 1995). Zuroff, Koestner, and Powers (1994) found 
associations between self-criticism as an adolescent and a higher level of maladjustment, 
depression and lack of satisfaction with work and family relationships, at age 31. Moreover, 
Koestner, Zuroff, and Powers (1991) found interesting gender differences. Female levels of 
self-criticism during childhood were stable through to young adulthood, whereas for males 
there was a strong relation for self-criticism at a young age and inhibited aggressive impulses 
in adulthood. They suggest this may be due to social learning, where it is acceptable for 
females to express inadequacy through depressed feelings, but more acceptable for males to 
express it through anger. Also, development of self-criticism reflected parental behaviour that 
was restrictive and rejecting, but only from the same sex parent. This could be seen to result 
in the internalisation of the same sex-parent as a harsh superego, setting unobtainably high 
standards and inflicting guilt for not reaching those standards (Koestner et al., 1991). 
However, Koestner et al. (1991) note limitations, such as the reporting of both maternal and 
paternal parenting styles by the mother. Furthermore, Brewin, Andrews, and Fumham, (1996: 
cited in Kuyken & Brewin, 1999) found contradictory evidence that parental approval was a 
predictor of positive self-esteem among young adults, but not disapproval.
Longitudinal research for cognitive behavioural models of depression has focused primarily in 
the present day, but appears relatively sparse, perhaps due to the mood activation requirement 
for accessing dysfunctional attitudes (Miranda & Persons, 1988) and the unclear results from 
the personality-stressor research (Coyne & Whiffen, 1995).
With the research on the mood-activating hypothesis, the question is what is it that activates 
the mildly depressed mood. Is it the interpersonal consequences of the depressed person’s 
behaviour, which may be unconsciously motivated, such as dependency? Or is it the 
interpretation of a particular event based on the person’s specific vulnerability. Is it actual
18
Adult Mental Health Essay
adversity, or is it perceived adversity as a result of unrealistic standards established by the 
individual, as a result of beliefs or the internalised harsh parent?
Conclusion
I have attempted to explain the similarities and differences between cognitive behavioural and 
psychoanalytic concepts of depression. Cognitive behavioural concepts have focused on the 
work by Beck, with more recent explanation by the mood-activation hypothesis (Miranda & 
Persons, 1988) and Mindfulness Based Cognitive Therapy (Teasdale et al., 2000). 
Psychoanalytic concepts have been harder to characterise as they have a longer history of 
development. Therefore, I have taken the early work of Freud, work on attachment theory by 
Bowlby, with the recent ideas expressed by Blatt on two dimensions of depression (anaclitic 
and introjective). Differences exist between: - conceptual focus, past experience for 
psychoanalytic concepts and present functioning for cognitive behavioural concepts; 
suggested levels of conscious accessibility; and problematic interpersonal relationships versus 
problematic information processing. However, in my opinion there are clear similarities, such 
as the concept of loss; the importance placed on pathological cycles maintaining depression, 
whether interpersonal or thinking; the inclusion of early experience; and the role of 
personality variables.
Empirically, there appears to be more support for the psychoanalytic model than has been 
suggested (e.g. Wolpert, in Fonagy & Wolpert, 1999), especially as far as longitudinal 
research is concerned, which appears lacking for the cognitive behavioural model. It appears 
to me though, that the evidence for the two models is almost complementary. The only 
difference is the focus, whether it is loss, early experience or personality factors. For 
example, the psychoanalytic contribution of the impact of early experience would add support 
to the development of dysfunctional beliefs. Evidence for the activation of dysfunctional 
assumptions in the cognitive behavioural model would add support to psychoanalytic model, 
if you consider them as assumptions that were formed during personal distress, whether 
abandonment or inability to achieve affection from critical parents. It would make sense that 
these assumptions would be more accessible with accompanying low mood, which may 
parallel the mood associated with encoding. From Teasdale’s cognitive perspective (1997), 
these implicational meanings are inextricably linked to emotion, from experience associated 
with humiliation or rejection. From a psychoanalytic perspective, present relationships could 
be considered to reach the chronically accessible significant other representations from past 
relationships, which are also suggested to be affectively laden (Andersen et al., 1995).
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With regard to therapy, Teasdale (1997) has suggested that it is not sufficient to weigh up 
evidence of previously interpreted negative experience to prevent depressives from relapsing. 
What is required is the changing of schematic self-models. This he suggests can only be 
achieved through changing the way the person is and the experiences they encounter. 
Whether this is achieved through breaking the cycle of repeated interpersonal relationships or 
the cycle of depressive thinking, would be difficult to untangle. They seem mutually 
compatible mechanisms to me, one influencing the other in a dynamic manner, perhaps along 
the lines of the biological model, where conscious and unconscious processing merely involve 
separate pathways in the brain (Fonagy & Wolpert, 1999; Goodale & Milner, 1996).
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Introduction
Attitudes towards people with learning disabilities have tended to be largely contradictory. 
They have been regarded both as devoid of sexuality, yet sexually promiscuous and a threat to 
society (Moss, 1998). The later beliefs even led to enforced sterilisation for people with 
learning disabilities, which continued in some states in the USA until the 1970s (Hergenhahn, 
1997: cited in Lumley & Scotti, 2001). Being devalued both as a sexual being and a member 
of society could be considered as creating opportunities for abuse (McCarthy, 1993; Sobsey, 
1994a).
The essay will first discuss what sexual abuse is and how it is related to people with learning 
disabilities. Then it is necessary to highlight who the sexual abusers and the sexually abused 
are. Both individuals who have been sexually abused and / or sexually abuse others will be 
covered. After all, there may be a cycle of abuse, where many who sexually abuse may have 
been sexually abused themselves (Clare, 1993). The focus will largely be on adults, although 
there is an understanding that abuse does occur during the childhood of people with learning 
disabilities (Westcott, 1993: cited in Sobsey, 1994b). Then the role of the clinical 
psychologist in working in the area of sexual abuse with people with learning disabilities will 
be discussed. The author has chosen to use an “ecological model” of sexual abuse proposed 
by Sobsey (1994a) to provide the structure for this essay. The author believes that this model 
clarifies the need to consider sexual abuse work at various levels as a clinical psychologist 
working in the area of learning disabilities. Sobsey (1994a) suggests working at the levels of 
culture, the living environment and the level of the individual sexual abusers and the sexually 
abused.
What is sexual abuse?
Various definitions can be encountered in the literature. For example Sgroi (1989: cited in 
Thompson & Brown, 1997) suggests that sexual abuse is, “any sexual act (not necessarily 
involving contact) with another party who did not or cannot consent to the act, or for whom 
there exists a barrier to consent.” Barriers to consent include any power imbalance in the 
relationship that would counteract consent, for example threats or coercion (Thompson & 
Brown, 1997). Power imbalance would also seem to include McCarthy’s (1993) definition of 
sexual abuse as, “any sexual contact which is unwanted or and / or unenjoyed by one partner 
and is for the sexual gratification of the other.” This later definition would include sexual acts 
that appear to be consensual, but usually cause great discomfort to the person on the receiving 
end (McCarthy, 1993). These definitions will be used as the focus of sexual abuse in this 
essay. Thompson (1997) found that in his study, the most common forms of sexual abuse
26
People with Learning Disabilities Essay
were indecent exposure, touching private parts of the body through clothing, verbal sexual 
harassment, and actual / attempted penetration of the vagina or anus.
Prevalence and incidence of sexual abuse
Prevalence studies suggest that there have been very high levels of people with learning 
disabilities who have experienced sexual abuse. For example, Sobsey and Doe (1991: cited in 
Sobsey, 1994a) found that 76.9% (out of 107 sexual acts) of people with learning disabilities 
in their Canadian study had been abused more than once and 49.6% greater than 10 times. 
Incidence studies, such as Brown and Turk (1994), estimated that 60 new cases of sexual 
abuse might be reported each year in the UK. However, they admit that this may be an 
underestimate due to a lack of disclosure; difficulties in defining abuse and initiating 
proceedings.
Who are the victims / abusers?
Most studies have reported that it is women with learning disabilities in particular who are the 
victims. Brown and Turk (1994) found that 73% (61/84 cases) were women. Sobsey (1994a) 
found that 83% of 107 sexual offences against people with learning disabilities were against 
women. However, Beail and Warden (1998) found that 86% of victims of sexual abuse 
referred to their service were men with learning disabilities. They suggest that women may be 
overlooked, due to differences in subsequent behaviour. Men may be more likely to be 
referred to psychology departments for challenging behaviour, such as sexualised behaviour, 
whereas women may become depressed and less challenging for services.
The sexual abusers are commonly identified as men 97% (Brown & Turk, 1994) and 88.7% 
(Sobsey, 1994a). In particular, men with learning disabilities have been identified as the main 
perpetrators of abuse with people with learning disabilities (Thompson & Brown, 1997; 
McCarthy, 1993). Brown and Turk (1994) found that out of 84 cases which had sufficient 
evidence of abuse, 35 cases were committed by other service users, 15 by family members 
and 12 by staff / volunteers. In contrast, Sobsey (1994a) reported that people with learning 
disabilities committed only 6.7% of 107 acts of sexual abuse and that 25.2% were committed 
by disability staff, followed by family members (19.6%).
However, the detection of sexual abuse is a difficult area. Sexual abuse by service users may 
be easier to detect, due to it being more overt, with less available privacy (Thompson & 
Brown, 1997). Sexual abuse by staff may be less obvious, reflecting differences in the studies 
(Brown & Turk, 1994; Sobsey, 1994a). Brown and Turk (1994) also found that half the
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allegations of sexual abuse which did not have substantial evidence (25 cases), involved 
suspicions of family members.
Presentation of symptoms of sexual abuse may also differ from the general population and 
therefore affect awareness. Beail and Warden (1998) found that most clients were referred for 
behavioural problems. It was only in therapy that sexual abuse was uncovered. This is one 
area where clinical psychologists have had a major impact on the area of learning disabilities 
already, in attempting to understand the function and meaning of challenging behaviour (e.g. 
Emerson, 1998).
The role of clinical psychology
Clinical psychologists are involved at many levels of the lives of people with learning 
disabilities. They are involved in researching and changing attitudes towards people with 
learning disabilities; working to create better lives for people with learning disabilities in the 
community rather than in institutions; supporting carers of people with learning disabilities; as 
well as providing the more recent access to individual therapy. Therefore, it seems that when 
working with people with learning disabilities who have been abused and / or abuse others, 
the clinical psychologist’s role would need to cover all these different levels of working.
Sobsey (1994a) reports that 30.5% of cases of sexual abuse took place in environments 
resulting from the learning disability. It is important to consider what contributes to sexual 
abuse in order to decide appropriate interventions. An “ecological model” of sexual abuse 
(Sobsey, 1994a) appears to be a useful way to formulate sexual abuse amongst people with 
learning disabilities and illustrate where clinical psychologists should and have been 
contributing (Moss, 1998).
Sobsey (1994a) describes three levels to the model: 1) macrosystems (cultural factors); 2) 
exosystems (living environment); 3) microsystems (families, abuser-victim relationship).
Macrosystems (cultural factors)
Sobsey (1994a) describes attitudes as being very important. People tend to equate quality of 
life with intelligence. If someone’s life is already worthless, then it cannot be harmed by 
abuse. Brown (1991: cited in McCarthy, 1993) writes, “one cannot be sexually devalued if 
one has no value as a sexual being to begin with.” Using this context, Moss (1998) describes 
that clinical psychologists can tackle beliefs about the behaviour of people with learning 
disabilities and publicise work.
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As mentioned earlier, there is a belief that people with learning disabilities are asexual (Moss, 
1998). In fact, it was not until recently, that people contemplated the idea of people with 
learning disabilities being sexually abused and people had to “think the unthinkable” (Brown 
& Craft, 1989). Work from the Sex Education Team (SET), for example McCarthy (1993) 
and Thompson (1994) have enlightened people about the sex lives of people with learning 
disabilities. McCarthy (1993) describes sex as predominantly for the gratification of the man. 
Where there are two men involved having sex, again the sex appears to be for the pleasure of 
just one of the individuals (Thompson, 1994). Penetration occurs with a dry vagina or anus, 
making it a painful experience for those on the receiving end (McCarthy, 1993; Thomson, 
1994). There is also no private space for sexual activity, which results in it being rushed and 
no expectation of pleasure by the woman or man being penetrated. Sex purely for the 
gratification of one person would also count as sexual abuse (McCarthy, 1993).
Clinical psychologists contribute to the understanding that overt sexual behaviour or other 
challenging behaviour of people with learning disabilities may be the result of sexual abuse. 
Sobsey (1994a) found that out of 107 acts of sexual abuse, 58% of people showed signs of 
emotional distress, 16.9% withdrawal, 16.9% aggression, non-compliance, inappropriate 
sexual behaviour, and other behavioural problems. In addition, behaviour may tend to vary 
with gender, with women more likely to withdraw, become depressed or self-injure, whereas 
males may “act out” behaviour and cause more problems for carers (Beail & Warden, 1998). 
In this respect, the effects of sexual abuse seem similar to the general population (Moss, 
1998).
It is only in understanding that people with learning disabilities are sexual beings and are 
affected in similar ways by sexual abuse as the general population that abuse can be 
recognised; people can be protected and given access to support and therapeutic interventions. 
This is where the mini-culture of the living environment is an important area for clinical 
psychologists to contribute.
Exosystem (living environment)
Rindfleisch and Rabb (1984: cited in Sobsey, 1994a) reported people with learning disabilities 
to be twice as likely to be sexually abused in an institution as in the community. Although the 
vast majority of people have been resettled into the community now, this historical aspect 
cannot be ignored. People are often resettled with perpetrators of sexual abuse (Thompson, 
1997) and may be largely reliant on care staff. Familial isolation and financial but not 
emotional attachment of staff have both been identified as possible risk factors for sexual
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abuse (Sobsey, 1994a; Pillemer, 1985: cited in Sobsey, 1994a). Although there is less risk for 
sexual abuse in smaller accommodation e.g. group homes compared to institutions (Sobsey, 
1994a), there are several areas where clinical psychologists can have an impact. These are: 1) 
helping develop policies and procedures to protect against abuse; 2) guidance for staff about 
how to work with people with learning disabilities; 3) access to assertiveness and sexual rights 
education; 4) helping make services for survivors and perpetrators of sexual abuse accessible 
to people with learning disabilities (Moss, 1998).
Policies and procedures
Policies include vulnerable adult policies, where sexual abuse is suspected, leading to 
protection and investigation. This appears to be a very important area in the literature. 
Clinical psychologists have helped identify the need for guidance and training for staff in 
reporting suspicions of sexual abuse (McConkey & Ryan, 2001). McConkey and Ryan
(2001) found that in their study of 150 care staff, more than 50% highlighted clear guidelines 
and more training as the two main ways of increasing their confidence in dealing with issues 
of sexual abuse. Only 11% of direct care staff had had any training on vulnerable adults. In 
addition, Brown and Thompson (1997) report that service responses to sexual abuse often fail 
because of inconsistent perception and assessment of risk by staff members.
Perception of risk has focused on increasing staff knowledge about sexual abuse and 
identifying staff attitudes towards sexuality and sexual abuse, which are seen as important in 
guiding their behaviour.
Staff training
Carer’s attributions may influence whether they feel the desire to help someone with 
challenging behaviour. For example, if carers perceive that a person’s challenging behaviour 
is within their control, then they may react angrily and negatively to this individual. If they 
perceive that this behaviour is out of the person’s control, then they may react with sympathy 
and understanding (Stanley & Standen, 2000). This is an important area for clinical 
psychology to contribute to, especially in light of the possible presentation of sexual abuse as 
challenging behaviour (e.g. Sobsey, 1994a; Beail & Warden, 1998). Hogg, Campbell, Cullen, 
and Hudson (2001) ran an open learning course for a range of staff working with people with 
learning disabilities. The aim was to focus on increasing staff knowledge about sexual abuse 
amongst people with learning disabilities. This involved agreed definitions of sexual abuse; 
educating about antecedents and consequences of sexual abuse; what procedures to follow 
once sexual abuse is suspected; consequences and effects of sexual abuse for staff, carers,
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victims, perpetrators and the mini-culture of the environment they work in. The course also 
focused on how to reduce sexual abuse in practice. The effect of training on staff attitudes 
was also assessed.
Although staff attitudes were largely in agreement with the course teaching at the pre-test 
measure, they found that staff knowledge of sexual abuse was significantly increased, as well 
as the need to accept formal practices in dealing with abuse. There was also increased 
confidence in dealing with incidents and mindfulness of the vulnerability of people with 
learning disabilities to sexual abuse. Whilst there was an increase in the vast majority of areas 
of knowledge, there was no significant improvement in knowledge of why people with 
learning disabilities were more at risk of sexual abuse than in the general population, or 
knowing the ratio of men to women victims. Staff did improve significantly on knowing who 
are the main perpetrators of sexual abuse amongst people with learning disabilities according 
to the literature. However, there was a lack of agreement that “normal sex” for men and 
women with learning disabilities can be abusive, which the literature is attempting to make 
people aware of (e.g. McCarthy, 1993; Thompson, 1994). However, importantly following 
the training there was increased agreement to acknowledging that staff may sexually abuse 
people with learning disabilities and that junior staff may feel unable to report suspicions of 
sexual abuse by more senior members of staff (Hogg et al., 2001). Interestingly, there was 
also an increased agreement to a statement that staff may react negatively to any sexual 
expression by their clients. There has been some concern that training staff in identifying and 
preventing abuse may lead to an over-cautious approach where all sexuality is seen as risky 
(Craft, 1987: cited in McConkey & Ryan, 2001).
The staff in the study were selected by their trusts to take part in the course. Whether there 
were any biases, for example choosing those most likely to benefit, in terms of willingness to 
change views and wanting to leam is uncertain. As the sample may not have been randomly 
chosen, it makes it unclear whether the results are likely to generalise to other members of 
staff. Although knowledge was maintained over 6-month period the authors suggest that it 
would also have been useful to see whether the course had actually impacted on practice 
(Hogg et al., 2001), particularly whether training just some members of staff could effect the 
mini-culture and the other members of staff. It is also not clear whether it was highlighted 
that people with learning disabilities who abuse other people with learning disabilities may 
have been abused themselves (e.g. McCarthy, 1993).
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Helping carers to understand the process of recovery of someone who has been sexually 
abused is also a possible valuable contribution from clinical psychologists (Moss, 1998). 
Understanding challenging behaviour exhibited by someone who has been sexually abused is 
important for carers to facilitate support and prevent any punitive strategies. Clinical 
psychologists can educate staff about the stages of recovery following sexual abuse and help 
with reacting to these behaviours. This may include numbness, disbelief, periods of distress, 
tearfulness, intense anger, rage, shouting, aggression and self-harm. However, once memories 
are remembered and processed, then the person is usually able to move on (Moss, 1998).
People with learning disabilities also need access to sex education, assertiveness training and 
sexual rights. There is often an acceptance of unwanted sexual contact by individuals (e.g. 
McCarthy, 1993). Without knowing what behaviour is acceptable, people with learning 
disabilities may not know what is sexually abusive behaviour. This is important, as a large 
part of disclosure of sexual abuse comes from people with learning disabilities (66% out of 84 
cases and only 25% staff, Brown & Turk, 1994). Clinical psychologists are often responsible 
for running groups to inform people with learning disabilities about sex and their sexual 
rights.
Educating people with learning disabilities
As has been mentioned, there has been almost an acceptance amongst people with learning 
disabilities that sexual pleasure is one-sided (McCarthy, 1993; Thompson, 1994). It may be 
hard for women with learning disabilities to think of themselves in a positive sexual sense or 
to acquire protective skills with negative attitudes towards people with learning disabilities 
after years of abuse, exploitation and coercion (McCarthy, 1993). Men as victims should also 
not be forgotten (e.g. Thomson, 1994; Beail & Warden, 1998). Therefore, there is both a need 
to educate people about their bodies and their rights in sexual relationships (McCarthy, 1993).
Sexual abuse prevention programmes are an area where clinical psychologists can aid people 
with learning disabilities. Lumley, Miltenberger, Long, Rapp, & Roberts (1998) designed and 
evaluated a sexual abuse prevention program for six women with learning disabilities. 
Training focused on preventing abuse from caregivers. This incorporated teaching 
participants to respond appropriately to a sexual lure by 1) verbally refusing the request; 2) 
leaving the situation; 3) reporting the incident to a trusted adult e.g. staff member or care 
manager. Training initially took the form of sex education about body parts, sexual behaviour 
and appropriate and inappropriate sexual relationships (especially someone who has power 
over them e.g. staff). Then participants practised responding appropriately to different sexual
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lures with feedback, until they were able to do so to criterion (responses 1 to 3). All 
participants learned the skills and reached criterion. However, when followed up using 
“naturalistic probes”, i.e. testing the participants unaware in their living environment, they 
failed to reach the criterion although they had passed a role-play situation at follow-up. 
Despite not fully generalising the skills, half of the participants did show some improvement 
from a pre-test “naturalistic probe”. For some, it may be that it is hard to overcome the years 
of coercion, which McCarthy (1993) refers to. However, a fellow client sexually assaulted 
one participant during the training. The participant did say “no” and unfortunately although 
not able to get out of the situation was able to report the incident to a member of staff as a 
result of the training (Lumley et al., 1998). Clinical psychologists can continue to further 
such programs and increase their efficacy.
Clinical psychologists are also contributing to sexual abuse prevention as part of general 
safety training, such as “Keeping Safe in the Community” groups (Long & Holmes, in press). 
After all, now more people with learning disabilities are living in local communities, they are 
open to possible abuse from members of the public as well as other service users, staff and 
family. This group format includes identifying people who it may not be safe to trust (e.g. 
strangers); that people should not be able to touch people’s bodies if they do not want them to 
or like it; and how to seek help if they are in an uncomfortable or dangerous situation. The 
group also includes practice at assertiveness in the form of role-playing how to deal with 
potentially dangerous situations, such as a stranger inviting the person back home or dealing 
with unwanted touching. These role-plays are videoed and then played back to the group, so 
that the performance can be judged and commented on by all participants. There was a 
significant improvement in knowledge of keeping safe following the group, which was 
maintained 4-6 months later (Long & Holmes, unpublished). Whether these skills can be 
generalised though to potential situations is unclear (e.g. Lumley et al., 1998).
The sexual abuser
As far as the abuser is concerned, there is also a possible role for clinical psychologists to be 
involved in co-ordinating or contributing to the care of people with learning disabilities. 
People may have been found guilty of sexual abuse or they may be suspected of sexual abuse, 
but there have been no criminal proceedings (Thompson, 1997). Work may involve 
multidisciplinary work with probation (Lindsay, Neilson, Morrison, & Smith, 1998) and care 
staff, as well as other professionals, such as speech and language therapists. Whether 
someone with learning disabilities involved is formally charged seems to depend on whom the 
offence has been committed against. Sexual abuse towards women in the general public and
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children are more likely to reach court than sexual abuse of other people with learning 
disabilities or female members of staff (Thompson, 1997). This is an area to which clinical 
psychologists can contribute greatly, in terms of both increasing understanding of the sexually 
abusive behaviour of the individual and risk assessment. At present services may be ignoring 
even the most serious forms of assault by people with learning disabilities against other 
people with learning disabilities, but are compelled to act when the sexual abuse is directed at 
someone more able, such as a member of public (Thompson, 1997). Indeed vulnerable 
people, for example with communication difficulties or a lack of assertiveness may be living 
with or close to known abusers (McCarthy & Thompson, 1996: cited in Thompson, 1997).
Clinical psychologists can also contribute to understanding the response of staff teams to 
sexual offenders with learning disabilities. Clinical psychologists can help to reflect on the 
psychological transference encountered in caring for someone convicted or suspected of 
sexual offending, including denial, collusion and desires to punish the offenders, (Corbett, 
1995) rather than act, understand and help. Clinical psychologists can facilitate understanding 
and empathic support for the sexual abuser at a time that may be confusing and distressing for 
the individual.
Microsystem (victim and abuser level)
Clinical psychologists can have different roles at the level of someone with a learning 
disability who has been sexually abused and / or sexual abusing. They may be involved in 
facilitating the disclosure process by an individual and or providing therapeutic involvement 
(Corbett, Cottis, & Morris, 1996). Clinical psychologists may also be involved in referring 
people to an external organisation (e.g. RESPOND). RESPOND provides an individual or 
group psychotherapeutic service for people with learning disabilities who have been sexually 
abused and / or sexually abusing. The author has chosen to focus on the therapeutic aspects 
when considering the sexually abused and / or sexually abusing individual, which usually 
consist of individual or group therapy.
Individual work 
Sexual abusers
Techniques for the non-learning disabled population, usually use cognitive restructuring 
techniques, for example victim empathy to challenge the distorted cognitions that sexual 
offenders may have formed about their behaviour (Bremble & Rose, 1999). This work 
includes working with distorted cognitions concerning the victim, such as, “they enjoyed it,” 
or, “it won’t cause them any harm,” (Lindsay, Olley, Jack, Morrison, & Smith, 1998). Until
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recently, the use of such therapeutic techniques seems to have been a rare occurrence for 
people with learning disabilities (Thompson & Brown, 1997). The use of cognitive-behaviour 
therapy (CBT) for people with learning disabilities is achieving increasing acceptance 
(Stenfert Kroese, Dagnan, & Loumidis, 1997). If the acceptance and contribution of CBT is 
anything like that in the non-learning disabled population, then clinical psychologists will 
have a large role to play. Bremble and Rose (1999) report using CBT for 5 out of 19 cases of 
sexual abusing. Whilst they report a certain amount of success for a range of interventions, 
they fail to report whether there were any differences in outcome according to the therapeutic 
input. However, Lindsay, et al., (1998b) advocate the use of group rather than individual 
therapy (see group work section), finding better success for group CBT versus individual 
CBT. They only base this on comparing the treatment of two individuals though. The man 
who received individual CBT reoffended after 9 months.
The application of psychodynamic theory is also an invaluable possible contribution from 
clinical psychologists. There is a need for recognising power dynamics, trauma, broken 
attachment, death and unresolved grief when working with sexual offenders (Corbett, 1995).
Sexually abused individuals
Providing psychotherapeutic input to people with learning disabilities has been slowly 
increasing, with clinical psychologists playing an important role (e.g. Beail, 1995). Much of 
the literature though discusses the process and not outcomes (Beail, 1995). However, Beail 
(1994: cited in Beail, 1995) reported a decrease of symptoms on a simplified version of the 
Symptom Checklist (SCL-90-R) for a man with a learning disability who had been ritually 
abused. The number of symptoms dropped from 70 (out of 90) to 32 following 40 sessions of 
psychodynamic psychotherapy. The possibility of therapeutic involvement with people with 
even severe or profound learning disabilities has been highlighted by the work of the 
psychotherapist Valerie Sinason (1989; 1992).
Group work
Sexually abused individuals
Again, clinical psychologists are involved in setting up and running groups for people with 
learning disabilities who have been sexually abused. Group work in the literature seems to 
have mainly focused on women with learning disabilities who have been sexually abused, 
although the need for input for men with learning disabilities is apparent (e.g. Beail & 
Warden, 1998).
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Some groups have attempted to facilitate general improvement in terms of self-esteem, 
assertiveness and empowerment in women with learning disabilities who have been sexually 
abused (e.g. Barber, Jenkins, & Jones, 2000). After all, being passive and lacking 
assertiveness have been factors associated with risk for sexual abuse (Thompson, 1997). 
Where abuse has already taken place, then this appears to be an important area to cover. The 
group aimed to achieve this, by providing an environment for therapeutic change, where there 
is a feeling of trust and acceptance by all group members (Rogers, 1977: cited in Barber et al.,
2000). Information was also provided about sexual knowledge and health; assertiveness and 
self-protection. Skills were again practised through role-plays. Throughout there was 
opportunity for discussion. However, although there was an increase in assertiveness and 
self-esteem, this was not maintained at a 3-month follow-up.
Other groups have started off as sex education groups, but have developed into a survivor’s 
group for sexual abuse, following disclosure of sexual abuse by members of the group (e.g. 
Millard, 1994). They report positive results. Group members fed back that the experience of 
talking about sexual abuse had been beneficial. Participants also felt more assertive and 
developed a greater amount of choice in their lives (Millard, 1994). The author also suggests 
that the experience of learning to value yourself as a person is an important outcome from the 
group and necessary for the healing process. Clinical psychologists can contribute towards 
this healing process, by enabling groups to explore emotions and beliefs not only about the 
sexual abuse, but what it means in general to be regarded as a person with a learning disability 
(Millard, 1994).
Sexual abusers
Clinical psychologists may also contribute to group work that educates people with learning 
disabilities who sexually abuse, such as sex education and / or therapeutic work. At present, 
there appears to be no evidence that well-trusted methods used with the forensic population 
are effective for people with intellectual disabilities (Clare & Murphy, 1998). More recent 
work (Murphy, 2001), aims to develop cognitive-behavioural group work for people with 
learning disabilities. The group work aims to cover sexual education, as well as assessing and 
challenging cognitive distortions and enhancing victim empathy. These have all been found 
to be successful with forensic populations (Murphy, 2001). The clinical psychologist can 
again adapt therapeutic styles to make them accessible to people with learning disabilities and 
individually tailored. This often includes pictorial presentation, to compensate for any 
difficulties in verbal communication (Stenfert Kroese et al., 1997). Sexual offenders with 
learning disabilities appear to benefit from adapted cognitive-behavioural therapy (Lindsay,
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1999; Lindsay et al., 1998a; Lindsay et al., 1998b). Lindsay et al. (1998b) report that group 
work may be more beneficial than individual work. In a group format other members can be 
therapeutic, by being both empathic and also challenging to other participants. There are also 
valuable opportunities to develop social skills, as many sex offenders may be isolated 
individuals (Lindsay et al., 1998b). There also appears to be a more light-hearted feel to the 
group, allowing brief respite from the intensity of individual sessions as well. In terms of 
effectiveness, none of the six men reoffended in a 4-year period after treatment.
Conclusion
This essay has shown that the role of the clinical psychologist with people with learning 
disabilities who have been sexually abused and / or sexually abusing is varied and can involve 
many different roles. In line with the many different levels that clinical psychologists work at 
when working with people with learning disabilities, an approach to sexual abuse has been 
considered to take this into account. An “ecological model” of sexual abuse (Sobsey, 1994a), 
has been used to show the many areas where clinical psychologists do and can contribute. 
This has been at the level of culture (macrosystem) - promoting and publicising work and 
changing attitudes; the living environment (exosystem) - educating and supporting people 
with learning disabilities and staff teams; and at the level of the victim and the abuser 
(microsystem) - with individual and group therapeutic interventions.
Since people were forced to “think the unthinkable” (Brown & Craft, 1989), sexual abuse 
amongst people with learning disabilities has been a rapidly increasing research area. Clinical 
psychologists have had a large involvement in this growth. The challenge is to take this area 
forward by promoting awareness and understanding, and developing effective interventions to 
decrease the vulnerability of people with learning disabilities to sexual abuse. At the same 
time, it is also vital to provide input to those who sexually abuse others. Facilitating the 
sexual expression of people with learning disabilities will be another major factor. Perhaps, it 
is only when people with learning disabilities are regarded and treated as sexual beings that 
real progress will be made and their vulnerability to sexual abuse will be reduced.
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Introduction
Normal fear reactions are important for the survival of species. However, anxiety disorders 
are considered to be fear reactions that have become maladaptively responsive to other forms 
of perceived threat (Rosen & Schulkin, 1998), such as the negative evaluation by others 
(social phobia). Anxiety is considered to involve three main components: physiological (e.g. 
increased heart rate), behavioural (e.g. avoidance or freezing), and cognitive (e.g. 
hypervigilence and appraisal of danger) (Salkovskis, 1996). Research reports that some adults 
describe the onset of their anxiety disorder to be dated back to their childhood (Bourdon, 
Boyd, Rae, Bums, Thompson, & Locke, 1988: cited in Kashdan & Herbert, 2001). The 
course of childhood anxiety disorders can often be chronic as well (e.g. OCD, Clark, 2000). It 
therefore seems likely that anxiety disorders in adulthood are a reflection of those disorders in 
childhood. This is often assumed to be the case in the literature (e.g. social phobia, Kashdan 
& Herbert, 2001). Theory and treatment of childhood anxiety disorders has lagged behind 
research into anxiety disorders in adulthood (Shafran, 2001) and may partly explain the 
transference of existing adult knowledge about anxiety disorders into the child domain. 
Nevertheless, does the emerging child research suggest that similar theoretical constructs can 
explain the development of anxiety disorders in children and adults? Is similar treatment 
effective for both client groups? This essay will focus on two anxiety disorders, obsessive- 
compulsive disorder (OCD) and social phobia, as these are anxiety disorders that span 
different stages of childhood. Similarities and differences in the theory and treatment of these 
disorders will be discussed to see if anxiety disorders are fundamentally different in childhood 
and adulthood. The essay will concentrate on psychological theory and treatment, in 
particular cognitive and behavioural theories and treatment, as there is controlled data 
supporting the efficacy of these approaches (Labellarte, Ginsburg, Walkup, & Riddle, 1999).
Obsessive-compulsive disorder
Obsessive compulsive disorder is considered to consist of obsessions and compulsions. 
Obsessions are described as, “recurrent, unwanted intrusive thoughts, ideas, images, or 
impulses that the person experiences as ego-dystonic and intensely distressing (American 
Psychiatric Association, 1994). The person is horrified by these intrusions and tries to resist 
them (Shafran, 2001). Often the person engages in compulsions, “repetitive physical or 
mental acts that the person feels driven to performing in response to the obsession or 
according to certain rules (American Psychiatric Association, 1994).” Usually obsessions and 
compulsions occur together (Clark, 2000; Shafran, 2001). Obsessions can occur by 
themselves without obvious compulsions in adults (Foa & Kozak, 1995) and compulsions
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may occur without obvious obsessions in children (Shafran, 2001). Prevalence rates are 
roughly similar with 1-4 % of children having OCD (Shafran, 2001; Carr, 1999), compared to 
approximately 2-3% of adults (Clark, 2000). The male to female ratio is approximately 3:2 in 
children (Geller, Biederman, Jones, Park, Schwarz, Shapiro, & Coffey, 1998). The ratio is 
approximately equal in adults (Rasmussen & Eisen, 1992: cited in Shafran, 2001). The mean 
age of onset is 10 years in children and 21 years in adults (Geller et al., 1998). However, 30- 
80% of adults recall the onset of symptoms before age 18 (Rasmussen & Eisen, 1992: cited in 
Shafran, 2001). There is also co-morbidity with tic disorders, such as Gilles de la Tourette 
syndrome in children (Shafran, 2001). However, are there theoretical differences that take 
into account these differences in presentation in both client groups?
Differences in adult and child theories of OCD
The main distinction between the theories of OCD in children and adults is the aetiology of 
the disorder. The most dominant child theory takes a neurobehavioural approach, whereas the 
most dominant adult theory draws from cognitive and behavioural theory (Shafran, 2001). 
This is an unusual distinction, as treatment approaches with both children and adults are 
considered cognitive behavioural, as will be discussed later.
The theory of childhood OCD revolves mainly around possible dysfunction in the basal 
ganglia of the brain, an area that is involved in releasing inhibition on muscles to allow 
movement to occur (Gerfen & Wilson, 1996). Particular attention is paid to the role of the 
immune system, with children who have developed OCD or tic disorders following group A 
beta-haemolytic streptococcal infections (Garvey, Giedd, & Swedo, 1998: cited in Shafran, 
2001). This has been termed as a paediatric auto-immune neuropsychiatric disorder associated 
with streptococcal infection (PANDAS). Antibodies that are produced in response to the 
infection are suggested to cross react with the basal ganglia and lead to OCD or tics in 
children who are genetically susceptible (Garvey et al., 1998: cited in Shafran, 2001). 
Support for this theory comes from increased numbers of antibodies found in children with tic 
disorders versus normal controls (Kiessling, Marcotte, & Culpepper, 1993: cited in Shafran,
2001) and the high rate of OCD in Sydenham’s chorea (Swedo, Rapoport, Leonard, Lenane, 
& Cheslow, 1989: cited in Shafran, 2001). Whilst this might explain the occurrence of 
compulsions, it has difficulty explaining the occurrence of obsessions, unless they can be 
considered as rationalisation of the compulsion (Bolton, 1996). With obsessions and 
compulsions usually being linked to areas such as checking, washing, repeating and touching 
(Shafran, 2001), it seems strange that neurological damage would be consistently so specific
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in its impact on daily functioning.
The main adult theory of OCD views the disorder as arising from the maladaptive appraisal of 
normal intrusions (thoughts, images, ideas, or impulses) (Salkovskis, Wroe, Gledhill, 
Morrison, Forrester, Richards, Reynolds, & Thorpe, 2000), for example that may concern 
harming others, or exposure to contamination (Clark, 2000). The theory proposes that people 
with OCD interpret the intrusions as the person being responsible for harm occurring to 
themselves or others. This then leads to “neutralising” behaviours to prevent the feared event 
from occurring, such as compulsive checking, washing or engaging in rituals. Assumptions 
formed from early life experience, relating to responsibility, harm and also about the meaning 
of the intrusive thoughts are also implicated in the adult model (Salkovskis et al., 2000). 
Examples include the belief that thinking something (e.g. stabbing your partner) is as bad as 
doing it, or not acting to prevent a danger that you foresee makes you responsible for that 
possible harm (Salkovskis et al., 2000). Selective attention to threat, trying to suppress the 
intrusions and seeking reassurance can also be seen to maintain the anxiety (Salkovskis et al., 
2000). Figure 1. shows the cognitive model of obsessive-compulsive disorder. (Salkovskis et 
al., 2000).
44
Child and Family Essay
Mood changes
distress, anxiety, 
depression
Attention and 
reasoning biases 
(looking for trouble)
Neutralising actions
(rituals, reassurance, 
mental argument)
Intrusive thoughts, images, urges, 
doubts
Early experiences
(making you vulnerable to 
OCD)
Counterproductive 
safety strategies
(thought suppression, 
impossible criteria, 
avoidance)
(what started the OCD off)
Critical incidents
Misinterpretation of significance of 
intrusions -  responsibility for action
Assumptions, general beliefs 
(e.g. Not preventing disaster is as bad as 
making it happen; better safe than sorry)
Figure 1.
Thus the main adult theoretical model views OCD as emanating from early experience and the 
development of beliefs. The child theory considers the aetiology of OCD as possibly
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neurological in origin. However, children tend to have less insight into their disorder than 
adults (Foa & Kozak, 1995). This makes it harder to assess whether belief systems and 
cognitions are involved in the origin and maintenance of OCD in children. This difference 
could be due to cognitive immaturity in children (Geller et al., 1998).
There is a large difference in the amount of research into the adult theory of OCD, whereas 
the child literature is very lacking. The neurobehavioural hypothesis is not easily testable 
(Shafran, 1998). Where the two theoretical stances overlap is with the theory of maintenance 
of the disorder and the subsequent treatment.
Similarities in adult and child theories of OCD
Adult theory of OCD explains people engaging in compulsions as a means to prevent a feared 
consequence, usually of harm to self or others (Salkovskis et al., 2000). Similarities have 
been made with “magical thinking” in children, where children perceive that they have control 
over actions which they do not. This can be considered as being a pre-rational developmental 
stage (Bolton, 1996). As children develop, they acquire more rational thought. This could be 
likened to beliefs in the adult cognitive model about over-responsibility for actions. Magical 
thinking can still be seen in adults, in the form of superstition, which like compulsions serve 
to lessen anxiety and increase control over events (Bolton, 1996). However, superstitions in 
children are distinct from obsessions. They are not as distressing, do not last as long and do 
not interfere with activities (Leonard, 1989: cited in Bolton, 1996).
Compulsions can be seen to play a role in the maintenance of OCD in both children and 
adolescents. Whether obsessions trigger compulsions, or obsessions follow compulsions as a 
form of rationalisation, they seem to become associated with the lessening of anxiety. 
Exposing people to the feared stimuli and preventing them from carrying out the compulsions 
forms the basis of treatment for both children and adults (Shafran, 1998). There are also 
certain differences in the approaches, which will also be discussed.
Similarities in the treatment of adult and childhood OCD
For both children and adults, cognitive behaviour therapy is seen as the treatment of choice 
(Clark, 2000; March, Franklin, Nelson, & Foa, 2001). Exposure to the feared stimuli (e.g. 
touching the sole of a shoe that the person fears is contaminated and has been avoiding) and 
preventing the person from performing the compulsion (e.g. washing their hands) (response 
prevention) form the basis of the approach in both adults and children (Shafran, 2001).
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Habituation of the anxiety will occur, as repeated exposure to the stimulus will be associated 
with lessening anxiety (Clark, 2000). Reviews suggest that approximately 80% of patients 
show an 80% reduction in symptom severity after exposure and response prevention (ERP) 
(Foa, Franklin, & Kozak, 1998: cited in Clark, 2000).
With children, ERP is the main component of CBT with some adaptations (Shafran, 1998). 
The child may build up preventing the response or compulsion for 5 minutes, 15 minutes etc. 
and the child may use a fear thermometer to assess the amount of anxiety when not 
performing the compulsion (Shafran, 1998). Franklin, Kozak, Cashman, Coles, Rheingold, 
and Foa, 1998: cited in March et al., 2001) examining the efficacy of CBT with 14 children, 
found a mean reduction of 67% on scores on the Yale-Brown Obsessive-Compulsive Scale 
(CY-BOCS) at post-treatment and 62% at 9 month follow-up. This is the main measure of 
efficacy in child OCD studies (March et al., 2001). This treatment involved exposure and 
ritual prevention. However, eight children were currently medicated with selective serotonin 
reuptake inhibitors (SSRI), which is the pharmacological treatment of choice (Williams & 
Allsop, 1999). There were no differences though in children who were medicated or not. 
Evidence for the effectiveness of CBT with children is weak and needs to be compared 
against other interventions (March et al., 2001). Whilst CBT is considered effective in both 
children and adults, the CBT involved has differences. This difference is the increased 
cognitive emphasis in CBT with the adult population (e.g. Salkovskis et al., 2000).
Differences in the treatment of adult and child OCD
A major difference in the treatment of adult OCD with CBT is the greater focus on cognitive 
elements (Shafran, 1998). Cognitive techniques, such as Socratic questioning, identification 
of negative automatic thoughts, evidence gathering and behavioural experiments to challenge 
the client’s belief that their obsession is threatening and must be controlled in order to prevent 
harm (Clark, 2000). The client’s appraisal that they are responsible to prevent the harm to 
themselves or others is a key feature of dysfunctional beliefs in adults with OCD (Salkovskis 
et al., 2000). In CBT with children, little emphasis appears to be placed on the cognitive 
element (e.g. March et al., 2001). The cognitive element consists of self-talk or “bossing 
back” OCD (March & Mulle, 1996) allowing the child to gain control over the OCD. OCD is 
described to children as “brain hiccups”. Li this sense, OCD is externalised, taking blame 
away from the child (White & Epston, 1990: cited in March & Mulle, 1996). There is no 
consideration of the childs’ beliefs about being responsible for preventing harm, even though 
childhood obsessions seem to be very similar to adult themes e.g. concerning contamination
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and checking (Shafran, 2001). This may be due to perceiving children as not cognitively 
developed enough to have insight into their obsessions (Foa & Kozak, 1995). This may be as 
a result of the diagnostic criteria of childhood OCD, which does not require insight into the 
condition (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) and the difficulty in assessing cognitions 
in children. Children may be reluctant to share their worries (Kendall & Chansky, 1991). 
This may be even more so in OCD where someone may fear having those thoughts or 
intrusions in the first place. Another possible difference in children may be that their fear is 
more present-orientated, due to more concrete thinking (Carr, 1999). With adults with OCD, 
the anxiety is connected with responsibility for an event in the future, possibly very far away, 
for example blasphemous thoughts leading to eternal damnation (Salkovskis, 1996). 
However, from ages 5-7 children develop a capacity to think in concrete logical terms and 
may develop “media-based” fears of disease and epidemic (Carr, 1999), which may be related 
to fear of contamination in OCD.
A more systemic treatment approach is also taken with children. Parents are included in at 
least two treatment sessions, to assist the child in not completing the compulsions and 
rewarding them for not doing so (March et al., 2001). Rates of first-degree relatives of 
children and adolescents with OCD are higher in children than adults, although the majority 
affected do not have a first-degree relative with the disorder (Pauls, Alsobrook, Goodman, 
Rasmussen & Leckman, 1995: cited in Shafran, 2001). However, the effectiveness of 
involving the family in interventions versus individual interventions has not been investigated.
Conclusion: OCD in childhood and adulthood
Differences do exist between the theory and treatment of OCD in children and adults. The 
neurobehavioural approach to childhood OCD differs from the more cognitive behavioural 
approach to OCD in adults. Similarities in terms of magical thinking and responsibility have 
been discussed, as well as the overlapping behavioural elements. Therefore, it does not seem 
that OCD is fundamentally different in children and adults. Greater integration of theory and 
treatment, seems to be important to develop effective treatment for OCD, linked to a strong 
theoretical base (Shafran, 2001). Research into adult OCD, particularly the cognitive model 
(Salkovskis et al., 2000) is the most empirically tested and supported, yet the 
neurobehavioural approach to OCD is more dominant in children (Shafran, 2001).
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Social phobia
Social phobia is “a marked and persistent fear of social or performance situations in which 
embarrassment may occur” (American Psychiatric Association, 1994). Greater than 13% of 
people are believed to meet diagnostic criteria for social phobia at some point in their lives 
(Kessler, McGonagle, Zhao, Nelson, Hughes, Eshelman, Wittchen, & Kendler, 1994: cited in 
Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). Social phobia has a lower mean age of onset than other anxiety 
disorders of 15.5 years of age (Kashdan & Herbert, 2001). Social phobia has lagged behind 
other disorders in terms of research, probably as a result of it only being included more 
recently as a formal psychiatric diagnosis (Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). The disorder may have 
been minimised, due to the common experience of social anxiety (Zerbe, 1994). Presentation 
may differ in children, adolescents and adults (Kashdan & Herbert, 2001). Children may 
present with irritability, crying, inflexibility, or somatic symptoms, whereas adolescents may 
present with fighting, truancy, or antisocial behaviour. Does the theory and treatment of 
social phobia consider it as fundamentally different in childhood and adulthood?
Similarities in the theory of adult and child social phobia
The most dominant understanding of social phobia draws from cognitive and behavioural 
theories. A cognitive behavioural model has good empirical support with both adult and child 
social phobia (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997; Velting & Albano, 2001; 
Spence, Donovan, & Brechman-Toussaint, 1999). The childhood theory of social phobia 
considers the majority of aspects of the adult theory.
The key component of the adult model of social phobia considers people seeing themselves as 
social objects and therefore focusing their attention on themselves, when there is a threat of 
being evaluated by others (Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). They believe that others view them as 
they perceive themselves, i.e. performing badly and appearing very anxious (Clark & Wells, 
1995). Due to self-focused attention, adults with social phobia fail to spot signs of approval 
from the audience (Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). The unique aspect of social phobia, is that the 
feared occurrence can occur, unlike other anxiety disorders. Anxiety can lead to poorer 
performance (blushing, unsteady voice) and also appearing less friendly in social situations, 
by making less eye contact or by not revealing much personal information (Clark & Wells, 
1995). Adults with social phobia also appear to engage in safety-behaviours to prevent feared 
outcomes, e.g. gripping their glass tightly when they are down the pub, to prevent people from 
seeing them shaking. These can actually increase the feared behaviour, by making the person 
shake even more (Clark & Wells, 1995). Before feared events, adults with social phobia
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appear to have a biased recall of past failures and imagine present failure. They also tend to 
tease apart their performance afterwards, focusing on negative aspects (Clark & Wells, 1995). 
Dysfunctional assumptions (if I make a mistake others will reject me) and self-schemata (I am 
a failure) are also considered as critical in the adult cognitive model of social phobia. Figure 
2. shows the model of social phobia by Clark & Wells (1995) drawn upon in this essay.
SOCIAL SITUATION
Behavioural
symptoms
Activates assumptions
Perceived social danger
Somatib and
cognitive
symptoms
PROCESSING OF SELF 
AS SOCIAL OBJECT
Figure 2.
The mean age of onset of social phobia is considered to be in adolescence (Turner, Beidel, 
Cooley, Woody, & Messer, 1994). Therefore, there is considerable overlap between the adult 
and child theories of social phobia. Developmental theory suggests that children are able to 
consider other people’s perspectives, foresee and become concerned about negative evaluation 
around age eight (Bennet & Gillingham, 1991: cited in Velting & Albano, 2001). During 
adolescence, children become aware of their appearance and behaviour becoming a source of 
evaluation (Crozier & Burnham, 1990: cited in Velting & Albano, 2001).
Similar features of the cognitive model have been found in both children and adults. Clark 
and Wells (1995) report that adults with social phobia have been found to interpret ambiguous 
social situations more negatively and negative situations more catastrophically than controls.
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They have also found more negative self-evaluative thoughts (e.g. I’m boring), although not 
regarding others disliking them. Adults with social phobia have been rated by observers to 
have performed less well than controls on social tasks, but still to have overestimated their 
poor performance (Stopa & Clark, 1993). Lucock and Salkovskis (1988) have found 
cognitive distortions in adults that are specific to socially evaluative situations and do not 
represent a general negative bias.
Spence, Donovan, and Brechman-Toussaint (1999) also found a higher level of negative self­
talk with children with social phobia. This was on tasks that involved social evaluation, such 
as reading out loud and performing role-plays that required the children to be assertive. 
Children with social phobia also expected to perform less well than non-anxious controls and 
evaluated their performance afterwards more negatively. Children with social phobia were 
also less likely to receive positive outcomes from their interactions with peers, such as being 
invited to parties. Epkins (1996) also found higher levels of negative cognitions in socially 
anxious children than non-anxious controls. Epkins (1996) found content specificity in 
socially anxious children versus dysphoric children, as well as personalisation and 
overgeneralisation thinking biases. However, Epkin’s sample represents children with social 
anxiety, rather than diagnosed social phobia. No research has investigated safety-behaviours 
in children and adolescents. If they exist, they may be less sophisticated, due to cognitive 
development, or overt avoidance may be central in younger children.
Differences in the theory of adult and child social phobia
Adult theory focuses more on cognitive biases, self-focused attention and safety behaviours 
that may lead to impaired performance in social situations and lead to confirmation of poor 
expectations of performance (e.g. Clark & Wells, 1995). The theory of social phobia in 
children considers deficits in actual social skills existing, as well as distorted thinking (Spence 
et al., 1999). Spence et al. (1999) found that children with social phobia were rated as less 
socially skilled than non-anxious children and were less likely to chooses assertive responses 
on an assertiveness questionnaire. They responded with fewer words when prompted, took 
part in fewer school social interactions and initiated social interactions less frequently. 
Spence et al. (1999) propose that deficits in social skills lead to reduced success in social 
situations and subsequent negative expectations. Avoidance of situations may then accentuate 
the problem by providing limited opportunity to practice the limited social skills. It is 
uncertain whether actual deficits exist. Rapee and Heimberg (1997) suggest that social skills 
deficits in adults may not be pervasive and may be linked to specific situations without clearly
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defined rules. People with social phobia may perform well on tasks that require less working 
memory, e.g. giving a speech compared to socialising at a party, as anxiety can impair 
performance on tasks necessitating high levels of working memory (Eysenck, 1991: cited in 
Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). Stopa and Clark (1993) found that observers rated adults with 
social phobia as more socially negative than controls and recommended training in 
conversational skills. However, it is uncertain in the adult theory whether social skills deficits 
exist before the onset of anxiety, or are a consequence of the anxiety, self-focused attention 
and safety behaviours. Rapee and Heimberg (1997) only acknowledge the possibility of 
social skills deficit in their model of social phobia if the person has chronically avoided social 
situations leading to an underdevelopment of social skills.
Some adults with social phobia report childhood shyness (Clark & Wells, 1995). It is possible 
that social phobia may be just shyness in childhood. However, people who are shy tend to 
pay attention to cues from their audience and soon realise that people are interested in them 
(Clark & Wells, 1995). Essau, Conradt, and Peterman (1999) found that 51% of 12-17 year 
olds in a community sample had at least one social fear. However, Wittchen, Stein, and 
Kessler (1999) found that when you looked at social phobia only 9.5% of males and 4.9% of 
females met this criteria. However, the age range of this sample was 14-24 years old and so 
not limited to children.
Similarities in the treatment of adult and child social phobia
Cognitive behaviour therapy has again been transferred from the adult field into working with 
(Kashdan & Herbert, 2001). It consists of psychoeducation about anxiety, exposure, somatic 
management techniques and developmentally suitable cognitive restructuring (Velting & 
Albano, 2001). The treatment format for social phobia appears to be largely in a group format 
for both adults and children (Chambless & Hope, 1996; Kashdan & Herbert, 2001). Perhaps 
this is due to the added bonus of the social exposure that comes with being in a group. 
However, Lucas and Tech (1993: cited in Chambless and Hope, 1996) made a random 
comparison between group and individual therapy with adults and found equal success.
The effective components of treatment with both children and adults with CBT remain 
uncertain. For adults, the group CBT (CBGT) designed for social phobia (Heimberg, Dodge, 
Hope, Kennedy, Zollo, & Becker, 1990) has unconvincing evidence to support the presumed 
cognitive mechanism of change. According to the cognitive model, anxiety and behaviour 
should be associated with a change in cognitions. Comparing CBGT against a control
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treatment of educational supportive group psychotherapy (ES), CBGT participants had fewer 
negative self-statements at 6-month follow-up than the ES group (5% vs. 48%). At 5 years 
follow-up, the number of negative self-statements had increased in the CBGT group and 
decreased slightly in the ES group (34% vs. 42%). Although the CBGT group continued to 
function well, it is uncertain how much the role of cognitions played in this maintenance at 
long term follow-up (Heimberg, Salzman, Holt, & Blendell, 1993). Group CBT for 
adolescents (CBGT-A, Albano, Martin, Holt, Heimberg, & Barlow, 1995: cited in Velting & 
Albano, 2001) was adapted from CGBT for adult social phobia (Heimberg et al., 1990). With 
adolescents, no study has compared CBGT against another credible from of treatment 
(Kashdan & Herbert, 2001). If the adult literature is uncertain, then the child literature based 
on this approach is even more so.
Differences in the treatment of adult and child social phobia
The main difference again seems to be the added focus of social skills training in the treatment 
of social phobia in children. CBGT focused on identifying and challenging cognitions, 
exposure and controlling maladaptive strategies before and during exposure sessions and for 
homework (Heimberg et al., 1993). CGBT-A included social skills training, such as smiling, 
maintaining eye contact, speaking at an appropriate volume, asking questions and being 
assertive (Albano & Barlow, 1996). Support for this approach in children is still far from 
convincing. Hayward, Varady, Albano, Thieneman, Henderson, & Shatzburg (2000: cited in 
Kashdan & Herbert, 2001) used CBGT with 35 female adolescents versus a waitlist control. 
They found that 45% of the treatment group no longer met diagnostic criteria for social phobia 
at post-treatment versus 5% of the wait list group. There was no comparison treatment, so 
this change cannot be attributed to the treatment, but only doing something versus not doing 
anything. Indeed, at 1-year follow-up, there were no longer significant differences between 
the treatment and no treatment group.
Social effectiveness therapy for children (SET-C, Beidel & Turner, 1998) has been designed 
for pre-adolescent children (8-12 yrs) with social phobia. The main focus is on practising 
social skills and exposure sessions. Peers from the community are invited to take part to give 
realistic practice of social skills and management of anxiety (Beidel & Turner, 1998). 
Practice of social skills is included. Perhaps due to the younger age group, there is no focus 
on cognitions. Beidel, Turner, and Morris (in press: cited in Kashdan and Herbert, 2001) 
evaluated SET-C with 36, 8-12 year olds against a credible control treatment involving 
exposure with 31 children. At post-treatment, 67% no longer met criteria for social phobia
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versus 5% in the control treatment group. At 6 months follow-up, 85% no longer met criteria 
for social phobia, but no figure is given for the alternative treatment group.
Whether it is better to include more of a cognitive component in children or adolescents as 
well as social skills, or whether social skills training should be incorporated into adult 
treatment of social phobia may not actually be important. Mersch (1995), found that an 
integrated treatment approach with adults including actual exposure, social skills training and 
rational emotive therapy (Ellis’s version of Beck’s cognitive therapy) was no more effective 
than exposure alone, although both were more effective than a wait list control. However, 
clients perceived the exposure to be more credible that the combined treatment, which may 
well have affect the outcome (Mersch, 1995). This has not been investigated in a child or 
adolescent population.
Systemic factors, such as the role of the family in maintaining the disorder have also been 
considered with children. Spence, Donovan, and Brechmann-Toussaint (2000) included 
parents in a social skills based cognitive behavioural intervention. Parents were able to watch 
their children taking part in the treatment group through a one way screen and were given 
their own sessions. They were taught to ignore socially anxious behaviour, not to reinforce 
avoidance and to model, prompt and praise the child’s practice of skills outside the sessions. 
Better results were obtained when the parents were involved, but this was not significant 
(Spence et al., 2000).
Conclusion: social phobia in childhood and adulthood
Social phobia does not seem fundamentally different in childhood and adulthood according to 
the theory and treatment. The main difference is the emphasis on social skills training, as a 
result of presumed social skill deficits in children. In adulthood, there is more of an emphasis 
on the role of dysfunctional cognitions in the disorder. Cognitions play more of a role when 
the treatment groups are adolescents and adults. The social skills emphasis with younger 
children perhaps reflects a difficulty in identifying them in the childhood anxiety disorders 
(Kendall & Chansky, 1991). Actual social skills deficits in the adult form may also be 
overlooked, presuming that reduced performance is the result of anxiety, cognitions and safety 
behaviours. The difference may also be developmental, assuming that cognitions play more 
of a role as children mature.
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Conclusion
Anxiety disorders in childhood and adulthood do not appear to be fundamentally different, 
according to the theory and treatment of OCD and social phobia. There are certainly some 
differences. In OCD, this is particularly between the neurobehavioural theory in children and 
the adult cognitive theory. There are certainly overlaps in the behavioural treatment, but with 
more cognitive emphasis in the adult population. With social phobia, the adult cognitive 
theory has been transferred directly to childhood social phobia. The perspective changes as 
the children get younger, focusing on a social skills deficit in children before adolescence, 
with an increasing cognitive emphasis in adolescence and adulthood (Albano & Barlow, 1996; 
Clark & Wells, 1995). Differences do exist in the presentation of anxiety disorders in 
childhood and adulthood. Perhaps this is as a result of maturation. However, it is important 
not to assume that what works for adults necessarily will work for children with some 
adaptations. The adult field of anxiety disorders is not convincingly strong. The role of 
cognitions in adult disorders is only implicated by association, not by causality and is likely to 
be only one aspect of a more complicated picture. Research with childhood anxiety disorders 
has lagged behind the adult field. Therefore, it is not surprising that theory and successful 
treatment with adults has been adapted for children (Kashdan & Herbert, 2001). Childhood 
theories, for example with OCD, do not easily equate with the treatment borrowed from the 
adult approach (e.g. March & Mulle, 1996). In social phobia, the role of social skills and 
cognitions is uncertain. Increased research in the area of children is needed, to achieve better 
empirical support for the theory and treatment of childhood anxiety disorders.
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Introduction
Clinical neuropsychology is defined as “an applied science concerned with the behavioural 
expression of brain dysfunction” (Lezak, 1995). In attempting to understand the effects of 
brain dysfunction on behavioural and psychological functioning, it has drawn on areas such as 
animal lesion studies, the effects of human brain lesions, both surgical, traumatic and 
neurological in origin and from areas of normal brain functioning, such as intellectual 
functioning and psychometrics (Kolb & Wishaw, 1996). This combination of being able to 
measure brain function together with knowledge of selective brain damage has led to many 
applications of neuropsychology. Two areas where neuropsychology is frequently involved, 
is in the diagnosis of dementias, such as Alzheimer’s disease (Zakzanis, 1998) and assessing 
cognitive outcome in traumatic brain injury (Ponsford, 1995).
However, the field of neuropsychology is threatened by the development of technology that 
allows clinicians to view the brain from structural and functional points of view. This is the 
advent of neuroimaging. To some extent, this excitement in neuroimaging has overshadowed 
the utility and sensitivity of neuropsychological assessment. Some infer that neuropsychology 
occupies a subordinate position to neuroimaging (American Academy of Neurology 
Therapeutics & Technology Assessment Subcommittee, 1996). This essay will discuss the 
threat of this new technology to neuropsychology, in particular focusing on the diagnosis of 
Alzheimer’s disease and assessment of traumatic brain injury. The neuroimaging techniques 
will first be explained before comparing neuropsychology and neuroimaging across the areas 
identified. The essay will focus on the adult literature. Neuroimaging techniques will be 
restricted to Computerised Tomography (CT), Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI), Positron 
Emission Tomography (PET), Single Photon Emission Computed Tomography (SPECT) and 
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI), due to common usage and present and 
future utility. The exact technical mechanisms of these procedures are beyond the scope of 
this essay.
Neuroimaging
CT scans involve transmitting a narrow beam of X-rays through the brain at various angles 
with a computer being able to create a structural image of the brain based on the absorption 
rate of different structures within the head (Lishman, 1998). Images are displayed using a 
grey scale in which the greatest absorption of X-rays is represented as white and the least as 
black. For example, bone is white, water is grey and air is black (Rutledge, 1989). CT scans 
are useful for identifying conspicuous neurological abnormalities, such as meningeal tumours,
60
Specialist Essay
acute intracranial haemorrhages, calcified lesions, and parencymal infarction (McConnell, 
1998).
MRI works by stimulating areas of the brain with radioffequency (RF) waves. These 
magnetic waves energise hydrogen atoms causing them to align or “spin”. When the RF 
source is turned off energy is released and a receiver coil detects the energy, giving 
information about the density of the atoms and their chemical environment. A computer then 
processes this information into images (Rutledge, 1989). MRI has better sensitivity than CT 
(McAllister, Sparling, Flashman, & Saykin, 2001) and is useful in evaluating white matter in 
demylinating disorders, dementia, infarction, neoplastic disease, vascular malformations and 
degenerative disease (McConnell, 1998).
Functional techniques offer the benefit of detecting changes in brain functioning, such as 
levels of activation and metabolism beyond observable structural changes.
PET involves participants ingesting glucose containing very short acting radioisotopes. As 
brain activity increases, so does its glucose usage, which can then be measured in terms of 
increased radioactivity by the scanning equipment. The isotopes have a very short life, lasting 
only a few minutes, meaning that there is no harm to the brain (Kolb & Wishaw, 1996).
SPECT also involves administering radioisotopes to participants with longer half-lives, such 
as xenon. The technique relies on detecting blood flow rather than oxygen uptake. It is less 
accurate than PET, but provides better quality of image (Lishman, 1998).
fMRI incorporates the positive aspects of all the above techniques in that it can capture both 
structural and temporal aspects. fMRI is able to monitor changes in levels of brain 
oxygenation presumed to result from functional activation of brain areas. Functional images 
are created due to the levels of oxygen carried by haemoglobin affecting the magnetic 
properties of blood (Kolb & Wishaw, 1996).
Alzheimer’s disease (AD)
AD accounts for more than 50% of all dementias (Fields, 1998). It is a progressive disorder 
characterised in the early stages by failing memory, muddled inefficiency and spatial 
disorientation. This disease progresses to difficulties with language expression and 
comprehension (dysphasia), inability to perform intentional movements (apraxia) and
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problems of recognition (agnosia). Personality and mood changes may also be evident. In the 
final stage the patient becomes bedridden and doubly incontinent, with bodily wasting and 
possible epileptic seizures (Lishman, 1998).
Histological markers include deformed axon terminals “senile plaques,” containing an 
accumulation of the protein “amyloid.” These are detected throughout the cerebral cortex, 
hippocampus and other forebrain structures. Few plaques are seen in normal brains (Beatty, 
1995). Neurofibrillary tangles are also present, which consist of pathological webs of 
neurofilaments within nerve cells. Again, these are prominent in the forebrain, hippocampus 
and cortical pyramidal cells (Beatty, 1995).
Early detection and diagnosis of AD is important for the management and treatment of the 
condition. Differentiating AD from other neurological or functional disorders, such as 
depression which have associated memory complaints has important implications for 
treatment options. Recent advances in pharmacological treatment with drugs such as Aricept 
are believed to offer some improvement of functioning in AD in the early stages, although 
there is still disease progression (Fields, 1998).
Application of Neuroimaging
Neuroimaging’s contribution largely comes from detecting brain atrophy in AD.
Cortical and ventricular atrophy
Significant brain atrophy has been observed in patients with AD on CT scans and has 
therefore been used as a diagnostic marker. Of particular interest is the size of the brain 
cavities filled with cerebrospinal fluid “ventricles” and the “sulci” (external areas of cortex 
where brain is indented). Jacoby and Levy (1980) found greater ventricular and sulcal size in 
age-matched controls than in patients with dementia. More precisely, Bums, Jacoby, Philpot, 
and Levy (1991) found that both ventricular and cortical atrophy decreased over a 12-month 
period in AD, but that ventricular atrophy was more associated with memory decline.
However, there are difficulties focusing on such a gross measure as cortical and ventricular 
atrophy, as increase in ventricular size is not only associated with AD, it is a normal aspect of 
ageing. Barron, Jacobs, and Kinkel (1976: cited in Lishman, 1998) studying CT scans found a 
gradual increase in ventricular size from ages 50-60 and a dramatic increase from age 70. As 
age increased, so did the variability of ventricular size. Further more, patients greater than
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eighty years old with dementia are significantly less likely to have large ventricles (Jacoby & 
Levy, 1980), making differentiation in older patients even harder. Cerebral atrophy alone is 
not specific to AD and has also been found in patients without dementia, with epilepsy and 
alcoholism (Lishman, 1998). Dolan, Calloway, Thacker, and Mann (1986) found increased 
ventricle size in patients with a history of depression compared to controls, with the 
differences being greater in the middle-aged and the elderly. Consequently, CT’s contribution 
to AD is more restricted to ruling out potentially treatable causes of dementia, such as 
hydrocephalus or tumour, with MRI providing the main diagnostic tool (Scheltens & Dorf, 
2000).
Medial temporal lobe atrophy (MTA)
Memory difficulties are reported as the earliest feature, preceding mood and behaviour 
changes and distinguish AD from other dementing conditions (Lishman, 1998). For this 
reason it is unsurprising that a lot of research has focused on the early memory changes to aid 
in differential diagnosis of AD. The medial temporal lobes are the area of the greatest 
interest, which incorporate structures such as the hippocampus, parahippocampal gyrus and 
subiculum. These structures have a crucial role in declarative memory (memory that is 
consciously accessible, Parkin, 1997). It appears that the hippocampus becomes functionally 
disconnected in AD. Cell death in the entorhinal cortex largely deprives the hippocampus of 
sensory input, whilst cell death in the area of the subiculum and adjacent pyramidal cells of 
the hippocampus damages hippocampal output pathways (Hyman, Van Hoesen, Damasio, & 
Barnes, 1984: cited in Beatty, 1995).
MRI’s contribution has focused on the visible MTA usually observed in the disorder, which is 
highly predictable of AD (Scheltens & Dorf, 2000). Patients with AD have been shown to 
have significantly higher degrees of MTA than controls (Scheltens, Leys, Barkof, Huglo, 
Weinstein, Vermersch, Kuiper, Steinling, Wolters, & Valk, 1992). Frisoni, Laakso, 
Beltramello, Geroldi, Bianchetti, Soininen, and Trabucchi (1999) were also able to 
differentiate AD from frontotemporal dementia (FTD), where there is greater involvement of 
the frontal cortex. Sensitivity was 80% on the basis of hippocampal volume, but equal 
entorhinal cortex atrophy was found in the medial temporal lobes in both AD and FTD. The 
lack of sensitivity for entorhinal cortex atrophy is surprising, considering that it is considered 
a primary site of cell loss in AD (Hyman et al., 1984: cited in Beatty, 1995). In addition, 
Bobinski, de Leon, Wegiel, Desanti, Convit, Saint Louis, Rusinek, and Wisniewski (2000) 
carried out postmortem MRI on eleven AD and four control brains. They found a significant
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correlation between hippocampal, parahippocampal and subiculum volume on MRI and 
postmortem volume estimation. However, MTA did not completely separate patients with 
AD from controls. The authors state that this could have been as a result of preclinical AD in 
some control patients, or that they were observing age-related hippocampal atrophy in some 
controls. Again age can be a serious confounding factor in neuroimaging, as a significant 
correlation with age and false-positives was found in the control group, implicating that MRI 
is less sensitive for diagnosis in older patients. It therefore seems that structural deficits 
observed on neuroimaging in more precise areas such as the medial temporal lobes may not be 
sufficiently accurate to reliably distinguish AD from normal ageing.
Functional imaging is not routinely used in the diagnosis of AD, however research has 
demonstrated characteristic decreased functioning of the temporal and parietal lobes early in 
the disease and later frontal abnormalities on PET (Mazziotta, Frackowiak, & Phelps, 1992: 
cited in Small & Leiter, 1998). These are the areas associated with declarative memory, 
visuospatial ability and executive functions (conceptualisation, planning, inhibition etc.) 
respectively. Haxby, Grady, Koss, Horwitz, Heston, Schapiro, Friedland, and Rapoport 
(1990) also demonstrated a potentially predictive element of PET. They found relatively 
stable asymmetries in the left and right hemispheres of patients with AD that were later 
associated with the degree of language and visuospatial impairments that developed.
SPECT’s diagnostic power appears limited. McKelvey, Bergman, Stem, Rush, Zahimey, and 
Chertkow (1999: cited in Scheltens and Kopf, 2000) found no SPECT correlations in a group 
of thirty-six patients with mild cognitive impairment (MCI), of whom 18 progressed to AD. 
Patients with MCI have memory problems not sufficient for a diagnosis of AD, but are 
considered at risk of developing AD. Again this was with older adults, where difficulty has 
been found with other imaging techniques.
It is likely that further research with fMRI will bring increased clarity in identifying 
preclinical structural and functional changes in patients with AD. Existing research has 
identified decreased activation in the medial temporal lobes in patients with AD when 
compared with controls (Small, Perera, DeLaPaz, Mayeux, & Stem, 1999). Reduced 
activation was also found in four out of the 12 patients with mild cognitive impairment (MCI), 
possibly indicating early AD. Regretfully there was no follow up of these high-risk patients 
identified, to see if they did develop AD.
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Although neuroimaging can be sensitive in the early detection of AD, there are areas of 
possible artefact that might appear on images, such as the influence of normal ageing and 
depression, particularly on structural imaging. Functional imaging, has great promise for the 
future, but it is too early to judge this enthusiasm. Most of the research to date has focused on 
the more available structural techniques. Many questions remain to be answered. Will fMRI 
be confounded by similar factors to structural imaging, such as functional affects of 
depression and ageing? Activation artefact is also a problem. Studies need to rule out 
background brain activation not directly involved with the tasks (Fiez, 2001). Functional 
imaging also requires careful use of neuropsychological tests to evaluate normal and abnormal 
brain activation. It therefore seems that neuroimaging alone is insufficient to aid in the 
diagnosis of AD.
Neuropsychological assessment
Characteristic early memory impairment has also been the focus for neuropsychological 
assessment. Memory impairments associated with AD consist of deficient consolidation of 
memories, rapid forgetting of new information and worse performance on delayed recall. 
Recognition memory is also impaired and there is no benefit from providing multi-choice 
alternatives, or providing cues to aid recall (Pasquier, 1999). This differs from memory 
impairment associated with subcortical dementias, such as vascular dementia, and 
pseudodementias such as depression, where the deficit is more with retrieval of memories 
than actual forgetting. Executive deficits may also be present in AD. Patients experience 
difficulty shifting conceptual sets and mentally manipulating information, but memory deficits 
are considered primary (Fields, 1998).
Performance on memory tests have retrospectively differentiated which patients presenting 
with a mild memory impairment would develop AD, before obvious clinical signs. Albert, 
Moss, Tanzi, and Jones (2001) conducted a large-scale study over three years with 123 
' patients with mild memory difficulty recruited from the community. After initial screening 
and neuropsychological assessment their progress was monitored annually against a control 
group. Neuropsychological assessment consisted of tests of memory, executive and 
visuospatial functioning, language, sustained attention and general intelligence. Tests of 
memory were most predictive -  total learning score (number of the 16 words recalled over six 
successive trials) of a list learning task, (California Verbal Learning Test, CVLT); and 
immediate visual recall of figures on Wechsler Memory Scale. This adds support to the early 
pathological changes in the medial temporal lobes. Additionally, two tests of executive
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function -  part B of the Trail Making Test (set shifting) and total score on Self-Ordering test 
(sequencing task) were predictive. Verbal fluency -  both category and letter fluency were 
also predictive. Visuospatial ability was not. Executive deficits may arise from alterations in 
the anterior cingulate gyrus early in AD, which has connections to the entorhinal cortex and 
the prefrontal cortex (Arikuni, Sako, & Murata, 1994: cited in Albert et al., 2001).
Neuropsychological assessment of memory is further able to differentiate AD from the second 
most common dementia, vascular dementia (VD), which accounts for 15-25% of dementias 
(Fields, 1998). VD usually affects subcortical regions, such as the white matter, with 
accompanying deficits in “procedural memory” (unconscious memory for performing tasks), 
whereas declarative memory (conscious recollection) is affected in AD. Libon, Bogdanoff, 
Cloud, Skalina, Giovanetti, Gitlan, and Bonavita (1998) found that patients with AD obtained 
lower scores with the delayed recall and recognition trials of CVLT (involving declarative 
memory), and higher scores on a procedural learning task (Pursuit Rotor Learning Test). The 
opposite profile was obtained for patients with VD. Deficits in recall can also be observed, 
but unlike AD performance is improved with cueing or on recognition.
Declarative memory disorders are not restricted to AD. They occur in conditions such as 
alcoholic Korsakoff syndrome (affecting the mamilliary bodies and thalamic nuclei), and 
herpes simplex encephalitis (affecting the temporal and orbitoffontal lobes) (Zakzanis, 2000) 
meaning that careful consideration of other factors, such as patient history should be equally 
as important in assessment. Atypical presentation of AD may provide further difficulties. 
Galton, Patterson, Xureb, and Hodges (2000) describe patients with AD who presented with 
progressive visual dysfunction or progressive aphasia, both fluent and non-fluent, when fluent 
aphasia is usually associated with AD. There may also be age-appropriate memory decline. 
Non-verbal memory tends to be more affected than verbal memory and delayed recall is more 
affected than immediate recall (Ratcliff & Saxton, 1998), which needs to be differentiated 
from AD. Age-appropriate memory impairment is usually in the normal range of peers, 
whereas it is 1 Standard Deviation or more below in AD (Ratcliff & Saxton, 1998).
There also appears to be concurrent support for both neuroimaging and neuropsychological 
assessment in the literature. Libon et al. (1998) found that VD patients had greater 
hippocampal formation than AD patients, as well as better performance on a declarative 
memory performance task. Scheltens et al. (1992) found that the extent of MTA correlated 
significantly with scores on memory tests including “logical memory” on the Wechsler
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Memory Scale -  Revised. '
Overall, it seems that both neuroimaging and neuropsychology can be sensitive tools in the 
diagnosis of AD. However, which is most sensitive? Zakzanis (2000) performed a meta­
analysis of studies involving neuropsychological and neuroimaging detection of AD, to 
evaluate this. Effect sizes revealed that neuropsychological measures were most sensitive for 
differentiating AD patients from healthy controls, followed by MRI, SPECT and PET, with 
long-delay free recall on the CVLT being the most sensitive. Total learning score on CVLT 
was fifth, in contrast to Albert et al. (2001), although this meta-analysis is based on twenty- 
seven studies rather than just one. A meta-analysis comparing differentiation from other 
dementias would also be useful.
AD conclusion
Present research suggests that neuropsychology’s position in the diagnosis of AD is not 
threatened. However, fMRI has not been studied sufficiently in AD and may pose a future 
threat. In any case, both neuroimaging and neuropsychology are limited in diagnosis, as a 
definite diagnosis of AD can only be made histologically, on evidence obtained from biopsy 
or autopsy (Lishman, 1998). Characteristic neurofibrillary tangles and senile plaques are 
usually evident on post-mortem, as well as amyloid-like material. Neuroimaging and 
neuropsychology are only able to detect the structural and functional aspects of the disease 
and not subtle pathological changes.
Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI)
Accurate assessment in TBI is important to know to what extent a patient’s injury will affect 
their performance in everyday life, for example occupationally. If they are involved in a 
rehabilitation program, it is essential to understand what the patient is capable of achieving 
and what cognitive deficits need to be worked on or compensated for (Lezak, 1995). 
Mechanisms of TBI will first be discussed before examining the utility of neuroimaging and 
neuropsychology.
TBI usually involves an alteration of consciousness, neurological impairment, and cognitive 
deficits. It is a process that evolves not only hours and days after injury, but also weeks and 
months later (Lucas, 1998). Involvement in a high velocity impact such as a motor vehicle 
accident may lead to a variety of brain damage. Brain rotation in TBI may cause both focal 
and diffuse lesions that are independent of the site of impact (Richardson, 2000). Brain areas
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particularly susceptible are the frontal and temporal lobes (Courville, 1950: cited in 
Richardson, 2000) involved in executive functioning and memory respectively. This is 
largely due to the soft brain accelerating inside the skull on impact and hitting bony 
projections of the base of the skull. As well as focal damage, damage to the brain may also 
occur on the opposite side to the impact (“contrecoup injury”) (Richardson, 2000). Brain 
rotation also exerts pressure on axons, leading to axonal straining, which can lead to 
downregulation of biochemical functioning of the neuron, or axonal shearing, where axons 
can be severely damaged and lead to degeneration of surrounding brain areas. This is termed 
“Diffuse Axonal Injury” (DAI, Richardson, 2000). White matter is particularly susceptible 
(Bigler, 2001), often producing slowed processing and inefficiency, as in subcortical 
disorders. As well as primary injury to the brain, secondary injury can occur as a result of 
brain swelling, due to raised intracranial pressure and intracranial bleeding (Richardson,
2000). TBI can result in varied and extensive areas of brain injury and dysfunction.
Neuroimaging
Neuroimaging appears to have an important role in TBI, where diffuse damage to the brain 
can be observed. However, CT scans may be limited. Mild orbitofrontal and temporal lobe 
contusions (bruising), which are the most common areas of injury are often missed, and it is 
also poor at detecting DAI, as well as subcortical lesions in the basal ganglia (Lucas, 1998). 
CT is superior to MRI in detecting skull fractures (Newberg & Alavi, 1996) and in its ability 
to detect haemorrhage soon after brain injury, although MRI is able to detect residual 
haemorrhage not detected by CT three weeks post-injury (Lucas, 1998). MRI is able to detect 
intracerebral lesions in TBI ranging from minor to severe (Wilson, Wiedmann, Hadley, 
Condon, Teasdale, & Brooks, 1988).
A normal MRI does not rule out possible microscopic damage. The nature of a lesion several 
months after the injury may also be more extensive than days after the injury. Wilson et al. 
(1988) observed discrepancies between MRI scans taken at 21 days post-injury and 5-12 
weeks post-injury. Some patients with lesions confined to the cortex and subcortical white 
matter had developed deep white matter lesions and ventricular enlargement consistent with 
atrophy on the second scans. Neuroimaging scans taken on the date of injury should not be 
relied on to assess injury, due to the evolving nature of TBI (Bigler, 2001). Another difficulty 
with MRI, is that it is sensitive to existing demylinating conditions such as multiple sclerosis 
(Levin, Amparo, Eisenberg, Williams, High, McArdle, & Weiner, 1987).
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Severe TBI, where the patient has prolonged unconsciousness is a particularly difficult area. 
CT scans may fail to reveal any neurological consequences, even though the patient is 
unconscious (Markowitsch & Calabresse, 1996).
Structural imaging is unable to detect areas of dysfunctional brain tissue that do not appear 
visibly damaged. Animal models of mild brain injury have shown that although injury might 
not cause axonal tears, it can produce neuronal cytoskeleton abnormalities, leading to 
neuronal dysfunction, but without cell death, therefore appearing normal on structural MRI 
scans (Bigler, 2001).
Functional assessment in addition to structural examination seems to reveal more extensive or 
subtle brain dysfunction. Bigler (2001) notes that focal lesions may not be representative of 
actual brain damage and has shown using functional imaging (SPECT) that the area of 
physiological disruption exceeds the lesion viewed on MRI. Different imaging techniques are 
able to detect different brain abnormalities. To obtain an accurate picture it is advisable to 
obtain information from different imaging techniques, such as SPECT and MRI (Kesler, 
Adams, & Bigler, 2000). However, in clinical practice, this would be costly and time 
consuming.
Functional imaging would appear to be a more useful technique for assessing outcome of TBI. 
There are few studies to date that have used fMRI to study TBI (McAllister, Sparling, 
Flashman, & Saykin, 2001). McAllister, Saykin, Flashman, Sparling, Johnson, Guerin, 
Mamourian, Weaver, and Janofsky (1999) have demonstrated that patients with mild TBI 
have greater cortical activation compared to normal controls on working memory tasks, 
suggesting a need to compensate for decreased neural efficiency, such as that which is 
associated with white matter injury. McAllister, Sparling, Flashman, Guerin, Ford, 
Mamourian, and Saykin (2001: cited in McAllister et al., 2001) have also found a significant 
reduction in cortical activation when testing encoding and retrieving of a 10 word list learning 
task in mild TBI patients compared to normal controls.
It seems that at present, neuroimaging’s role in predicting functioning particularly from 
structural scans is limited, and that any visible damage is likely to have more extensive 
physiological and functional deficits.
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Comparisons with neuropsychological assessment
Studies have repeatedly demonstrated deficits in memory and executive functioning in TBI 
patients (for example Levin, Amparo, Eisenberg, Williams, High, McArdle & Weiner, 1987; 
Levin & Goldstein, 1986: cited in Richardson, 2000). Kesler et al. (2000) demonstrated 
correlations between both MRI and SPECT and neuropsychological assessment, in areas of 
memory and intellectual functioning (Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale -  Revised, WAIS-R, 
Wechsler Memory Scale, WMS-R). Memory and intellectual impairments were associated 
with greater temporal and frontal lobe abnormalities, as well as diffuse cortical atrophy. 
However, SPECT abnormalities alone were not correlated with neuropsychological 
functioning (intelligence, memory, planning and visuospatial ability) (Kesler et al., 2000).
Predicting neuropsychological and neurobehavioural outcome on the basis of structural 
imaging techniques such as CT and MRI would seem highly inaccurate. Bigler (2001) 
describes three patients with extensive left frontal damage, as assessed by MRI. The scans 
would predict deficits in executive functioning, as well as impaired performance on tests of 
verbal fluency and expressive language function, personality change, and probable memory 
reduction. However, the behavioural outcome was very varied. One patient had right-sided 
hemiparesis, mildly reduced verbal performance on WAIS-R and slowed responding, but 
otherwise no problems of executive function. Behavioural outcome seemed more in line with 
neuropsychological evaluation, as this patient went on to achieve a Masters degree six years 
after the brain injury. Another patient with seemingly similar structural damage had no 
observable deficits on a broad range of neuropsychological tests tapping intellectual and 
executive functioning, memory, language and visuospatial skills. However, behaviourally 
they had difficulties with personality change and motivation. This demonstrates the 
complexity of brain functioning and the varied affects that similar visual structural damage 
can have. Despite this study being restricted to only three patients, it still highlights that there 
is a danger of falling into the trap of over-localisation, where identical deficits are predicted in 
individuals on the basis of damage to specific areas of the brain (Bigler, 2001).
The literature shows that there are many factors influencing outcome following TBI. These 
include age, education, premorbid personality factors, socio-economic factors, lesion size and 
location (Markowitsch & Calabresse, 1996). This was particularly the case for the patients 
reviewed by Bigler (2001), of whom the most affected in adult life was the patient who 
incurred the frontal injury at the age of 8, but who came from a high educational and 
economic background. The other two patients both had their injuries in adulthood and were
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both of average to high average intelligence premorbidly, yet one had problems with 
motivation, whereas the other was sufficiently motivated to obtain a Masters degree post­
injury. Neuropsychological outcome can also be criticised, because the less motivated 
individual had a better outcome on neuropsychological assessment, which did not appear 
reflected in his everyday functioning.
Just as there are dangers in interpreting a normal neuroimaging scan as representative of 
normal functioning in an individual, the same can be said for neuropsychology. The 
ecological validity of neuropsychological assessment (how abilities or deficits in the testing 
environment are reflected in the living environment) is important to consider. This can be 
particularly the case for executive functioning, which can be a common deficit in TBI. 
Executive functioning can be thought of as the patient being able to create an internal 
structure for behaviour, cognition and mood. Deficits result in the patient being dependent on 
the environment (Richardson, 2000). Ironically, in assessing for these deficits, the 
neuropsychologist aims to reduce distractions by testing in a quiet environment. They also 
provide structure to patients on tasks, giving criteria and rules for the patient to follow. They 
provide occasional prompts if the patient’s behaviour is incorrect (Sobordone, 1996: cited in 
Bennett, 2001), thereby supporting these deficits that one is trying to assess. In addition, 
mistakes can also be made when interpreting test scores if neuropsychologists concretely use 
quantitative scores without attending to qualitative aspects (Goldstein 1942: cited in Bennett,
2001). For example, a patient could obtain a reasonable score on a task by developing a 
strategy that was highly inefficient in everyday life.
However, there is reasonable support for the ecological validity of commonly used 
neuropsychological measures, such as CVLT and the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task (WCST), 
which is used as a measure of executive functioning, particularly perseveration of response. 
Kibby, Schmitter-Edgecombe, and Long (1998) found that memory performance on CVLT 
was predictive of the type of job position held by the patient post-injury. Performance on the 
WCST was not, although others have found this to be more important as job status increases 
(Dikmen & Morgan, 1980: cited in Kibby et al., 1998).
TBI conclusion
It appears that functional assessment in the form of neuropsychology may be more 
informative than structural imaging for TBI, due to damage extending beyond structural 
changes. New functional imaging techniques hold promise for the future though.
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Conclusion
Is neuroimaging a threat to neuropsychology? Different imaging techniques and 
neuropsychology have been compared in their application to the common referrals of AD and 
TBI. The evidence for neuroimaging suggests that its accuracy in both diagnosis of AD and 
outcome in TBI may be more limited than expected. There is room for error in AD, resulting 
from age-related and functional (pseudo-dementia) structural changes in brain atrophy, which 
neuropsychology can help clarify. Neuropsychological assessment although more sensitive to 
memory functioning in AD is not error-free in separating patients with AD from controls. It 
waits to be seen whether the overlap is due to susceptibility in certain controls to AD. 
However, neuroimaging can rule out reversible causes of dementia, such as tumours.
In TBI, structural neuroimaging is insufficient to detect the full extent of brain and 
behavioural dysfunction arising. Neuropsychology has been shown to have good predictive 
value in outcome, although it is important to remember that there are many factors that 
influence outcome.
Functional neuroimaging has demonstrated deficient functioning in both AD and TBI. It 
offers great hope for the future, if it can fulfil its promise of combining structural and 
functional information. The main difficulty is filtering out irrelevant brain activation (if any 
activation is irrelevant).
Neuroimaging does not hold a subordinate position to neuroimaging (Bigler, 2001). 
Nevertheless, neither technique should at present stand on its own. Both make valuable 
contributions, linking functional and structural information. Clinical decisions should be 
based on information from several sources, including neuroimaging, neuropsychology and 
behavioural observations from staff and family.
fMRI is likely to be an important area of the future, bringing a synthesis between 
neuroimaging and neuropsychology, where standardised neuropsychological probes can be 
combined with the latest imaging techniques (Bigler, 2001). However, costs are likely to 
delay common clinical usage for the present.
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Adult Mental Health Placement
Setting
Community Mental Health Team 
Client demographics
■ Individual work with 8 clients (6 female, 2 male) ranging in age from 26-73.
■ Couple work with a male and female client (aged 44 and 37).
Presenting problems
■ Depression
■ Anxiety (phobia, health anxiety, relationship)
■ Pain
■ Psychosis
■ Obsessive-compulsive disorder
■ Alcohol abuse
■ Sexual abuse.
■ Interpersonal difficulties.
Assessments
■ Team risk assessment proformas.
■ Questionnaires including Beck Depression Inventory II, Clinical Outcome in Routine 
Effectiveness, Dysfunctional Attitude Scale, Rosenberg Self-Esteem inventory, Schema 
questionnaire.
■ Neuropsychological assessment using: WAIS-III, WMS-III, BADS, NART H, FAS, Rey 
Figure, Token Test.
Intervention
■ Cognitive behavioural therapy
■ Systemic
■ Incorporation of psychoanalytic thinking 
Teaching / Presentations
■ Presentation on Mindfulness Based Cognitive Therapy to multidisciplinary team.
■ Case presentation of a girl with health anxiety and depression related to Crohn’s disease 
to the multidisciplinary team.
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Meetings / visits / observations
■ Regular multidisciplinary team meetings.
■ Day visit to a therapeutic community for people with personality disorders.
■ Visit to rehabilitation services.
■ Visit to day hospital and acute admissions ward.
■ Day observing Liaison Psychiatry team.
■ Attending service meetings on single management of health and social services and 
proposals for an out of hours service.
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People with Learning Disabilities Placement
Setting
Community Team for People with Learning Disabilities.
Client demographics
■ Individual work with one male client, aged 23.
■ Indirect work with 5 clients (3 male, 2 female) aged 18-56.
■ Group work with 7 clients (6 male, 1 female) aged 27-57.
Presenting problems
■ Challenging behaviour
■ Gilles de la Tourette’s syndrome
■ Dementia and Down syndrome
■ Sexual abuse
■ Sex offending
■ Fragile X
■ Cerebral palsy
Assessment
■ Involved in designing a pre and post measure for a keeping safe group.
■ Assessments of eligibility for learning disability service using WAIS-HI, BPVS, and 
Vineland.
■ Clinical outcome: HONOS-LD, Personal Relatedness Profile.
■ Neuropsychological assessment: Hayling and Brixton, Trail Making, Leiter, Adaptive 
Behaviour Scale, Assessment of Dementia in Down Syndrome.
Intervention
■ Psychodynamic
■ Behavioural
■ Systemic
■ Neuropsychological
■ Group keeping safe intervention, co-run with two other trainee clinical psychologists.
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Teaching / Presentations
■ Presentation on the dysexecutive syndrome to a staff team.
■ Presentation on Parkinson’s disease to the psychology department.
Meetings / visits / observations
■ Regular attendance at team meetings and involvement in case discussions.
■ Risk assessment meeting related to inappropriate behaviour.
■ Review meeting for sex offender with probation and staff team.
■ Attended an after school club for children with learning disabilities.
■ Observed clients with profound learning disabilities at a Day Unit.
Child and Family Placement Summary
Child and Family Placement
Setting
■ Child and Adolescent Mental Health Team 
Client demographics
■ Individual work with 5 clients (3 male, 2 female) aged 8-15.
■ Indirect work with 2 clients (1 male, 1 female) aged 5 - 8 .
■ Group work with 9 male clients.
Presenting problems
■ Attachment difficulties
■ Anxiety
■ Bullying
■ Migraine
■ Enuresis
■ Asperger’s syndrome
■ ADHD
■ Learning disability
■ Epilepsy
Assessment
■ Clinical effectiveness: HONOS-CA.
■ Child Depression Inventory.
■ Psychodynamic: Family Relations Test
■ Neuropsychological assessment using: WPPSI-R, WISC-III, and WORD.
Intervention
■ Cognitive
■ Behavioural
■ Psychodynamic
■ Systemic
■ Social skills group for children with social communication disorders, co-run with a 
primary mental health worker and a clinical psychologist.
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Teaching / Presentations
Presentation on the difference between anxiety disorders in children and adults to the 
multidisciplinary team.
Meetings / visits / observations
■ Regular attendance at team meetings.
■ Observation of family therapy and involvement in a reflective team.
■ Attended a consultation meeting between social services and the family therapy team.
■ Observation of multidisciplinary child development service (paediatricians, speech and 
language therapy, occupational therapy) for children under 5.
■ Attendance of school annual appraisal meetings.
■ Attended meetings with Chief Executive to discuss trust changes.
Courses and training events
■ Quality Protects conference organised by social services to promote quality care and user 
involvement of young people in services.
Other
■ Discussed role of educational psychology with educational psychologist.
■ Attended presentation on working with looked after children.
■ Attended social services presentation on making appropriate referrals.
83
Older People Placement Summary
Older People Placement
Settings
■ Rehabilitation hospital
■ Day hospital
Client Demographics
■ Individual and indirect work with 5 clients (4 female, 1 male) aged 86-95.
■ Group work with 9 clients (5 female, 4 male) aged 76-87.
Presenting problems
■ Worry
■ Panic
■ Fear of falling
■ Life adjustment issues
■ Depression and post-stroke depression
■ Chronic pain
■ Stroke
■ Vascular dementia
■ Alzheimer’s disease
■ Group work involved the co-running and co-development of a multidisciplinary pain
management group, and the running of a reminiscence group for people with Alzheimer’s
disease.
Assessment
■ Questionnaires used: Agoraphobic Cognitions Questionnaire, BAI, Panic Rating Scale, 
Impact of Events Scale, Brief Assessment Schedule Depression Cards.
■ Neuropsychological assessment using: CAMDEX-R, R-BANS, and Hayling and Brixton.
Intervention
■ Cognitive-behavioural
■ Rational emotive behavioural
■ Behavioural
■ Neuropsychological
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Teaching / Presentations
■ Presentation on the development and outcome of the multidisciplinary pain management 
group to an older people special interest group.
■ Regular case presentations during joint supervision.
Meetings / visits / observations
■ Observation of a physiotherapy session.
■ Attended meeting for intermediate care following hospital discharge.
Courses and training events
■ Attendance at a Vulnerable Adult Training Day
■ Attendance at a seminar for dementia care.
■ Attended presentations on fear of falling, psychological treatment of stroke survivors, and 
running a forgetfulness group for patients with mild memory problems.
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Specialist Placement: Acute Adult Neuropsychology
Setting
■ Acute Neurosciences hospital 
Patient demographics
■ Neuropsychological assessment of 19 patients (12 male, 7 female) aged 37-80.
Presenting problems
■ Early and late onset Alzheimer’s disease
■ Parkinson’s disease
■ Progressive supranuclear palsy
■ Lewy body dementia
■ Vasculitis
■ Hydrocephalus
■ Tumour
■ Head injury
■ Motor neurone disease
■ Encephalitis
■ CADASEL
■ anxiety and depression.
Meetings / visits / observations
■ Observation of two neurosurgery cases -  spina bifida and removal of a meningioma (brain 
tumour).
■ Attended pre-assessment meeting for neurorehabilitation patients.
■ Attended Speech and Language case discussion of patient with swallowing difficulties.
■ Attended weekly neurology meetings, with case discussions and presentations including 
neuroimaging data, such as MRI, CT, and angiography.
Courses and training events
■ Attended Cognitive Therapy Unplugged Workshop presented by Dr Christine Padeskey.
■ Attended academic meeting on “Neuropsychological aspects of epilepsy.”
Specialist Placement Summary
Specialist Placement: Paediatric Neuropsychology
Setting
■ Hospital setting.
Patient demographics
■ Neuropsychological assessment of 5 children (3 female, 2 male) aged 4-17.
■ Neuropsychological rehabilitation with 1 female patient aged 13.
■ Individual and indirect work with one male paediatric psychology patient aged 8.
Presenting problems
■ Encephalitis ‘
■ Epilepsy (BSPECTS, frontal lobe, temporal lobe)
■ Stroke
■ Head injury
■ Genetic conditions
■ Kleine Levin syndrome
■ Anxiety
Teaching / Presentations
■ Presentation on implicit memory for trauma post head injury was made to the paediatric 
psychology team.
■ Regular case presentations during joint meetings with Paediatric Neurology and during 
joint supervision.
Meetings / visits / observations
■ Regular team meetings with paediatric psychology.
■ Joint meetings with Paediatric Neurologists.
■ Attendance at neurology ward round.
■ Attendance at psychosocial ward round.
■ Observation of MRI and EEG.
■ Visit to a rehabilitation centre for children with brain injury.
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Courses and training events
■ Attendance at a Division of Neuropsychology Training Day in Challenging Behaviour.
■ Seminars at the Institute of Neurology on Huntington’s and Parkinson’s disease.
■ Seminar at the Institute for Cognitive Neuroscience on “Amnesia: the Implicit / Explicit 
Distinction.”
Research
■ Collected data for publication of a case study documenting the neuropsychological 
recovery of a patient with streptococcal infection.
Clinical Case Report Summaries
Clinical Case Report Summaries
89
Summary of Adult Mental Health Case Report
Summary of Adult Mental Health Case Report
Cognitive behavioural assessment and intervention of depression and fear of dying with 
a woman suffering from Crohn’s disease and Chronic Fatigue Syndrome.
Reason for referral
A 27-year old white woman was referred by her GP to the community mental health team 
with depression and fear of dying associated with a diagnosis of Crohn’s disease and Chronic 
Fatigue Syndrome.
Presenting problem
She described feeling tearful and depressed in relation to her disease diagnosis and the impact 
that this had on her life.
Assessment
During the assessment interview, information was gained from her regarding her personal and 
family history, psychiatric history and issues related to Crohn’s disease and Chronic Fatigue 
syndrome. She had a history of depression associated with disease diagnosis and disease 
flare-ups. She believed that the disease would one day kill her. She relied on her family to do 
things for her, such as getting her meals, doing her washing and providing transport. She 
believed that if she did things herself, she would be exhausted and that it would ruin her day. 
She disliked being in a “sick role” and felt that her family maintained her in this role. The 
Beck Depression Inventory (2nd Edition, BDI-II) and Core Outcome in Routine Effectiveness 
(CORE) were used as outcome measures. Initial BDI-II scores placed her in the severe 
depression range. The CORE highlighted difficulties with physical symptoms, trauma, 
anxiety, depression, and general functioning.
Formulation
A collaborative cognitive-behavioural formulation based on a model of health anxiety was 
developed. Previous experience related to illness was seen to lead to the development of 
dysfunctional beliefs that doing activity would be detrimental to her health. Illness flare-ups 
were seen to activate negative automatic thoughts and maintain her anxiety and depression, 
along with hypervigilence to illness, avoidance of activity, resting dependent on fatigue levels, 
and physiological changes, such as reduced energy from inactivity.
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Intervention
A collaborative CBT approach was used. Over 5 sessions negative automatic thoughts and 
dysfunctional beliefs related to her health were collected and challenged, using Socratic 
questioning and behavioural challenges. Systemic considerations related to the family 
maintaining her in the sick role were discussed.
Outcome
Despite only a short intervention period due to illness, improvement was observed in the form 
of increased levels of activity and associated self-esteem, by not being reliant on other people 
for everything. She started to do more activities around the house and also arranged her own 
transport on occasions to meet up with friends. BDI-II ratings of depression reduced to 
moderate depression, despite being admitted to hospital at the time of completing the rating 
scales. CORE ratings indicated decreased ratings of . anxiety, depression, and physical 
symptoms and an increase in general functioning.
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Brief insight-oriented psychotherapy with a 23-year old man with moderate to severe 
learning disabilities and aggressive behaviour: A psychodynamic approach.
Reason for referral
A 23-year old white man living in a community home for people with learning disabilities was 
referred to the community team for people with learning disabilities by his care manager, due 
to his aggressive behaviour towards residents and staff.
Presenting problem
He presented with physical and verbal aggression towards staff and other residents, including 
swearing at people and threatening to beat them up.
Assessment
During the assessment interview, information was gained regarding his personal and family 
history, psychiatric history and issues related to Tourette’s syndrome. He had a history of a 
difficult relationship with his family. He reported experiences of aggression towards him 
when he was growing up. He also experienced rejection from his parents. Despite them 
living close-by, they would seldom visit him. His history of Tourette’s diagnosis was 
uncertain. The Health of the Nation Outcome Scales -  Learning Disabilities (HONOS-LD) 
and Personal Relatedness Profile were used as outcome measures. The HONOS-LD 
suggested behavioural difficulties, problems associated with mood changes, and problems of 
attention and concentration. The Personal Relatedness Profile suggested functioning in the 
paranoid-schizoid position rather than the depressive position.
Formulation
His difficulties were formulated using psychodynamic theory. This was based on a model of 
personal development in response to a traumatic environment, in particular the areas of 
emotion regulation, development of attachments and sense of self. His difficulties were 
viewed as switching from a position of vulnerability, of clinging, fearful behaviour to a 
position of power, identifying with the aggressor, and re-enacting previous traumatic 
incidents. Transference and countertransference in relation to current other, therapeutic and 
past relationships were formulated, based on poor attachment relationships. The influence of 
Tourette’s syndrome on relationships became an important part of the formulation, although 
it’s influence on relationships was not initially apparent, for example as a presentation of 
challenging behaviour, such as swearing, and aggressive outbursts, which were not realised by 
staff to be out of the client’s control.
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Intervention
The intervention consisted of 17 half hour sessions, with their focus on containment and 
provision of a positive attachment relationship. The individual intervention was accompanied 
by systemic intervention through the staff team by the trainee’s supervisor.
Outcome
Particular changes were observed in the therapeutic transference, once the influence of 
Tourette’s syndrome was recognised and acknowledged, in addition to the containing 
environment that was provided by the trainee. This was accompanied by a reduction in 
aggressive behaviour within the staff environment. Post-intervention outcome scores for the 
HONOS-LD suggested improvement in behaviour and mood changes. The Personal 
Relatedness Profile suggested greater functioning in the depressive position. However, 
alternative individual accommodation was still found for the client, due to the dynamics of the 
staff team. It was hoped that this could have still been made a positive move in terms of 
greater independence.
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Behavioural problems with a 5-year-old girl: An attachment perspective.
Reason for referral
A 5-year-old-girl was referred by her health visitor to the child and adolescent mental health 
service due to aggressive and non-compliant behaviour towards her mother.
Presenting problem
She presented with aggressive behaviour towards her mother, such as kicking, screaming, and 
hitting.
Assessment
During the assessment interview with both parents and their daughter information was 
gathered in relation to personal and family history, and psychiatric history. The aggressive 
behaviour emerged following the birth of her younger sister. Her mother described being 
unable to get her daughter to do anything, as her daughter would react aggressively towards 
her. The mother had had previous relationship difficulties with her son from a previous 
difficult marriage, and had subsequently been depressed. She was concerned that her current 
relationship was also deteriorating. However, her present husband was very supportive figure. 
The Health of the Nation Outcome Scales -  Children and Adolescents (HONOS-CA) was 
used, which suggested difficulties with aggressive behaviour, peer relationships and family 
relationships.
Formulation
The girl’s aggressive behaviour was formulated from an attachment perceptive, considering an 
insecure attachment between her and her mother. This was associated with decreased self­
esteem of the mother from the previous relationship failure with her son, which influenced the 
way she interacted with her daughter. The systemic influence of the presence of the younger 
daughter and adjustment of the family role, with less involvement of the mother with the older 
daughter was also incorporated.
Intervention
The intervention consisted of 6 fortnightly sessions with the parents, based on attachment 
theory principles and behavioural approaches. It incorporated exploration of the role of the 
previous attachment relationships and provided insight about the influence of past 
relationships on current relationship difficulties. Cognitive techniques were also incorporated
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to challenge dysfunctional assumptions about the current relationship. A behavioural program 
of rewarding good behaviour and ignoring aggressive behaviour was also implemented.
Outcome
Both parents had developed greater insight into the influence of past relationship difficulties 
on the present, and had led to associated cognitive change. The relationship between mother 
and daughter had become more relaxed and less confrontational, with both enjoying spending 
a greater amount of individual time together. Their daughter also started to want to include 
the younger daughter in activities. The mother’s confidence in dealing with difficult 
behaviour had additionally increased. Post-intervention scores on the HONOS-CA indicated 
improvements in family and peer relationships, although ratings of aggressive behaviour did 
not change.
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Neuropsychological assessment of a 95-year-old woman with a history of transient 
ischaemic attacks.
Reason for referral
This 95-year-old woman was referred by her hospital consultant. She had a history of 
difficult relationships with care staff who had been supporting her at home, which people 
attributed to her personality. She had a recent history of transient ischaemic attacks. Her 
consultant wondered whether there was an organic influence on her personality.
Presenting problem
Nursing staff and family reported aggressive outbursts towards staff if they did not do tasks to 
this lady’s liking.
Assessment
Information was obtained from the patient, her daughter, and staff using a standardised 
assessment measure for older people (CAMDEX-R). Nursing staff described her as being 
very demanding and being verbally aggressive to staff when tasks were not done according to 
her wishes. According to her daughter, she had a history of difficult relationships throughout 
her life. She viewed the difficulties as solely related to personality. Her mother had become 
increasingly stubborn the last 5 years, more indecisive, and more changeable in mood. She 
was also profoundly hard of hearing. Her daughter did not think that there had been any 
maj or cognitive changes.
The patient reported that some nurses and staff were rude to her and did not always treat her 
and her possessions with dignity. She liked nurses who did that little bit extra for her. She 
reported that she had some slight difficulty recalling names of less familiar people, but no 
other cognitive difficulties. She displayed disinhibited behaviour during the assessment 
session and rapid changes in mood.
Neuropsychological hypotheses
It was hypothesised that she would show neuropsychological deficits associated with 1) 
transient ischaemic attacks: generalised intellectual decline, slowed processing, poorer recall 
memory, and possible executive dysfunction, or with 2) vascular dementia: generalised 
intellectual decline, significant deficits in executive functioning, and significantly poorer 
recall memory, compared with recognition memory.
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Opinion
Neuropsychological performance suggested general cognitive decline, with significant 
executive deficits in planning and verbal fluency, and impaired memory recall compared with 
recognition memory. This together with observation of disinhibited behaviour, mood lability 
and the additional history of transient ischaemic attacks, increased stubbornness, 
indecisiveness, and mood lability suggested a possible diagnosis of vascular dementia. 
Premorbid personality and deafness were viewed as contributing factors to the behaviour.
Recommendations
Neuropsychological, behaviour management and communication recommendations were 
discussed with the nursing staff and family. This included incorporating structure and routine 
into their approaches to support executive difficulties. Findings also had important 
implications for staff and carer’s in terms of their attribution of her behaviour, which had 
previously solely been attributed to her personality.
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Differential neuropsychological diagnosis of multiple system atrophy or Lewy body 
disease in a 72-year-old man with a present diagnosis of idiopathic Parkinson’s disease.
Reason for referral
This 72-year-old-man was referred by his neurologist. His neurologist was uncertain whether 
a diagnosis of multiple system atrophy or Lewy body disease would be more appropriate than 
his present diagnosis of Parkinson’s disease.
Presenting problem
He presented with increased motor slowness, over a period of three years. He had difficulty 
with fine motor control, decreased speech output, and increased incontinence. He showed 
much less interest in usual activities, such as reading. He also reported seeing people that 
were not there, such as images of the devil, and had delusional beliefs about his wife having 
an affair. He had periodic episodes of acute confusion, attributed to urinary tract infections. 
He had reacted badly to previous antipsychotic medication to treat his hallucinations and 
delusions.
Neuropsychological hypotheses
It was expected that his neuropsychological performance would be consistent with 1) 
Parkinson’s disease: deceased executive functioning, decreased memory recall, but better 
recognition memory, and impaired motor performance; 2) multiple system atrophy: similar to 
Parkinson’s disease, but with greater deficits in verbal fluency and motor performance; 3) 
Lewy body dementia: pronounced visuospatial / visuoperceptual and visuoconstructional 
deficits, impaired attention, verbal fluency and similar deficits in executive functioning.
Neuropsychological assessment
Standardised measures were used and clinical observation. These included WAIS-in, WMS- 
III, WATR, VOSP, TEA, D-KEFS, and GNT. He showed significant impairment on 
visuoperceptual / visuospatial and visuoconstructional tasks, had impaired selective attention, 
executive deficits, and pronounced motor impairment. He also demonstrated delusional 
behaviour during the assessment and was observed to have problems with figure ground 
discrimination on a confrontation naming task.
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Opinion
This neuropsychological profile and observations taken together with his past history of 
reaction to neuroleptic medication, hallucinations and delusions, periods of acute confusion, 
and incontinence, were suggestive of Lewy body pathology in addition to Parkinson’s disease. 
These findings were communicated to the referring neurologist to assist with treatment for the 
patient.
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Service Related Research Project 
The development o f self-ejficacy amongst trainee clinical psychologists.
Year 1 
June 2001
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Abstract
Self-efficacy and state and trait anxiety of 225 trainee clinical psychologists at seven clinical 
psychology training courses in the south of England were analysed. First, second and third 
year trainees completed postal questionnaires. Self-efficacy was measured using a version of 
the Counseling Self-Estimate Inventory (Larson, Suzuki, Gillespie, Potenza, Bechtel, & 
Toulouse, 1992), adapted for trainee clinical psychologists. Principal component analysis 
revealed 6 underlying components, which differ slightly to Larson et al. (1992). These were: -
1) core clinical psychology skills; 2) process; 3) therapeutic skills; 4) dealing with difficult 
client behaviour; 5) cultural competence; and 6) awareness of values. Self-efficacy was found 
to increase across the years of training, significantly in the 3rd year. Trainees with higher 
ratings of self-efficacy had lower ratings of both state and trait anxiety, measured by the State- 
Trait Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger, 1983). The relationship with the 6 components and 
state and trait anxiety is also discussed. The findings have important implications for clinical 
psychology training, as self-efficacious trainees are more likely to be able to cope with the 
demands of training and develop professional identification.
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Introduction
Self-efficacy theory and application to clinical psychology training
Self-efficacy, described by Bandura (1977) as, “the conviction that one can successfully 
execute the behaviour required to produce outcomes,” is suggested to be a key factor in 
human competence and performance accomplishments (Bandura, 1997). To function 
effectively in an activity requires both skills and the efficacy belief to use them (Bandura, 
1997). It is also believed that self-efficacy best develops through actual experience or 
enactive mastery (Bandura, 1997). Mastery itself is suggested to have particular vocational 
importance, as it is associated with developing professional identification and commitment to 
a career (Bucher and Stelling, 1977).
Larson et al. (1992) have developed a standardised questionnaire: the Counseling Self- 
Estimate Inventory (COSE) to measure self-efficacy amongst trainee counselling 
psychologists. In a study of 213 counselling psychology trainees, they found that self-efficacy 
increased as practical experience was gained, and was a significant predictor of trainees’ 
performance. The measure has good reliability with the items being internally consistent (a 
= .93). Larson et al. (1992) state that the validity has some preliminary support in terms of a) 
being positively related to counsellor performance; b) being negatively related to state and 
trait anxiety; and c) being able to detect changes across the counsellor practical experience 
and with different levels of counselling experience.
Professional and psychological adaptation in relation to clinical training 
The limited amount of research on trainee clinical psychologist development has so far 
focused on areas such as professional socialisation (Cheshire, 2000a) or psychological 
adaptation (Kuyken, Peters, Power, & Lavender, 1998; Kuyken, Peters, Power, Lavender, and 
Rabe-Hesketh, 2000). Cheshire (2000a) using a semi-structured interview approach found that 
identification and confidence developed mainly in the third year of training among 39 Scottish 
trainee clinical psychologists. First year trainees frequently described themselves as “pretend 
psychologists”, feeling uncertain about what they were supposed to be doing in clinical 
sessions. Second year trainees started to believe in themselves slightly more as “real 
psychologists”, and third year trainees found the last year the time when their confidence 
really developed.
Cheshire (2000b) also found widespread anxiety in trainee clinical psychologists as they made 
the transition from assistant psychologist to trainee. She suggests that trainees may be
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overwhelmed by the expectations and distress expressed by clients. They may struggle with 
their own expectations of their clinical performance, even when they have considerable 
relevant experience. This may at first be as a result of feeling deskilled. Kuyken et al. (1998) 
in a study of 183 trainees using multiple scales, found that at least 25% of trainees reported 
significant self-esteem problems, problems adjusting at work and depression and anxiety. 
Kuyken et al. (2000) followed up the previous study with 167 trainees using the Employee 
Assistance Program Inventory (EAPI). They reported that levels of psychological distress 
significantly increased between year one and year two of training. They suggest that there 
may be a connection between a longstanding difficulty and anxiety. The EAPI is said to have 
moderate to high concurrent validity with trait anxiety (Anton & Reed: cited in Kuyken et al., 
2000). Larson et al. (1992), found that anxiety was also a significant predictor of trainee 
counselling psychologist performance and that state and trait anxiety on the State Trait 
Anxiety Inventory (STAI, Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983) was 
negatively correlated with counselling self-efficacy.
Rationale for study
The research so far on self-efficacy amongst trainees has largely concentrated on trainee 
counselling psychologists. It has yet to be established whether the findings of Larson et al. 
(1992) would be replicated in a population of clinical psychology trainees. Furthermore, there 
has as yet been no attempt to ascertain whether other measures of psychological adaptation 
(such as anxiety) relate to self-reports of self-efficacy amongst clinical psychology trainees. 
This study aims to address these gaps in the literature.
In particular, this research aims to plot self-efficacy and anxiety cross-sectionally over the 
three years of clinical psychology training, using a version of the COSE adapted for use with 
clinical psychology trainees, and the STAI. The relationship between self-efficacy and 
demographic/experiential factors such as age; gender; and years of relevant work experience 
before clinical training will also be explored.
Hypotheses
1. Self-efficacy will increase over the three years of clinical psychology training.
2. Self-efficacy will be negatively related to state and trait anxiety.
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Method
Design
A mixed within-participant and between participant design was used. The within participant 
factors were self-efficacy and anxiety (state and trait). The between participant factors were 
year of training, age, gender, and years of relevant work experience prior to clinical 
psychology training.
Participants
First year, second year and third year clinical psychology trainees from seven clinical 
psychology training courses in the south of England were asked to participate. The total 
available sample was 394.
Measures
The Counselling Self-estimate Inventory (COSE, Larson et al., 1992) was adapted for use 
with trainee clinical psychologists. This involved the insertion of 6 additional questions that 
were thought to be relevant to trainee clinical psychologists (see appendix 1). Suggested 
items came from the author their supervisor, and training criteria outlined in the Surrey course 
handbook. These items covered: integrating psychological theory, research and practice; 
research theory and methodology; formulation; use of psychometrics; transferring skills. 
These items were added in random order to the existing questionnaire. The wording of some 
of the existing items had to be changed to be relevant to trainee clinical psychologists and also 
to trainees working with different theoretical orientations. It was thought that some items 
were particularly slanted towards a psychodynamic orientation and would not be 
representative of all trainees. (See appendix 1 for all alterations).
The State Trait and Anxiety Inventory (STAI, Spielberger et al., 1983) was also used to 
provide a measure of state and trait anxiety (see appendix 2). This inventory consists of forty 
4-point Likert items, with 20 items measuring state anxiety and 20 items measuring trait 
anxiety. Higher scores reflect greater state and trait anxiety. Test-retest reliability varies for 
state anxiety as would be expected (.16 to 62), but is more stable for trait anxiety from .65 
to.75. (Spielberger et al., 1983). As state anxiety is expected to change over time the 
reliability is considered adequate (Spielberger, 1970: cited in Larson et al., 1992).
A demographic form was also constructed by the researcher (see appendix 3) consisting of 
age, gender, year of training, and years of relevant experience prior to clinical training.
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(Relevant experience, academic qualifications, placements experienced on training, and 
theoretical preference were later excluded due to lack of space).
Procedure
Following approval by the University of Surrey Ethics Committee (see appendix 4), Course 
Directors at the seven courses were approached by letter (see appendix 5) to obtain their 
permission to conduct the research with their trainees. Participants were recruited by sending 
out the COSE, STAI and demographic page to the administrator of the courses that had agreed 
to participate. Sufficient copies were sent out for all three years of the relevant courses. Each 
trainee was also sent a covering letter explaining the nature of the research and highlighting 
the confidentiality (see appendix 6). Trainees were also given as self-addressed envelope to 
return the questionnaires in. Informed consent was assumed to be reflected in the 
questionnaire’s return. A second mail shot (see appendix 7) was carried out two weeks after 
the original mailing, in order to maximise the response rate (Dillman,1978).
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Analyses
Descriptive statistics were used to examine the characteristics of the sample. Principal 
components analysis (PCA) was used to examine the structure of the self-efficacy 
questionnaire. Due to significant skewness for state and trait anxiety (see appendix 8), non- 
parametric statistics (Mann Whitney U and Kruskal Wallis) were used to test for between 
group differences. Spearman’s rank was used for correlations between self-efficacy and 
anxiety, due to significant skewness with state and trait anxiety.
Results
Response rate
225 (57%) trainees completed the questionnaire, 125 (56%) on the first mail shot and 100 
(44%) on the second mail shot.
Descriptive data
Descriptive statistics in relation to age and gender distribution, year of training, and length of 
work experience prior to clinical training can be found in Tables 1 to 4.
Table 1: Frequencies by age
Age Frequency Percent
under 30 187 83.1
30 plus 38 16.9
Table 2: Frequencies by gender
Gender Frequency Percent
male 44 19.6
female 181 80.4
Training variables
Table 3: Frequencies by year o f training
Year of training Frequency Percent
year 1 96 42.7
year 2 78 34.7
year 3 51 22.7
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Table 4: Frequencies by years o f relevant work experience prior to clinical training
Years of relevant Frequency Percent
work experience
0-2 years 77 34.2
2-3 years 81 36
3 years plus 67 29.8
Recoding
Before all analyses, negatively reversed items were recoded, so that higher scores indicate 
higher estimates of self-efficacy and high anxiety for all items.
Self-efficacy
Principal Component Analysis (PCA)
PCA was conducted to examine the comparability of components within this sample to those 
reported by Larson et al. (1992), who had initially extracted 14 components and reduced this 
to 5 components (See appendix 9 for comparison of items). From the 43 self-efficacy items, 
PCA with varimax rotation yielded 10 components with eigenvalues greater than 1.00, 
accounting for 60% of the total variance. The eigenvalue for the first component was (11.740, 
27% of variance). The components were reduced to 8 factors using Cattell’s scree test (1966: 
cited in Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001) and then reduced to 6 components, due to only two items 
in the last two components. Only items with factor loadings above .40 were retained. This 
appeared to be the best solution to approximate simple structure (Thurstone 1946: cited in 
Larson et al., 1992). 6 components were identified as follows: -
1) Core clinical psychology skills: The questionnaire items loading on this component, 
seemed to represent skills in research, psychological formulation and integrating 
psychological theory and practice.
2) Process seemed to depend on the trainee client feedback loop. This depends on the trainee 
monitoring and reacting to several interactions with a client.
3) Therapeutic skills appeared to reflect having the knowledge to be confident in practice..
4) Difficult client behaviour seemed to involve feeling able to work with people who are 
unmotivated, suicidal, or indecisive.
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5) Cultural competence involved working with clients of different ethnic or social 
backgrounds.
6) Awareness of values concerned trainee’s being aware of bringing biases or values into their 
work in the form of countertransference.
Components 2, 4, 5, 6 were almost identical to Larson et al. (1992) in terms of the items 
included and include their title for the component (see appendix 9 for any difference in items, 
compared to Table 6.).
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29. 
I do 
not feel I possess 
a 
large 
enough 
repertoire 
of techniques 
to 
deal with 
different problem
s 
my 
client m
ay 
present.
27. 
W
hen 
giving 
responses, i.e. reflection 
of feeling, active 
listening, clarification, probing, I’m 
afraid 
that they 
w
on’t be 
effective 
in 
that they 
w
on’t be 
validated 
by 
the 
client’s 
im
m
ediate 
response.
26. 
I am 
uncertain 
as to 
w
hether I w
ill be 
able 
to 
appropriately 
intervene 
and 
challenge 
my 
client in 
therapy.
22. 
I am 
not sure 
that in 
a 
therapeutic 
relationship 
I will express m
yself in 
a 
way 
that is natural w
ithout deliberating 
over every 
response 
or action.
18. 
I may 
not be 
able 
to 
m
aintain 
the 
intensity 
and 
energy 
level needed 
to 
produce 
client confidence 
and 
active 
participation.
9. 
I am 
worried 
that the 
type 
of response 
that I use 
at a 
particular tim
e, i.e. reflection 
of feeling, interpretation, etc., 
may 
not be 
the 
appropriate 
response.
7. 
I am 
worried 
that the 
wording 
of my 
responses - 
like 
reflection 
of feeling, clarification 
and 
probing 
may 
be 
confusing 
and 
hard 
to 
understand.
2) 
P
rocess
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3
.1 feel that I am 
able 
to 
draw 
on 
my 
general psychological know
ledge 
when 
working 
with 
clients 
and 
populations 
with 
different needs.
3
7
.1 feel confident that I will be 
able 
to 
conceptualize 
my 
clients’ problem
s.
21.1 feel able 
to 
use 
form
ulation 
and 
com
plex 
problem 
solving 
skills, drawing 
on 
psychological theory, research 
and 
their clinical application.
19.1 do 
not feel confident that I can 
integrate 
psychological theory, research 
and 
practice.
17.1 feel that I have 
enough 
fundam
ental know
ledge 
to 
do 
effective 
therapy.
14.1 am 
confident that both 
my 
form
ulation 
and 
suggestions 
for 
intervention 
will be 
effective.
11.1 believe 
I have 
a 
good 
understanding 
of research 
theory 
and 
m
ethodology 
and 
feel able 
to 
apply 
it in 
evaluating 
and 
developing 
clinical practice.
6
.1 am 
certain 
that both 
my 
form
ulation 
and 
suggestions 
for 
intervention 
will be 
concise 
and 
to 
the 
point.
3
.1 feel confident that I can 
draw 
upon 
a 
broad 
theoretical and 
research 
know
ledge 
base 
and 
apply 
this 
appropriately 
to 
my 
clinical practice.
1) Core 
clinical psychology 
skills
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33. 
I am 
unsure 
as how 
to 
deal with 
clients who 
appear noncom
m
ittal and 
indecisive.
32. 
I may 
have 
difficulty 
with 
clients who 
do 
not verbalize 
their thoughts during 
the 
therapy 
session.
31. 
I am 
uncom
fortable 
dealing 
with 
clients 
who 
appear unm
otivated 
to 
work 
towards 
m
utually 
determ
ined 
goals.
30. 
I feel confident regarding 
my 
ability 
to 
deal with 
crisis 
situations which 
may 
arise 
during 
therapy 
sessions - 
e.g. 
suicide, alcoholism
, abuse, etc.
4) D
ifficult client behaviour
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39. 
I am 
confident that I can 
assess my 
client’s readiness and 
com
m
itm
ent for change.
24. 
I am 
confident that I will know 
when 
to 
use 
open 
or close 
ended 
probes, and 
that these probes will reflect the 
concerns of the 
client and 
not be trivial.
20. 
I am 
confident that the wording 
of both 
my 
form
ulation 
of the 
client’s situation 
and 
suggestions for intervention 
will be 
clear and 
easy 
for the 
client to 
understand.
16. 
I feel that the 
content of both 
my 
form
ulation 
and 
suggestions for intervention 
will be an 
accurate reflection 
of 
what the 
client is saying.
15. 
I feel confident that I have resolved 
conflicts in 
my 
personal life 
so 
that they 
will not interfere 
with 
my 
therapist 
abilities.
13. 
I feel confident that I will appear com
petent and 
earn 
the respect of my 
client.
12. 
I am 
sure 
that the 
content of my 
responses, i.e. reflection 
of m
eaning, clarification, and 
probing 
will be an 
accurate 
reflection 
of what the 
client is saying.
10. 
I feel I will respond 
to 
the 
client in 
an 
appropriate 
length 
of time 
(neither interrupting 
the 
client nor waiting 
too 
long 
to 
respond).
5. 
I am 
confident that I will respond 
appropriately 
to 
the 
client in 
view 
of what the 
client will express (my 
questions 
will be m
eaningful and 
not concerned 
with 
trivia 
and 
m
inutia).
2. 
W
hen 
I initiate the 
end 
of a 
session 
I am 
positive 
it will not be 
in 
a manner that is abrupt or brusque 
and 
that I w
ill 
end 
the 
session 
on 
tim
e.
1. 
W
hen 
using 
responses like 
feeling, active 
listening, clarification, probing, I am 
confident I will be 
concise 
and 
to 
the point.
3) Therapeutic 
skills
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38. 
I am 
unsure 
as to 
how 
I will lead 
my 
client towards the 
developm
ent and 
selection 
of concrete 
goals to 
work 
towards.
36. 
I am 
worried 
that both 
my 
form
ulation 
and 
suggestions for intervention 
may 
not over time 
assist the 
client to 
be 
more 
specific 
in 
defining 
and 
clarifying 
the problem
.
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28. 
I believe 
that I am 
com
petent in 
my 
adm
inistration 
of psychom
etric 
assessm
ent.
25. 
M
y 
assessm
ent of clients’ problem
s 
may 
not be 
as 
accurate 
as 
I would 
like 
them 
to 
be.
23. 
I am 
afraid 
that I may 
not understand 
and 
properly 
determ
ine 
m
eanings 
of the 
client’s non-verbal behaviours.
Items deleted 
based 
on 
loadings below 
.40
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40. 
I feel that I may 
give 
advice.
8. 
I feel that I may 
not be 
able 
to 
respond 
to 
the 
client in 
a 
non-judgem
ental way 
with 
respect to 
the 
clients’ values, 
beliefs, etc.
4. 
I am 
likely 
to 
im
pose 
my 
values 
on 
the 
client during 
the 
therapeutic 
process.
6) Awareness of values
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42. 
I 
am 
afraid 
that I may 
not be 
able 
to 
relate 
to 
som
eone 
of lower 
socio-econom
ic 
status 
than 
m
e.
41. 
In 
working 
with 
culturally 
different clients 
I may 
have 
a 
difficult time 
viewing 
situations 
from 
their perspective.
35. 
I feel I will be 
an 
effective 
psychologist with 
clients 
of a 
different social class.
34. 
W
hen 
working 
with 
ethnic 
m
inority 
clients 
I am 
confident that I will be 
able 
to 
bridge 
cultural differences 
in 
the 
therapeutic 
process.
5) 
C
ultural
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Reliability analysis
A reliability analysis of the self-efficacy and the components was then undertaken using 
Crohnbach’s alpha. The internal consistency score for the COSE total score and the 6 
component scores were: COSE total, a  = .93; Core clinical psychology skills, a  = .88; 
Process, a  = .83; Therapeutic skills, a  = .82; Difficult client behaviour, a  = .71; Cultural, a  = 
.73; Awareness of values, a  = .46. The item total correlations ranged from .47 to .77 (see 
table 6.).
Demographic influences on self-efficacy
Table 7. shows the mean and standard deviations for the 6 components and total self-efficacy 
score. (See appendix 10 for all mean ranks data)
Mean SD
Core clinical psychology 
skills
36.67 9.04
Process 36.70 6.64
Therapeutic skills 46.91 6.56
Dealing with difficult 
client behaviour
14.39 3.37
Cultural competence 17.75 3.13
Awareness of values 13.31 2.33
Self-efficacy total 165.49 21.86
Table 7.
Total self-efficacy score
Demographic influences upon self-efficacy ratings were examined by means of Kruskal- 
Wallis analyses. There was a highly significant difference for year of training, (H = 18.857, 
df = 2, p< .001). Post hoc comparisons using Mann Whitney U found a significant difference 
between years 2 and 3, (U = 1399.50, p= .005). The mean rank of self-efficacy scores were 
higher in year 3. There were no significant differences for age (H = .051, df = 1, p> .05); 
gender (H = .003, df = 1, p> .05); or years of relevant work experience (H = .981, df = 2, p> 
.05).
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Component efficacy scores
1) Core clinical psychology skills
There were significant differences for gender (H = 5.256, df = 1, p = .022) and year of 
training (H = 18.970, df = 2, p = < .001). The mean rank for males was higher than for 
females. Mann Whitney U revealed a significant difference between years 3 and 2 and 2 and 
1. Year 3 had a higher mean rank than year 2 (U =1461,p  = .011) and year 2 a higher mean 
rank than year 1 (U = 3094.50, p = .049). There was no significant effect for age (H = 1.823, 
df = 1, p> .05) or years of relevant work experience (H = 3.242, df = 2, p> .05).
2) Process
Kruskal-Wallis analysis revealed a significant difference for year of training (H = 16.484, df 
= 2, p< .001). Year 3 had a significantly higher mean rank than year 2 (U = 1268, p = .001). 
There were no significant differences for age (H = .013, df =1, p> .05); gender (H = .095, df 
=1, p> .05); and years of relevant work experience prior to clinical training (H = .450, df = 2, 
p> .05).
3) Therapeutic skills
There was a significant difference for year of training (H = 12.952, df =2, p = .002). Year 3 
had a significantly higher mean rank than year 2 (U = 1418.50, p = .006). There were no 
significant differences for age (H =.244, d f=1, p> .05); gender (H = .258, d f=1, p> .05); and 
years of relevant work experience (H = 3.580, df =2, p> .05).
4) Dealing with difficult client behaviour
There were no significant differences for age (H =.743, d f=1, p> .05); gender (H = .258, d f= 
1, p> .05); year of training (H = 3.547, df = 2, p> .05); and years of relevant work experience 
(H = .429, df = 2, p> .05).
5) Cultural competence
There were no significant differences for age (H =.044, d f=1, p> .05); gender (H = .412, d f= 
1, p> .05); year of training (H = 3.547, df = 2, p> .05); and years of relevant work experience 
(H = 2.508, df = 2, p> .05).
6) Awareness of values
There were no significant differences for age (H = .000, df =1, p> .05) and years of relevant 
work experience (H = 1.057, df = 2, p> .05). There were significant differences for gender (H
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= 14.942, df = 1, p< .001) and year of training (H = 9.076, df =2, p = .011). Females had a 
significantly higher mean rank than males. Year three had a significantly higher mean rank 
than year 1 (U =1708, p = .002).
State and Trait Anxiety
Table 9. shows the state and trait anxiety median and standard deviations. Median are given, 
due to skewed scores.
Median SD
State Total 36 10.64
Trait Total 38 9.32
Table 9.
State Anxiety
Kruskal-Wallis revealed a significant difference for years of relevant work experience, (H = 
8.776, df = 2, p = .012). Mann Whitney U showed that the significant difference was between 
2 -3 years work experience and 3 years plus experience, (U = 2194.500, p = .045). 3 years 
work experience had a lower mean rank for state anxiety. There was no significant difference 
for age, (H = .458, df = 2, p> .05); gender, (H = 1.882, df = 1, p> .05); or year of training, (H 
= 2.835, df=2, p> .05).
Trait Anxiety
There were significant differences for gender, (H = 4.847, df = 1, p = .028) and year of 
training, (H = 8.223, df = 2, p = .016). Females had a significantly higher mean rank on trait 
anxiety than males. Mann Whitney U revealed that the significant difference was between 
years 3 and 2, (U = 1497.00, p = .018). The mean rank of trait anxiety was significantly lower 
in year 3 than year 2. There were no significant difference for age, (H = .241, df = 2, p> .05); 
years of relevant work experience, (H = 2.499, df = 2, p> .05).
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The relationship between self-efficacy and anxiety
Table 10. shows the correlations between scores for total self-efficacy, components and state 
and trait anxiety.
State Anxiety Trait Anxiety
Self-efficacy total -.21* _ 40**
Core clinical 
psychology skills
-.08 -.30**
Process -.23* -.34**
Therapeutic skills -.20* _ 29**
Dealing with difficult 
client behaviour
-.13* -.25**
Cultural competence -.11 -.12
Awareness .02 -.02
Table 10.
Significance * p< .05
**p< .001
State anxiety
There were significant negative correlations with state anxiety and total self-efficacy score ( r 
= -.21, p< .001); process (r = -.23, p = .001); therapeutic skills (r = -.20, p =.003); and dealing 
with difficult client behaviour (r = -.13, p= .049).
There were no significant correlations with core clinical psychology skills (r = -.08, p> .05); 
cultural competence (r = -.113, p> .05); and awareness of values (r = -.020, p> .05).
Trait anxiety
There were significant negative correlations with trait anxiety and total self-efficacy scores (r 
= -.40, p< .001); core clinical psychology skills (r = -.30, p< .001); process (r =-.34, p< .001); 
therapeutic skills (r = -.39, p< .001); and dealing with difficult client behaviour (r = -.25, p< 
.001).
There were no significant correlations with cultural competence (r =-.12, p> .05) or awareness 
of values (r =-.02, p> .05).
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Discussion
The response rate for this sample compares favourably with that of Kuyken et al. (2000, 
60.7% for 1st and 2nd year trainees). Larson et al. (1992) had a 100% response rate, although 
it was a course requirement to complete the questionnaires.
PCA analyses revealed that the underlying structure of the self-efficacy questionnaire for 
trainee clinical psychologists is slightly different to the original questionnaire designed for 
trainee counselling psychologists (Larson et al. (1992). Both questionnaires had the 
components 2) process, 4) dealing with difficult client behaviour, 5) cultural competence and
6) awareness of values in common. Their differing components were 1) core clinical 
psychology skills and 3) therapeutic skills (largely microskills from Larson et al. 1992). 
Additional items that were included to make the self-efficacy questionnaire relevant to trainee 
clinical psychologists may have affected this. 5/9 items in component one (core clinical 
psychology skills) were additional items. Component 1 now seemed to focus on core skills of 
a clinical psychologist, such as formulation, knowledge of research methodology and the 
ability to integrate psychological theory and practice. Interestingly, this component now 
accounted for the majority of variance. With counselling psychologists, microskills (now 
therapeutic skills) accounted for the most variance, which Larson et al, (1992) described as 
core counselling skills. Other factors retained most of the items from Larson et al. (1992). 
The internal consistency of the questionnaire was not affected by the insertion of items 
relevant to trainee clinical psychologists. Of the additional items, use of psychometric 
assessment surprisingly had little contribution to ratings of self-efficacy, with the majority of 
trainees rating their abilities as high.
This study shows that self-efficacy ratings differ across years of clinical psychology training 
as well as counselling psychology. Ratings of self-efficacy were shown to increase across the 
three years of training, in particular between the 3rd and 2nd year trainees, providing support 
for hypothesis 1. This also supports the findings of Cheshire (2000), who found that although 
2nd year trainees felt more confident than 1st year trainees, the 3rd year was when their 
confidence really developed. Gender had no effect in terms of overall self-efficacy, which 
supports the findings of (Larson et al., 1992).
Year of training was also an influential factor in component self-efficacy ratings. Again the 
third year was the time when there were significant increases in self-efficacy ratings. 
However, for core clinical psychology skills there was a significant increase in efficacy 
ratings between all three years. These may take less time to improve than therapeutic or
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process skills, which may require longer clinical experience. Only confidence in dealing with 
difficult client behaviour and cultural competence did not seem to increase significantly 
throughout the years of training. Cultural competence ratings hardly changed across the years 
of training, with trainees rating themselves as fairly efficacious throughout clinical training. 
Gender was also a factor. Males rated themselves as more efficacious in core skills. 
However, females rated themselves as more self-efficacious with awareness of values.
The influence of demographic variables upon state anxiety revealed that year of training had 
no significant effect. However, this may have been affected by 3rd years being anxious at the 
time of completing the questionnaires, as they were about to hand in their theses. Trait 
anxiety, was significantly lower in the third year of training.
Trainees with more years of relevant work experience prior to clinical training seemed to 
exhibit less state anxiety. This contradicts the findings of Cheshire (2000), who found that 
that previous experience had little to do with anxiety. Whether she included state anxiety or 
solely focused on trait anxiety is uncertain. Gender was an important factor in trait anxiety, 
with females exhibiting significantly more than males.
Self-efficacy was also examined in relation to state and trait anxiety. A negative relationship 
was found with both. This replicates the findings of Larson et al. (1992), but with trainee 
clinical psychologists. Higher ratings for process, therapeutic skills and dealing with difficult 
client behaviour were also associated with low trait and state anxiety. Only trait anxiety 
varied significantly with core clinical skills, suggesting that perhaps developing confidence in 
core clinical psychology skills such as research and formulation is linked with personality 
characteristics of trainees. This may add support to Kuyken et al. (2000), who found that 
trainees who had problems coping with demands of clinical training continued to do so 
throughout the course of training. Cultural competence and awareness of values seem to have 
little relationship with anxiety.
Limitations of study
Due to the cross-sectional design, factors can only be considered as associations. Trainees 
were not followed across the three years of training. A longitudinal study would have been 
better, but was not possible due to time constraints. Design of the self-efficacy questionnaire 
itself could also be improved. Many items contain two elements, which is not desirable for 
questionnaire design. This may mean that people may agree to one item but not the other. 
However, this was based on the questionnaire by Larson et al. (1992), which already had
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good reliability and convergent validity. Important areas are also neglected in the 
questionnaire. For example, the questionnaire doe not include working with care staff or 
families. In addition, whilst there was a good response rate, there may be a systematic bias in 
the sample, with more self-efficacious trainees responding.
Implications for trainine
The findings suggest that self-efficacy does appear to increase throughout clinical psychology 
training. Self-efficacy theory (Bandura, 1977) applied to clinical psychology trainees, implies 
that trainees with higher self-efficacy are more likely to approach, expend more effort and 
persist in clinical psychology behaviours. This is important in light of the research by 
Kuyken et al. (2000). Trainees who are more self-efficacious are more likely to be able to be 
able to draw from personal and professional resources in the face of demands of clinical 
training. This is important with the high levels of depression and anxiety reported by Kuyken 
et al. (2000) amongst some trainees. Self-efficacious trainees are also more likely to commit 
to their career and develop professional identification (Bucher & Stelling, 1977), which is 
important for the future growth of clinical psychology in the National Health Service.
Future directions
Further research needs to ascertain in greater detail, which particular aspects of course or 
placement experience facilitate self-efficacy. Cheshire (2000a) found that both insufficiently 
clear connections between theory and practice in supervision, as well as inadequate feedback 
about their own interventions, left trainees confused. The experience of success and failure is 
very important in the development of self-efficacy (Bandura, 1997). Failure can be much 
more detrimental to self-efficacy than any benefits of success (Bandura, 1977). How trainees 
experience success and failure is an important direction for further research.
Feedback to service
Findings of the research project were fed back to trainees via course directors in the form of a 
letter (see appendix 11 for responses from course directors). Additionally, the research was 
presented orally to first and second year trainees at the author’s university.
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Appendix 1
* = items changed from original questionnaire, which were thought to have a psychodynamic
slant (text in italics is original wording of item.
(CP) = items changed to be more relevant to trainee clinical psychologists (text underlined is
original wording of items).
N = new items inserted relevant to clinical psychology training
The rating for each item was: -
strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 strongly agree
1. When using responses like reflection of feeling, active listening, clarification, 
probing, I am confident I will be concise and to the point.
2. When I initiate the end of a session I am positive it will not be in a manner that is not 
abrupt nor brusque and that I will end the session on time.
3. I feel confident that I can draw upon a broad theoretical and research knowledge base and 
apply this appropriately to my clinical practice. (N)
4. I am likely to impose my values on the client during the therapeutic process.
5. I am confident that I will respond appropriately to the client in view of what the 
client will express (e.g. my questions will be meaningful and not concerned with trivia 
and minutia).
6. I am certain that both my formulation and suggestions for intervention will be concise and 
to the point. *
I  am certain that my interpretation and confrontation responses will be concise and to the 
point.
7. I am worried that the wording of my responses - like reflection of feeling, clarification 
and probing may be confusing and hard to understand.
8. I feel that I may not be able to respond to the client in a non-judgemental way with 
respect to the client’s values, beliefs, etc.
9. I am worried that the type of responses I use at a particular time, i.e. reflection of 
feeling, interpretation, etc., may not be the appropriate response.
10. I feel I will respond to the client in an appropriate length of time (neither interrupting 
the client nor waiting too long to respond).
11. I believe I have a good understanding of research theory and methodology and feel able 
to apply it in evaluating and developing clinical practice. (N)
12. I am sure that the content of my responses, i.e. reflection of meaning, clarification, 
and probing will be an accurate reflection of what the client is saying.
13.1 feel confident that I will appear competent and earn the respect of my client.
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14. I am confident that both my formulation and suggestions for intervention will be 
effective. *
I  am confident that my interpretation and confrontation responses will be effective in that 
they will be validated by the client’s immediate response.
15.1 feel confident that I have resolved conflicts in my personal life so that they will not 
interfere with my therapist abilities.
16. I feel that the content of both my formulation and suggestions for intervention will be an 
accurate reflection of what the client is saying. *
Ifeel that the content o f my interpretation and confrontation responses will be consistent 
with and not discrepant from what the client is saying.
17. I feel that I have enough fundamental knowledge to do effective therapy.
I feel that I have enough fundamental knowledge to do effective counseling.
18. I may not be able to maintain the intensity and energy level needed to produce client 
confidence and active participation.
19. I do not feel confident that I can integrate psychological theory, research and practice. (N)
20. I am confident that the wording of both my formulation of the client’s situation and 
suggestions for intervention will be clear and easy for the client to understand. *
I  am confident that the wording o f my interpretation and confrontation responses will be 
clear and easy to understand.
21.1 feel able to psychologically formulate clinical cases. (N)
22. I am not sure that in a therapeutic relationship I will express myself in a way that is 
natural without deliberating over every response or action.
I am not sure that in a counseling relationship I will express mvself in a wav that is 
natural without deliberating over every response or action.
23. I am afraid that I may not understand and properly determine meanings of the client’s 
non-verbal behaviours.
24. I am confident that I will know when to use open or close ended probes, and that 
these probes will reflect the concerns of the client and not be trivial.
25. My assessment of clients’ problems may not be as accurate as I would like them to 
be.
26. I am uncertain as to whether I will be able to appropriately intervene with and 
challenge my client in therapy. *
I  am uncertain as to whether I  will be able to appropriately confront and 
challenge my client in therapy.
27. When giving responses, i.e. reflection of feeling, active listening, clarification, 
probing, I’m afraid that they won’t be effective in that they won’t be validated by the 
client’s immediate response.
28. I believe that I am competent in my choice and administration of psychometric 
assessment. (N)
123
Service Related Research Project
29. I do not feel I possess a large enough repertoire of techniques to deal with the 
different problems my client may present
30. I feel confident regarding my abilities to deal with crisis situations which may arise 
during the therapy sessions -  e.g. suicide, alcoholism, abuse, etc.
31. I am uncomfortable dealing with clients who appear unmotivated to work towards 
mutually determined goals.
32.1 may have difficulty with clients who do not verbalise their thoughts during the 
therapy session.
33. I am unsure as how to deal with clients who appear noncommittal and indecisive.
34. When working with ethnic minority clients I am confident that I will be able to 
bridge cultural differences in the therapeutic process.
When working with ethnic minority clients I am confident that I will be able to 
bridge cultural differences in the counseling process.
35. I feel I will be an effective psychologist with clients of a different social class.
I feel I will be an effective counselor with clients of a different social class.
36. I am worried that both my formulation and suggestions for intervention may not over 
time assist the client to be more specific in defining and clarifying the problem. *
I  am worried that my interpretation and confrontation responses may not over 
time assist the client to be more specific in defining and clarifying the problem.
37. I feel confident that I will be able to conceptualise my clients’ problems.
38. I am unsure as to how I will lead my client towards the development and selection of 
concrete goals to work toward.
39. I am confident that I can assess my client’s readiness and commitment to change.
40. I feel I may give advice.
41. In working with culturally different clients I may have a difficult time viewing 
situations from their perspective.
42. I am afraid that I may not be able to relate to someone of lower socio-economic status 
than me.
43. I feel that I am able to draw on my general psychological knowledge when working with 
clients and populations with different needs. (N)
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SELF-EVALUATION QUESTieNNM RE^
Devclopc^^SR^rics^). Spielberger 
R.L. Gorsuch, R. Lushcnc, P.R. Vagg, and GA. Jacobs
STAI Form Y-l
N am e:______________________________]___________________  Date:   S______
Age:________ :___________  Sex: M ___ F _ ______ T______
DIRECTIONS: A number of statements which people have used to describe 
themselves are given below. Read each statement and then blacken in the
appropriate circle to the right of the statement to indicate how you feel right 4^ .
now, that is, a t this moment. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not ^  ^  9 ^
spend too much time on any one statement but give the answer which seems to 9 ^  4?^
describe your present feelings best.
V  v*
1. I feel ca lm   ( l )  ©  CD (D
2. I feel secure     ©  (D  ©  ©
3. I am tense       ©  ©  ©  ©
4. I feel strained     ©  ©  ©  (&
5. I feel at ease    ®  ©  ©  ©
6. I feel upset   CD CD CD ©
7. lam  presendy worrying over possible misfortunes     CD CD CD ©
8. I feel satisfied  CD CD CD ©
9. I feel frightened   CD (D  (D  ©
10. I feel comfortable.......................   ©  ®  CD ©
11. I feel self-confident ........................................ . . . ....................................................... ©  ®  ®  ©  .
12. I feel nervous .................    ®  CD ®  (D
13. I am jittery....................................................................................................................  ®  ®  ®  ©
14. I feel indecisive.......................................................................................• ...................  ®  ®  ®  ©
15. I am relaxed .................................................... . ...........................................................  ®  ®  ®  ©
16. I feel content..........................................................    ®  ©  ®  ©
17. I am worried ...................................................................................................  ®  ®  ®  ©
18. I feel confused .............................................................................................................. CD CD CD
19. I feel steady.................................................................................................................... CD CD ®
20. I feel pleasant..............................................................................   ©  ©  ©  ©
The develi^ iimbQfadlfrediedb^ Faflitd^ ebxid^ jfcQlJ&i^ h^dl^ k^tcfitPf? GARDEN Inc.
PO Box 60699, Palo Alto, CA 94306, United States of America 
Published by Consulting Psychologists Press, Inc.
,  - ■ S E L F - E V A L U A T I O N  Q U E S T I O N N A I R E
rm Service Related Research Project
STAI Form Y-2 ~
Name:  c  _^_____. Date: ______________________
DIRECTIONS: A number of statements which people have used to describe
themselves arc given below. Read each statement and then blacken in the 'ts .
appropriate circle to the right o f the statement to indicate how you generally feel. <£)
There arc no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much time on any one q
statement but give the answer which seems to describe how you generally feci. ^
'SP \P
21. I feel pleasant............................................................................................................... © © © ©
22. I feel nervous and rcsdess............................................................................................ © © © ©
23. I feel satisfied with myself .................................................................................. .. © © © ©
24. I wish I could be as. happy as others seem to be ........................................................ © © © ©
25. I feel like a failure................................................................................................ ........ © © © ©
26. I feel rested................................................................................................................... © © ©
27. I am “calm, cool, and collected” ................................................................................ © © © ©
28. I feel that difficulties arc piling up so that I cannot overcome them ....................... © © © ©
29. I worry too much over something that really doesn’t matter .................................... © © © ©
30. I am happy................................................................................................................... © © © ©
31. I have disturbing thoughts............................................................. . ........................... © © © ©
32. I lack self-confidence....................... ................................................ .......................... © © © ©
33. I feel secure............................... ................................................................ .................. © © © ©
34. I make decisions easily ............................. ......................*........................................... © © © ©
35. I feel inadequate........................................................................................................... © © © ©
>6. I am content.................................................................................................. .............. © © © ©
7. Some unimportant thought runs through my mind and bothers m e ..................... © © © ©
8. I take disappointments so keenly that I can’t put them out of my m ind................. • © © © ©
9. I am a steady person....................................................... ............................................. © © © ©
0. I get in a state o f tension or turmoil as I think over my recent concerns and interests © © © ©
Copyright 1968,1977 by Charles D. Spielberger/All rights reserved. Reproduction o f  this test or any portion thereof 
by any process without written permission o f MIND GARDEN, Inc. is prohibited.
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1. Age
□  Under 25
□  25-30
□  31-35
□  36-40 
n  41 plus
2. Gender
CD Male 
CD Female
3. Year of training
□  ia
□  2nd
□  3rd
4. Relevant work experience before clinical psychology training
□  Assistant psychologist
□  Research assistant
□  Clinical / Research post
□  Nursing assistant
C 3  Other (please specify)...........................................
5. Years of relevant work experience (see question 4.) before clinical psychology training 
CD 0-1 year
CD 1-2 years 
CD 2-3 years 
CD 5 years plus
6. Academic qualifications (other than psychology undergraduate degree)
□  Conversion degree 
CD Masters
□  PhD
□  Other (please specify).............................
7. Placements experienced on training 
CD Adult Mental Health
CD Learning Disabilities
□  Child
CD Older Adult
C l  Specialist placement (please specify)...............................
8. Preferred theoretical orientation 
CD Cognitive behavioural
CD Systemic 
CD Psychodynamic
CD Other (please specify).....................................................................................................
Please could you complete the following details 
Appendix 3
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   Appendix 4
24 May 2001
Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
Department of Psychology 
University of Surrey
Dear V  •/.. *
The development of self-efficacy amongst trainee clinical psychologists 
(ACE/2001/28/Psvch)
I am writing to inform you that- the Advisory Committee on Ethics has considered the 
above protocol (and the subsequent information supplied) and has approved it on the 
understanding that the Ethical Guidelines for Teaching and Research are observed. For 
your information, and future reference, these Guidelines can be downloaded from the 
Committee’s website at http://www.surrev.ac.uk/Surrev/ACE/.
This letter of approval relates only to the study specified in your research protocol 
(ACE/2001/28/Psych). The Committee should be notified of any changes to the 
proposal, any adverse reactions, and if the study is terminated earlier than expected, 
with reasons.
Date of approval by the Advisory Committee on Ethics: 24 May 2001
Date of expiiy of approval by the Advisory Committee on Ethics: 23 May 2006
Please inform me when the research has been completed.
Yours sincerely
University 
of Surrey
Guildford
Surrey GU2 7XH, UK
Telephone
+44 (0)1483 300800
Facsimile
+44 (0)1483 873811
Registry
^ 3 / ‘l& '& diJZ C Z .
Catherine Ashbee (Mrs)
Secretary, University Advisory Committee on Ethics
cc: Professor L J King, Chairman, ACE
Dr L Dowdney, Supervisor, Dept of Psychology
UniSated Research Project
Appendix 5
Dear.
University 
of Surrey
Guildford
Surrey GU2 7XH, UK 
Telephone 
+44(0)1483 300800 
Facsimile
+44 (0)1483 300803
School of
Human
S c ien ces
Service related research project: The development of self-efficacy amongst 
trainee clinical psychologists
I am a trainee clinical psychologist writing to ask for your assistance in furthering my 
service related research project. My project aims to assess trainees’ sense of self- 
efficacy (or perceived ability) in relation to their clinical work, and how this develops 
over the course of their clinical training. Self-efficacy is believed to be important in 
predicting performance, professional identification and commitment to a career.
I plan to survey the Thames and South Eastern Region clinical psychology courses in 
order to obtain sufficient numbers for the study. I would like to approach trainees on 
your course in order to seek their participation in my project and would be extremely 
grateful for your permission to do so. I intend to measure self-efficacy by distributing 
a self-estimate questionnaire adapted from one used previously with counselling 
psychology trainees. This instrument assesses what trainees perceive their self- 
efficacy to be and what factors promote and/or inhibit their self-efficacy. I also intend 
to use the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) to measure anxiety, which is believed 
to be associated with the development of self-efficacy. A short demographic 
questionnaire would also suggest other important variables linked with self-efficacy. 
These questionnaires would be anonymous and completely confidential. No coding 
system would be used and questionnaires could be returned to me by sae. There 
would, therefore, be no way of identifying either individual trainees or the Course on 
which they are training.
I would be extremely grateful if  you would give me permission to send the 
questionnaires out by post to you for distribution. It would also be very helpful if  you 
could let me know who would be the person to contact about distribution of the 
questionnaires.
It is a requirement of our training that we feed back to those services who participate 
in our service related research projects. I would anticipate sharing the results of this 
study with you to feedback to the course as a whole. I hope that the results of this 
research will help to contribute to clinical psychology training in the future. Please 
would you indicate on the attached form whether I may approach your trainees to 
invite their participation in this project. A sae is attached, alternatively you can e-mail 
me a t: ..........
ated Research Proj ect
Appendix 6 University 
of Surrey
Guildford
Surrey GU2 7XH, UK
Telephone
+44 (0)1483 300800
Facsimile
+44 (0)1483 300803
School of
Human
S cien ces
Dear Trainee,
Service related research project: The development of self-efficacy amongst 
trainee clinical psychologists
I am a trainee clinical psychologist at the University of Surrey carrying out my service 
related research project. My. project aims to investigate trainees’ sense of self- 
efficacy (or perceived ability) in relation to clinical skills and how this develops over 
the course of clinical training. I am also looking at how anxiety is related to this. I 
would be extremely grateful if you could find some time in your busy schedule to fill 
in these three short questionnaires attached, which should take only 15 minutes to 
complete.
The questionnaires are completely anonymous and confidential, both on an individual 
basis and as to which course you are on. My only aim is to look at trainees as a whole 
across the Thames and South Eastern courses, using one-off questionnaires across all 
three year groups. I hope that my findings on how trainees develop confidence in 
carrying out their clinical work will be useful information for the courses and help 
contribute to good training for future trainees and ourselves.
Once you have 
attached;
completed the questionnaires, please could you return it in the sae
Thank you for helping with my research. 
Yours faithfully,
- Supervised by:
Trainee Clinical Psychologist Dr Linda Dowdney
University of Surrey Clinical Psychology Course Director
University of Surrey
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Appendix 7 University School of
of Surrey Human
S cien ces
Guildford
Surrey GU2 7XH, UK
Telephone
+44 (0)1483 300800
Facsimile
+44 (0)1483 300803
Dear Trainee,
Service related research project: The development of self-efficacy 
amongst trainee clinical psychologists
Last week I sent three questionnaires to you looking at perceived self- 
efficacy, anxiety and demographic information amongst tramee clinical 
psychologists. These questionnaires were sent to all trainees in the 
Thames and South-Eastern Region.
If you have already completed them and returned them to me, thank you 
very much. If not, please could you do so today. It is extremely 
important that I am able to get a large enough sample to make the 
research representative of trainees.
If by some chance you did not receive the questionnaires, or they got
misplaced, please contact me right now a t   and I will get
them in the post to you today.
Yours faithfully,
Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
University of Surrey
131
Service Related Research Project
Appendix 8
Table I. shows the skewness and kurtosis for total self-efficacy and state and trait anxiety.
Total self- State Trait
efficacy anxiety anxiety
Skewness -0.27 0.58 0.61
Std. Error of 0.16 0.16 0.16
Skewness
Z score -1.69 3.63* 3.81*
Kurtosis -0.27 -0.24 0.24
Std. Error of Kurtosis 0.32 0.32 0.32
Z score -0.84 -0.75 0.75
Table I.
* = significant skewness (Z = >/= 3.29).
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Appendix 9
Table H shows the items in the 5 components of Larson et al. f1992V
1) Microskills 2) Process 3) Dealing with 
difficult client 
behaviour
4) Cultural 
competence
5) Awareness of 
values
1. When using 
responses like 
feeling, active 
listening, 
clarification, 
probing, I am 
confident I will be 
concise and to the 
point.
7. I am worried that 
the wording of my 
responses -  like 
reflection of feeling, 
clarification and 
probing may be 
confusing and hard 
to understand.
17.1 feel that I have 
enough fundamental 
knowledge to do 
effective therapy.
34. When working 
with ethnic minority 
clients I am 
confident that I will 
be able to bridge 
cultural differences 
in the therapeutic 
process.
4. I am likely to 
impose my values 
on the client during 
the therapeutic 
process.
2. When I initiate 
the end of a session 
I am positive it will 
not be in a manner 
that is abmpt or 
brusque and that I 
will end the session 
on time.
9. I am worried that 
the type of response 
that I use at a 
particular time, i.e. 
reflection of feeling, 
interpretation, etc., 
may not be the 
appropriate 
response.
24. I am confident 
that I will know 
when to use open or 
close ended probes, 
and that these 
probes will reflect 
the concerns of the 
client and not be 
trivial.
35. I feel I will be 
an effective 
psychologist with 
clients of a different 
social class.
8. I feel that I may 
not be able to 
respond to the client 
in a non- 
judgemental way 
with respect to the 
clients’ values, 
beliefs, etc.
5. I am confident 
that I will respond 
appropriately to the 
client in view of 
what the client will 
express (my 
questions will be 
meaningful and not 
concerned with 
trivia and minutia).
18. I may not be 
able to maintain the 
intensity and energy 
level needed to 
produce client 
confidence and 
active participation.
29. I do not feel I 
possess a large 
enough repertoire of 
techniques to deal 
with different 
problems my client 
may present.
41. In working with 
culturally different 
clients I may have a 
difficult time 
viewing situations 
from their 
perspective.
15.1 feel confident 
that I have resolved 
conflicts in my 
personal life so that 
they will not 
interfere with my 
therapist abilities.
10. I feel I will 
respond to the client 
in an appropriate 
length of time 
(neither interrupting 
the client nor 
waiting too long to 
respond).
22. I am not sure 
that in a therapeutic 
relationship I will 
express myself in a 
way that is natural 
without deliberating 
over every response 
or action.
30. I feel confident 
regarding my ability 
to deal with crisis 
situations which 
may arise during 
therapy sessions -  
e.g. suicide, 
alcoholism, abuse, 
etc.
42. I am afraid that 
I may not be able to 
relate to someone of 
lower socio­
economic status 
than me.
40. I feel that I may 
give advice.
12. I am sure that 
the content of my 
responses, i.e. 
reflection of 
meaning, 
clarification, and 
probing will be an 
accurate reflection 
of what the client is 
saying.
23.1 am afraid that I 
may not understand 
and properly 
determine meanings 
of the client’s non­
verbal behaviours.
31. I am 
uncomfortable 
dealing with clients 
who appear 
unmotivated to 
work towards 
mutually 
determined goals.
13. I feel confident 
that I will appear 
competent and earn 
the respect of my 
client.
25. My assessment 
of client’s problems 
may not be as 
accurate as I would 
like them to be.
32. I may have 
difficulty with 
clients who do not 
verbalize their 
thoughts during the 
therapy session.
133
Service Related Research Project
1) Microskills 2) Process 3) Dealing with 
difficult client 
behaviour
4) Cultural 
competence
5) Awareness of 
values
16. I feel that the 
content of both my 
formulation and 
suggestions for 
intervention will be 
an accurate 
reflection of what 
the client is saying.
26. I am uncertain 
as to whether I will 
be able to 
appropriately 
intervene and 
challenge my client 
in therapy.
33. I am unsure as 
how to deal with 
clients who appear 
noncommittal and 
indecisive.
20. I am confident 
that the wording of 
both my
formulation of the 
client’s situation 
and suggestions for 
intervention will be 
clear and easy for 
the client to 
understand.
27. When giving 
responses, i.e. 
reflection of feeling, 
active listening, 
clarification, 
probing, I’m afraid 
that they won’t be 
effective in that they 
won’t be validated 
by the client’s 
immediate response.
37.1 feel confident 
that I will be able to 
conceptualize my 
client’s problems.
36. I am worried 
that both my 
formulation and 
suggestions for 
intervention may 
not over time assist 
the client to be more 
specific in defining 
and clarifying the 
problem.
39. I am confident 
that I can assess my 
client’s readiness 
and commitment for 
change.
38. I am unsure as 
to how I will lead 
my client towards 
the development 
and selection of 
concrete goals to 
work towards.
Table II.
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Appendix 10
Table III to X show the mean ranks for age, gender, year of training and years of relevant 
work experience prior to clinical psychology training. These ranks are compared for the 6 
components identified, total self-efficacy scores and state and trait anxiety.
Component and self-efficacy total mean ranks
Age N Mean
Rank
1) Core clinical skills under 30 187 110.36
30 plus 38 125.99
2) Process under 30 187 113.22
30 plus 38 111.91
3) Therapeutic skills under 30 187 112.03
30 plus 38 117.75
4) Dealing with difficult 
client behaviour
under 30 187 111.32
30 plus 38 121.26
5) Cultural competence under 30 187 113.41
30 plus 38 111
6) Awareness of values under 30 187 113.03
30 plus 38 112.87
Self-efficacy total under 30 187 112.56
30 plus 38 115.17
Table III.
Gender N Mean
Rank
1) Core clinical psychology male 44 133.16
skills
female 181 108.10
2) Process male 44 110.28
female 181 113.66
3) Therapeutic skills male 44 108.53
female 181 114.09
4) Dealing with difficult male 44 107.38
client behaviour
female 181 114.37
5) Cultural competence male 44 122.41
female 181 110.71
6) Awareness male 44 79.33
female 181 121.19
Self-efficacy total male 44 113.51
female 181 112.88
Table IV.
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Year of 
training
N Mean
Rank
1) Core clinical psychology year 1 96 95.18
skills
year 2 78 114.56
year 3 51 144.17
2) Process year 1 96 102.46
year 2 78 104.75
year 3 51 145.45
3) Therapeutic skills year 1 96 100.26
year 2 78 110.67
year 3 51 140.55
4) Dealing with difficult year 1 96 106.7188
client behaviour
year 2 78 111.19
year 3 51 127.59
5) Cultural competence year 1 96 113.42
year 2 78 112.48
year 3 51 113
6) Awareness of values year 1 96 100.79
year 2 78 114.07
year 3 51 134.35
Self-efficacy total year 1 96 96.016
year 2 78 112.99
year 3 51 144.99
Table V.
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Years of relevant work 
experience
N Mean
Rank
1) Core clinical psychology 0-2 years 77 113.53
skills
2-3 years 81 121.47
3 years + 67 102.16
2) Process 0-2 years 77 109.13
2-3 years 81 114.10
3 years + 67 116.12
3) Therapeutic skills 0-2 years 77 102.58
2-3 years 81 122.09
3 years + 67 113.99
4) Dealing with difficult 0-2 years 77 109.23
client behaviour
2-3 years 81 114.07
3 years + 67 116.04
5) Cultural competence 0-2 years 77 105.85
2-3 years 81 121.75
3 years + 67 110.63
6) Awareness of values 0-2 years 77 107.79
2-3 years 81 118.31
3 years + 67 112.57
Self-efficacy total 0-2 years 77 107.55
2-3 years 81 117.78
3 years + 67 113.49
Table VI.
State and Trait anxiety mean ranks
State /
Trait
Anxiety
Age N Mean
Rank
State under 30 187 114.32
anxiety
30 plus 38 106.49
Trait under 30 187 113.96
anxiety
30 plus 38 108.28
Table VII.
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gender N Mean
Rank
State anxiety male 44 100.93
female 181 115.93
Trait anxiety male 44 93.64
female 181 117.71
Table VIII.
year of 
training
N Mean
Rank
State anxiety year 1 96 109.5365
year 2 78 108.4615
year 3 51 126.4608
Trait anxiety year 1 96 121.2865
year 2 78 117.6987
year 3 51 90.21568
Table IX.
years
relevant
experience
N Mean
Rank
State anxiety 0-2 years 77 125.97
2-3 years 81 116.12
3 years + 67 94.31
Trait anxiety 0-2 years 77 120.77
2-3 years 81 113.39
3 years + 67 103.60
Table X.
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Qualitative Research Project
An exploration o f second year trainee clinical psychologists ’ experiences 
o f their dual status as clinicians and post-graduate students, with a focus
on potentially conflicting aspects.
Year 2
May 2002
Qualitative Research Project
Introduction
Previous research has identified that trainees experience clinical psychology training as 
“challenging in ways that they had not anticipated” (Cheshire, 2001), requiring trainees to 
become competent in areas of academic, research and clinical work. Cheshire (2000) 
conducted semi-structured interviews with 39 trainee clinical psychologists across three years 
of a clinical psychology training programme. Thematic analysis revealed that trainees felt 
emotionally and intellectually drained by the demands of the clinical role in their early 
placements, feeling that they had little to offer. Even trainees with previous experience 
reported being unprepared for the demands of the clinical work, especially the increased 
responsibility, increased complexity of cases and increased expectations of themselves.
Conflict was reported to arise from the different roles that they held, particularly their dual 
status as NHS employees and university postgraduates. Trainees identified much more with 
the employee role than the student role, but were required to switch between the two. 
Competing student and clinician roles often led to trainees feeling that they were letting 
patients and colleagues down by having to focus their attention on coursework, particularly 
their thesis. More importance was attached to the clinician role and this resulted in minimum 
effort being put into coursework apart from case studies, which were considered to help in 
developing their clinical skills.
Kuyken et al. (1998) in a study of 183 trainees using multiple scales, found that at least 25% 
of trainees reported significant self-esteem problems, problems adjusting at work and 
depression and anxiety. Kuyken et al. (2000) followed up the previous study with 167 
trainees using the Employee Assistance Program Inventory (EAPI). They reported that levels 
of psychological distress significantly increased between year one and year two. Therefore, 
the second year seems a particularly important time to study trainees.
So far little research has focused on trainee clinical psychologists’ experiences of clinical 
training, in particular their multiple academic, research and clinical roles and how they 
interact. Although Cheshire (2000) has described part of the process, there is little theory 
used to explain the experiences of trainees and how they cope with different the different 
demands of their competing roles. This research aimed to address this gap in the literature, by 
developing a theory of the trainee’s experience using a grounded theory approach.
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Method
Participants
Five second year trainee clinical psychologists were invited to be interviewed. Participants 
were chosen to cover a range of experiences, such as their ages and background experience 
before clinical psychology training. “Theoretical sampling” was used where participants were 
invited consecutively after analysing the transcript of previous participants, to identify gaps in 
the sample group (Glaser & Strauss, 1967: cited in Pidgeon, 1996). All agreed to participate. 
The demographic profile is provided in Appendix 3.
Researchers
The study was conducted by a group of researchers who were also second year trainee clinical 
psychologists. The theoretical orientation was mainly integrative, favouring cognitive- 
behavioural, psychodynamic and systemic approaches. One researcher had conducted 
previous research into the development of self-efficacy amongst trainee clinical psychologists.
Interviewing
An interview schedule was developed. This involved the researchers generating a list of 
appropriate areas of experience that they were interested in. This was based on their personal 
experience as trainees and from knowledge of the trainee literature. Questions were 
developed to elicit the experience of the trainee clinical psychologist in these various areas 
(see Appendix 1 for interview schedule). Advice was sought from an expert in qualitative 
research methods and incorporated into the interview schedule. Interviews were carried out at 
the trainees’ university and lasted twenty to thirty minutes. Two pilot interviews were 
initially conducted to verify the appropriateness of the questions. The pilot interviews led to 
minor clarification of the first question (see Appendix 1). The five interviews were divided 
amongst the five researchers. Interviews were taped and then transcribed (see Appendix 4 for 
sample interview). The interview began with a “grand tour” question (Spradley, 1979: cited 
in McVey, Madill, & Fielding, 2001), which was designed to be open-ended to allow 
interviewees to lead the conversation (see Appendix 1).
Analytic procedure
The interviews were analysed using grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967: cited in 
Pidgeon, 1996). Transcripts were analysed and units of meaning were identified (words 
describing the same phenomena). “Constant comparison” (continually sifting and comparing 
elements) was used to refine categories. Similar categories were clustered together. Links 
were identified between the different categories identified.
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Results
The data produced seven categories which conceptualised trainees’ experiences. These 
categories were structured around the experience of conflict experienced by trainee clinical 
psychologists, due to their dual status as clinicians and students (Figure 1). This was in line 
with Glaser and Strauss (1967: cited in McVey et al., 2001) who recommend doing justice to 
one central phenomenon. Category definitions can be found in Appendix 5.
The model shows an interactive relationship of categories. These were: previous experience; 
definitions and experience of the role of the trainee clinical psychologist; managing the roles; 
imposed structure; coping strategies; conflict; and future expectations.
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FUTURE EXPECTATIONS
Figure 1. Theory o f  role conflict in trainee 
clinical psychologists:
CONFLICT
COPING
STRATEGIES
IMPOSED STRUCTURE
OF TIME
PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE
MANAGING THE ROLES
Key:
Tentative causal link  interpreted by researchers
Strong causal link grounded by participants’ 
comments
An association grounded by participants’ comments
DEFINITIONS & EXPERIENCES OF THE ROLES
TRAINEE CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST
OF THE
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Previous experience
Trainees’ work experience prior to clinical psychology training appeared to have a large 
impact initially on how they defined and experienced the roles of a trainee clinical 
psychologist.
I suppose for me the clinician role is like working, so that’s actually much easier...um...and isn’t so 
different to what I was doing before I started the course. (A, lines 39-40)
However, even trainees with considerable previous experience and responsibility seemed 
considerably anxious about their competence when they started the course, moving to a role 
which they were unfamiliar with, which is a similar finding to Cheshire (2000).
I had a resource officers post before that [first placement], so I had a lot of responsibility...! think that 
created some anxiety moving from a role where I knew what I was doing to a role where I didn’t know 
what I was doing. (E, lines 59-65)
Managing the roles
Some trainees were able to identify that they had developed throughout the course so far. 
This included learning to identify with roles that they had not been used to before. However, 
increased identity with the clinical role did not always mean that the trainee felt comfortable 
with this role, due to the responsibility accompanying this role.
A big difference... I suppose one difference...there’s part of the identity of the professional or clinician, 
which I didn’t have before. People are coming to you. You help them sort out some of their 
difficulties. In some cases, people are looking at you for expert advice. That’s something I find quite 
uncomfortable. (C, lines 126-130).
Becoming aware of the requirements for the course, knowing what are the expectations of the 
trainee in the different roles also seemed associated with a lessening of anxiety.
I know what the course wants in terms of an essay, I know what they want in terms of a case report, you 
know I ’ve failed things, so I know what that’s like now. (A, 125-127).
Less ambiguity of the role appeared to develop throughout training, being associated with less 
anxiety and conflict. This is similar to role ambiguity theory, described in the conflict section 
(McCormick & Ilgen, 1987).
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Imposed structure
Some of the conflict experienced was interpreted as arising from the imposed structure of the 
course, having both university and placement days, creating an imposed separation of the 
roles.
I think it can be quite odd, particularly being a practitioner half of the week, when you’re a student the 
other half...You’re continually switching from being the person who doesn’t know anything and 
having to be given a lot of information, and then spending the other half of the week as if  you do know 
what you are talking about and as though you’re fit to deliver some kind of care to people. (D, lines 35- 
40).
Conflict
This category refers to the conflict trainees reported experiencing as a consequence of their 
different roles. Conflict appeared to result from three main sources. Firstly, a lack of identity 
with the student role. Trainees felt frustrated and disempowered by the constraints of the 
student role compared to their clinical role. They reported feeling “patronised” and as though 
at times they “were not being taught anything” and so the student role was “a waste of time.”
The second source of conflict was the trainees’ perception of a discrepancy between the level 
of competence expected of them in the student versus the clinician roles. They felt that in 
their role as a clinician they were expected to have a higher level of competence than they 
actually had, whilst as students they were treated as though they were incompetent.
The third source of conflict appeared to be competing pressures from the different 
environmental settings in which trainees perform the student and clinician role. Swapping 
between the different atmospheres in the different environmental settings created conflict 
between the trainees’ identities with each role. Such conflict was expressed in feelings of 
guilt about unequal dictation of time between the roles, feelings of rebellion towards the 
student role or feeling as though they were being deceitful in their portrayal of themselves as 
clinicians.
Conflict was interpreted as developing between the ambiguous nature of the student and 
clinician role. Trainees felt more comfortable with a position of not knowing in the student 
role than in the clinician role, because of client responsibility, needing to know how to help 
them.
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It’s quite ambiguous, because as a clinician you’re supposed to know things and as a student you are 
not necessarily supposed to. I think in terms of putting across a professional persona at work, that’s 
quite difficult sometimes. I don’t want to claim knowledge that I don’t have, and yet I don’t want to 
claim no knowledge as I don’t think clients wouldn’t like that. I think clients want to see someone who 
has some idea of what they’re doing and can be useful. You can go into supervision and say I don’t 
know anything about this, but you can’t go to your client and say I don’t know what to do, can you 
come back next week. (E, lines 29-37).
Conflict was also interpreted to arise due to the desire to appear competent, especially being 
evaluated by supervisors on clinical placements, feeling the need to appear competent, but at 
the same time acknowledging any knowledge gaps.
...being evaluated is quite difficult in supervision, because it comes up with wanting to present yourself 
as someone who knows some things, but sometimes you want to say I don’t know anything about this, 
I ’m completely lost. But then I start to think they’re [supervisor] going to fail me. So there’s pressure 
to be quite competent, but at the same time pressure to be very honest about the things your not quite so 
good at. (E, lines 47-52).
The role conflict described in this study is similar to that described in organisational 
psychology, which occurs when the behaviours for different conditions are contradictory, in 
this case not knowing in the student role and knowing in the clinician role (McCormick & 
Ilgen, 1987). The interpretation of role ambiguity in this study is implicated in poor role 
performance in organisational psychology and often leads to stress, when the person realises 
that they are supposed to do something and do it well, but does not know what that something 
is (McCormick & Ilgen, 1987).
Conflict also appeared to arise, if the trainee’s experience of the different roles was not in line 
with their previous experience, how they defined the role of the clinical psychologist, or what 
job role they saw themselves fulfilling after qualifying. In particular, the research role seemed 
to cause conflict for some trainees. This was the case for research where trainees could not 
see links to clinical work.
I don’t mind so much the academic and clinical bit because they ah seem to apply quite well to each
other. The research bit I could probably ....do without....it almost feels like the whole purpose of
being here, which is to treat people just gets completely lost. (B, lines 23-28).
I see the research as being part of the doctorate. Once it’s done and dusted that’s it. (D, lines 30-31).
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However, it seemed that perceiving your future role as involving different aspects, especially 
research and not just clinical work was associated with less conflict with the present variety of 
roles in clinical training.
I like the fact that there are different aspects to it [clinical training]. I see myself trying to continue this 
so that in future I’d see myself as having a part university job and a part clinical job. (C, lines 25-27).
Like Cheshire (2000) the student role also appeared to lead to conflict with the clinician role 
at times, when pressure of coursework meant that clinical work had to suffer.
Sometimes there can be a clash between the different roles....I suppose the classic example would be if 
I ’m deciding whether I ’m going to be doing some preparation for clients, or I ’ve got a piece of 
coursework to hand in....I’d think okay ...I think I ’m going to rely a bit more on my supervisor this 
week,....because I ’ve got to focus on the coursework. So sometimes that can be a bit uncomfortable. 
(C, lines 35-42).
Coping strategies
Some trainees seemed able to reflect that the ambiguity they experienced was not just part of 
clinical training, but part of the role of a clinical psychologist, which appeared to ease the 
anxiety experienced. Validation for these feelings seemed to come from contact with other 
professionals, who still experienced ambiguity. Therefore, we interpreted the use of others as 
social comparison or support as a coping strategy. This seemed associated with a decrease in 
conflict related to the ambiguous nature of the roles.
....I see them [family therapy team] in therapy struggling with the same sorts of issues and missing the 
same sorts of points and wandering around in the same incoherent way, the same thing that I do. It’s 
really nice, because I thought I was so many miles away from what other people were doing. I think 
it’s also realising that I ’m probably going to feel the same kind of way when I qualify. There are so 
many more experiences that I ’m going to want to get, so in a sense I ’m going to have this ambiguity 
forever. So rather than attributing it to being a trainee, I attribute it to the job to being about what 
psychology is. (E, lines 73-81).
Ambiguity in clinical training is recognised as causing considerable anxiety, being unsure 
what to do in potentially difficult clinical situations (Pica, 1998). The validation of these 
feelings of uncertainty has been considered important in decreasing the associated anxiety and 
stress (Pica, 1998; Nelson, Dell’Oliver, Koch, & Buckler, 2001).
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Validation for feelings of anxiety was also interpreted to be sought through social support 
from other trainees.
...there’s very much a shared anxiety or shared opportunity to whinge about the same kind of things, 
which is actually quite helpful, so you don’t feel isolated, and you know, “Am I the only one that’s 
feeling these kind of things?” (A, lines 121-127).
Other strategies interpreted by the researchers as coping strategies included viewing the 
different roles as distinct and switching from one role to the other, like changing hats.
it’s like one day I ’ll wear the major research one [hat] and then the next day I ’ll wear the academic hat. 
B, lines 137-138).
Some trainees described linking the different roles together mentally to form a cohesive 
framework for all the different roles.
I suppose what joins them all together for me, is that it’s always about learning. Okay sometimes it’s 
more about the research and sometimes more in clinical practice, but they seem quite strongly 
interrelated and it’s all about increasing self-awareness....learning more about the theories, learning 
about putting them into practice and being more reflective and empathetic... (C, lines 18-23).
For others, although they could conceptualise this, for the purpose of achieving the course 
requirements, it was actually easier to keep the tasks separate.
...in your mind you can see how the three sort of interlink and and interchange, but when it comes to the 
work you have to do on the course, I think you’ve got to be quite boundaried. (B, lines 102-104)
Due to the time-limited nature of the research, respondent validation was not attempted. 
Equally category credibility was restricted to the researchers’ perspectives.
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Discussion
This study has suggested an explanation of trainee clinical psychologists’ experiences of their 
roles as clinicians and students. The use of a grounded theory approach allowed the 
development of a theory to help explain these experiences. The model offers an explanation 
for why conflict arises between the roles of student and clinician in trainees. This model has 
similar aspects to a cognitive behavioural model (Beck & Emery, 1983: cited in Hawton, 
Salkovskis, Kirk, & Clark, 1989), where past experience is influential in the formation of 
general beliefs and the thoughts, feelings and behaviour in specific situations. The similarity 
of the model to cognitive behavioural models may reflect the influence of this model in 
teaching at the researchers’ university.
Both the interview schedule and the analysis using grounded theory were adequate at 
capturing trainees’ experiences of their dual role as clinicians and students and were able to 
identify conflicting aspects. The interview schedule could be criticised for its structure and 
use of prompts, leading interviewees in a certain direction. However, questions were designed 
to be open-ended (Pidgeon, 1996) so as not to be constraining and use of prompts was kept to 
the bare minimum and was based on the interviewees responses. Due to the small nature of 
the research the links are only tentative. Ideally, the interview would have been longer and 
more participants included. The use of “grounded theory” led to theory development, which 
was the purpose of the study, due to a lack of theory explaining role conflict with trainee 
clinical psychologists. The theory is not fully able to explain the relationship between the 
different categories, but has provided useful information for further investigation.
Limitations
The research was based solely on the experience of five trainees, all at the same university, 
due to the time constraints of analysing the data. Although the researchers deliberately tried 
to identify participants’ accounts that were lacking from the collected data, more trainees with 
an academic / research background could have been included. Only second year trainees were 
interviewed cross-sectionally. Ideally trainees would be followed longitudinally throughout 
the course, but again this was not possible, due to the small nature of the research. 
Interviewing people with experience at research may have meant that they were more 
motivated to give the researcher material that they thought would be helpful.
The influence of the researchers on the participants and the interpretation of the data is 
important to acknowledge. The researchers were also second year trainee clinical
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psychologists and had their own views, based on their experiences of clinical training, which 
will have influenced the data interpretation to some extent.
Implications for training
Validation of feelings of conflict and ambiguity is important, particularly the use of support 
from other trainees from all stages of training. This may include the availability of trainee 
groups to reflect together on the training experience. Validation of feelings of ambiguity even 
from qualified psychologists teaching on courses is also a powerful source of anxiety 
reduction. Better awareness of what is expected of trainees in different circumstances, will 
further decrease role ambiguity and conflict, including explicit, constructive feedback on 
performance.
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Appendix 1
An exploration of second year trainee clinical psychologists’ experiences of their dual status
as clinicians and postgraduate students, with a focus on potentially conflicting aspects.
Interview schedule
1. Could you describe (removed - what you see as the various aspects of) your role as a 
trainee clinical psychologist?
[If the participant volunteers only two or three aspects, prompt for further aspects]
2. Other researchers have attached importance to the clinician and student aspects of the 
role. [If the trainee has not volunteered these aspects in response to question 1, ask: How 
relevant does that seem to you?]. I know this might seem like a very general question but 
what is it like to be both a clinician and a student?
(If interviewee says that two roles are different, then explore possible conflict and use prompt)
It sounds like your roles are quite different. How do you manage to hold the two roles at 
the same time?
(If the interviewee does not differentiate between the two roles, then use prompt)
Bearing in mind that you have to work as a clinician and a student, in your experience
how do you feel that these two roles are similar and/or different?
3. Do you identify with one particular role more than the other?
[If yes: Why do you think that is? How is that reflected in what you do or how you are on the
course?]
[If no: Why do you think that is?]
4. Other researchers have suggested that a trainee’s identity with the different roles changes 
during training. Could you describe your experience of how your role as a trainee has 
developed since joining the course?
Prompts
What i f  any changes have you noticed from the first year to the second year?
(If the interviewee implies that there has been a change, then use prompt)
How have you managed that change?
Is there is anything that you consider important about the way you have managed the 
clinician and student role that hasn’t been covered in the interview?
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Appendix 2 
Please could you complete the following details
1. Age
EH Under 25
□  25-30
□  31-35
□  36-40
e h  41 plus
2. Gender 
D  Male
□  Female
3. Relevant work experience before clinical psychology training
□  Assistant psychologist
□  Research assistant
EH Clinical / Research post 
EH Nursing assistant
□  Other (please specify)..................................................
4. Years of relevant work experience (see question 4.) before clinical psychology training 
D  0-1 year
EH 1-2 years 
EH 2-3 years
□  5 years plus
5. Academic qualifications (other than psychology undergraduate degree)
EH Conversion degree
□  Masters
□  PhD
□  Other (please specify)..................................
6. Placements experienced on training 
EH Adult Mental Health
□  Learning Disabilities
□  Child
EH Older Adult
□  Specialist placement (please specify)....................................
7. Ethnicity
EH White -  British
EH White -  Other (please specify)..........................
□  Asian -  Indian
[U  Asian -  Other (please specify)..........................
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Appendix 3
Demographics for qualitative research
Age Gender Relevant work 
experience
Years
experience
Academic
qualifications
Placement 
experienced on 
training
Ethnicity
31-35 F Psychiatric nurse 5+ Masters 
RN (Mental 
health)
AMH, LD & 
CMH
White-
British
25-30 M PhD 4 PhD AMH, LD & 
CMH
White-
British
25-30 M Assistant 
psychologist 
Nursing assistant
2-3 None AMH, LD & 
CMH
White-
British
25-30 F Assistant
psychologist
Undergraduate
placement
2-3 None AMH, LD & 
CMH
White-
British
25-30 F Clinical/research post 
Resource officer
5+ None AMH, LD & 
CMH
White-
British
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Appendix 4 
Interview Transcript
(Interviewer; Participant)
Could you describe to me what you see your role as a trainee clinical psychologist?
I suppose I see different roles. Urn., one role I suppose is as an employee, being paid for by 
the NHS... um and I’m just talking off the top of my head now .. it’s something about.. um.. 
your being paid to do a certain amount of clinical work...there’s something you know., you 
are actually being paid as a professional to do a certain amount of work. Also there’s 
something about...um.. very much the role feels about learning and trying to become a good 
clinical psychologist and that’s sort of in a variety of areas. I suppose actually I see it split 
into two. One is sort of research and academic type things and one is the more clinical sort of 
focus. So the two main roles are research and clinical and also perhaps a role as a student and 
a role as an employee.
Do you see them all as very different or do you see overlaps?
Um...I suppose I see overlaps. Though it can feel different, sometimes it can be you know 
one day you’re sitting in lectures and you’re writing an essay and you’re very much in a 
student role and then another day you might be in a department in a very much more clinical 
and more professional role. But, I suppose what joins them all together for me, is that it’s 
always about learning. Okay, sometimes it’s more about the research and sometimes more in 
clinical practice, but they seem quite strongly interrelated and it’s all about increasing self- 
awareness...um.. learning more about the theories, learning about putting them into practice 
and being more reflective and empathetic, that sort of thing.
How do you manage the different roles?
To be honest, I like it I think. I like the fact that there are different aspects to it. I see myself 
trying to continue this so that in future I’d see myself as wanting to have a part university job 
and a part clinical job. I think I’d find that more interesting. Coming back to the question, for 
me it doesn’t feel as though I’m having to manage anything. It feels more that I like the fact 
that I am doing different things. The fact that I’m still learning all the time, because I very 
much enjoy that. Also it’s not just theoretical, there’s also an application as well.
158
Qualitative Research Project
So you enjoy the variety, but you can see that there is a kind of common theme between 
them all that links them together.
One thing that occurs to me. Sometimes there can be a clash between the different roles. You 
have to prioritise things. So, I suppose the classic example would be if I deciding whether I’m 
going to be doing some preparation for clients, or if I’ve got a piece of coursework to hand 
and then usually what would happen... I’d think okay I’m going to be seeing the clients for a 
number of weeks, I’m going to rely a bit more on my supervisor this week, or whatever, 
because I’ve got to focus on the coursework. So sometimes that can be a bit uncomfortable 
having to make decisions about... I really need to get on with my case report now. Other stuff 
has got to slip a bit.
How do you feel having to make those adjustments?
I suppose sometimes there can be ..maybe I’m less worried about it now I’m more used to it, 
but sometimes there can be a slight element of guilt. Maybe that’s putting it too strongly, but 
there’s at least a worry there, a concern in the back of your mind, am I not doing the best for 
these clients, because I’m selfishly focusing on this piece of coursework. Not a big concern, 
but you have those thoughts.
I: Are there any other similarities and differences you can see between the roles that 
you’ve mentioned?
P: I suppose one big similarity that I’ve mentioned is the learning. Differences...I suppose 
similarities in terms...maybe this is related to the learning, but you’re always trying to reflect 
on things, or ask yourself questions, or how could I have improved in this. Whether it’s a 
theory or a client. In some ways they can be quite similar, because you can be thinking, with 
a theory you’re trying to understand things in more general terms and to try to be critical 
about it, does this fit with the evidence. The same with the client, you’re trying to understand 
this person and fit in with the evidence.
One difference maybe, it feels that when you’re in the academic side of things you’re more 
the scientist. When you’re in the clinical role, there’s no way...we don’t understand anywhere 
near anything about the mind. A lot of it is done on intuition, what feels right, clinical 
experience, what seems right in the circumstances, without so much evidence. Maybe there’s 
a bit of a difference there.
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How easy is it to manage that difference?
Again, I wouldn’t have thought of it in terms of difficulty. It’s more something that’s quite 
interesting I find, because it’s I suppose a different way of looking at things. It’s a slightly 
different set of skills you’re trying to apply, theories to people and then also understand them 
and then bringing other things as well. Maybe sometimes what I do find a bit more difficult is 
when...we’ve been doing some projective tests at the moment in the child placement. So, I 
don’t know if you know the CAT, a series of pictures of animals and each one you have to tell 
a story and then you’ll make interpretations, so there’s not a lot of food on the table and 
they’re going hungry. So an interpretation might be, they’re not being nurtured properly. It’s 
not directly about food, it’s about comfort. Part of me...you know if you’re building up a 
theme, but part of me is also uncomfortable with that and would like to be able to know what 
the evidence base for this is more and maybe part of the difficulty about managing...I don’t 
know whether this comes into roles, is the lack of time. So, ideally with all the clinical 
techniques I like to go away and have some sense of what the evidence base for this is, rather 
than just having to rely on them, but it doesn’t feel that there’s quite the time. I’m not quite 
sure if that’s answering the question, I don’t know?
Do you identify with one role more than the other?
I suppose maybe slightly more the research role. Perhaps because I’ve had more research 
experience than clinical experience. And if I saw myself, I suppose the job I’d like is on a 
training course like this eventually, part clinical, part teaching. I see myself as a research tutor 
or something like that, not a clinical tutor. If I was given a choice of going completely into 
research, ideally I’d want research and clinical, I might go completely into research and 
not be happy about it, but I might prefer that than going completely into clinical.
I: Why’s that?
I enjoy the research and it depends a lot on how it goes. There was a period in my PhD when 
it didn’t go so well. I get different things from research and clinical work, but if I was forced 
to make the choice between the two, I’d probably opt for research. But then maybe that’s 
because I haven’t done so much clinical work.
It’s down to your experience so far?
I don’t feel so good at the clinical work, I don’t feel so confident at it. I haven’t seen...I’ve 
seen some positive outcomes. When I see more positive outcomes, it makes it seem more 
worthwhile. If I see people for a short while, there’s a huge long waiting list and it doesn’t 
make much difference, then it’s what am I doing this for. Ideally what I want is a mixture of 
both, but if you force me to choose at the moment, then it’s more research.
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Because of where you are and your experience.
Yes, but that could change and ideally as I say a mixture.
Could you describe how your experience...your role as a trainee has changed since you 
joined the course? Some researchers have said that a trainee’s identity varies at 
different stages throughout the course.
I suppose I’ve gone back into a more student or school type mode a bit. When I was doing 
my PhD...you’re more the student bit, but then if you intend to follow the research path you’re 
more going into postdoctoral research and things, so it wouldn’t be like a student, it would be 
more like an academic, you’d further along the career path. Whereas here, it feels like we’re 
back in a classroom situation, more in a student sort of role, asking questions and being 
presented with information, rather than go away and read the papers, go to a conference and 
ask one question, but forming your own ideas. And also writing essays and having them back 
and being marked. Again you’re back into the more student sort of role. I’m used to having 
supervision from research and now it’s clinical, so maybe that’s similar, going 
to someone for advice on what you’re doing. A big difference.. I suppose one 
difference...there’s part of the identity as a professional or a clinician, which I didn’t have 
before. People are coming to you. You help them sort out some of their difficulties. In some 
cases, people are looking at you for expert advice.
That’s something I find quite uncomfortable.
Why do you find it uncomfortable?
It depends what area it is in. In adult mental health, I felt more comfortable, but with child 
especially, some parents are having trouble disciplining their children and they say to you 
what would you do in these circumstances. You’re sitting and thinking how on earth would I 
know, having never had that experience. At least in my placement it feels that part of it is 
about being expert...it’s not all about being expert, but part is about helping parents who 
because of their upbringing haven’t necessarily got all the parenting skills, say you might to 
try this or you might want to look at that. Whereas with adult mental health, the person is 
very much the expert on themselves and you’re helping them to look at that and suggest some 
techniques and there were things that I could relate to myself. I could have tried some of the 
techniques on myself and have some experience of them. Whereas with children, I have very 
little experience of them, I haven’t got my own children. That feels more comfortable.
How does that compare to being in the student role?
I suppose there’s less responsibility in the student role. You can be more inquisitive. Okay 
you’ve got to get your essays and your case report done and you can take your time in the
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student role. If you’re not sure of anything, you can ask, whereas you’re wanting to give 
some sort of response and it’s strange because in the child placement I feel more undermined 
in myself. I might say I’m not quite sure about that, but I’ll go and talk to my supervisor and 
we’ll come back and talk about it next week. In adult mental health I felt okay, I’d seen the 
person longer, we didn’t have to have all the answers. But for the child I found that more 
difficult with some of the parents and my interpretation, my feeling is why the hell are they 
coming along to this person. He’s telling us, well not quite telling us...the implication is we’re 
not quite parenting and yet he’s a trainee, so I feel more undermined. In terms of roles, that is 
more difficult.
Are you saying that you can identify more now as a clinician than since when you started 
the course? Do still feel as much as a student?
I think it depends on the placement you’re in. Towards the end of the adult mental health 
placement I felt more like a clinician. I could read things myself and I wasn’t coming up with 
ground breaking ideas, but tiny little things that were maybe a slightly different way of seeing 
things, a little suggestion in CBT of some other way they could do something. I felt good 
about that...you know with a lot more experience I could see myself doing this...I’m not too 
bad at this, I could see myself being a clinician, so I was getting more into the clinician sort of 
role and liking that and seeing some positive outcomes. Learning disabilities, I suppose it 
slipped back a bit. maybe you’re offering more advice to people, but a lot of it was common 
sense, so sort of okay. Child though, I suppose because of the novelty of it, maybe I feel less 
confident about it now, I don’t know what it says about my clinical identity. It’s not like a 
clear progression across the course and if I was to go back into adult mental health now I’d 
feel that because of my learning disability, child experience, my adult mental health clinician 
identity would be stronger, but as a child clinician it’s dropped compared to the adult.
I: So it sounds as if you’re having to create your own clinical identity in each placement 
and they all vary depending on the nature of that placement?
Maybe I’m not quite sure what clinical identity means.
It’s just how you see yourself as a clinician.
I do feel differently about myself as a clinician in different circumstances and depending on 
the client group you’re working with. I feel there’s a progression with the adult mental health 
and that has been getting stronger over the course, with these little fluctuations, but with these 
other groups they’re probably improving, but you’ve gone backwards, because you’re 
working with a new group again.
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Lastly, is there anything important about the way that you have managed the student 
and the clinician role that hasn’t been covered in this interview or the other roles that 
you have mentioned?
The only that I can think of briefly. The other thing related to the clinician role is the role of 
professional, in terms of risk assessment and child abuse. I suppose the main way I’d say I’d 
managed that was taking things to supervision if I’m not sure about things. It still feels as 
though I’m passing the buck. There’s still quite a lot of responsibility there and in the end I’m 
passing the buck...ish. That’s how I feel I’m dealing with it. I don’t think I’ve ever had a case 
where that has been a hugely strong issue, but what has stopped me worrying about that a lot 
is my supervisor’s responsibility in the end. I can’t think off the top of my head of much else.
I: That’s great. Thank you very much for taking part in the interview.
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Appendix 5
Category definitions
Previous Experience
This category was concerned with trainees’ clinical, academic and research experiences before 
they commenced clinical psychology training. It encompasses comments about how trainees 
tended to feel more confident and comfortable with training experiences that they had 
encountered prior to clinical training (e.g. working with adult clients with mental health 
difficulties). They were therefore more likely to identify with these particular roles (e.g. 
experience as a research assistant prior to training tended to result in trainees identifying with 
the research role). Trainees also commented on how the course emphasised the importance of 
presenting “what you don’t know” (i.e. learning needs) unlike pre-training experiences where 
“what you know” seemed more significant. Comments were also made about how the 
compulsory nature of teaching sessions on training differed to previous experiences of 
academia, where attendance tended to be voluntary. Some trainees relied on their previous 
experience of research supervision to inform them of the purpose of clinical supervision.
Definitions and experiences of the role of trainee clinical psychologist
This category is concerned with how trainees defined the different roles of a trainee clinical 
psychologist. Roles consisted of student and professional / clinician. The clinician role 
involved being seen to work as a professional, being paid and having a responsibility to see 
and treat clients. In this role, trainees felt that they were perceived by others as more 
knowledgeable than in the student role. The student role was broken down by participants 
into an academic and a research role. This role was perceived as entailing less responsibility 
and was more about fitting back into the undergraduate student role of not knowing and being 
there to learn. The academic aspect involved being taught to and being set academic 
deadlines. Research consisted of the doctoral thesis and smaller research projects undertaken 
by the trainees. It also referred to the trainees’ personal experiences of the identified roles, 
including their attitude towards the different roles and the importance that they attached to 
each of them.
Coping strategies
This category is concerned with strategies that trainees adopted to cope with having several 
roles and the demands that the different roles place on the trainee. Some strategies involved 
linking aspects of the various roles to make them more cohesive, whereas other strategies
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involved keeping the roles quite separate, but being able to switching switch between the 
different roles. Other coping strategies included accepting that there are different roles and 
that accepting this fact made it easier to cope with the different roles. Social support from 
other trainees was also an important coping strategy for trainees, allowing comparison with 
stresses that other trainee’s experienced and being able to realise that personal anxieties and 
stresses were shared by other trainees and that talking to others provided a useful source of 
coping with difficulties that the different roles involve.
Role management
This category was concerned with the management and adjustment to the different aspects of 
being a trainee clinical psychologist and role identity. A number of key areas were described 
by participants as central to this category, including the process of developing and adjusting to 
the training roles. The process of role development encompasses the presence or absence of 
change in relation to participant’ management of the different aspects of the roles. A major 
aspect of this category was specific areas of development including clearer expectations of 
course requirements, more established preferences for models of working and personal 
responsibility for development. The second key aspect was mechanisms of adjustment to the 
roles. Participants reported a number of approaches to this including the use of organisational 
skills such as prioritising and time management and the concept of being ‘good enough’, that 
is a shift in their expectations of themselves in relation to managing the demands of clinical 
and academic work.
Imposed structure
This category is concerned with the structure imposed on the trainee clinical psychologist in 
terms of their division of time and the course requirements. The imposed structure of time 
entails the trainee attending the University for lectures on Mondays and Tuesdays (academic 
days), and attending their clinical placement for the remainder of the week (placement days). 
Within the placement days half a day each week is allocated study time. This division of time 
was seen by some trainees as an imposed separation of the student and clinician roles of the 
trainee, and was often described as an imposed way of managing these different roles. 
Consequently, on academic days trainees tended to regard themselves as students, and on 
placement days they tended to regard themselves as clinicians. The structure of course 
requirements refers to the structure of academic days and course assignments. The course 
requires that all trainees attend all lectures. The lecture timetable and contents are devised by 
the course. Some trainees reported that this imposed structure meant that some lectures were 
less relevant to them due to their previous knowledge or experience, or that they were not
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relevant to their clinical work on placement, and hence this was described as a further 
separation of the student and clinician roles. In terms of assignments, these were described as 
structured in terms of their focus, hence trainees were obliged to follow this imposed 
structure.
Conflict
This category refers to the conflict trainees reported experiencing as a consequence of their 
different roles. Conflict appeared to result from three main sources. Firstly, a lack of identity 
with the student role. Trainees felt frustrated and disempowered by the constraints of the 
student role compared to their clinical role. They reported feeling “patronised” and as though 
at times they “were not being taught anything” and so the student role was “a waste of time.”
The second source of conflict was the trainee’s perception of a discrepancy between the level 
of competence expected of them in the student versus the clinician roles. They felt that in 
their role as a clinician they were expected to have a higher level of competence than they 
actually had, whilst as students they were treated as though they were incompetent.
The third source of conflict appeared to be competing pressures from the different 
environmental settings in which trainees perform the student and clinician role. Swapping 
between the different atmospheres in the different environmental settings created conflict 
between the trainees’ identities with each role. Such conflict was expressed in feelings of 
guilt about unequal dictation of time between the roles, feelings of rebellion towards the 
student role or feeling as though they were being deceitful in their portrayal of themselves as 
clinicians.
Future exnectations
The category of future expectations was concerned with trainee’s ideas and aspirations about 
the types of positions and jobs they will be doing when they qualify. A number of important 
aspects emerged including a desire to focus on clinical aspects of the role, wanting a mixture 
of different roles combining clinical and research aspects. Future aspirations emerged as an 
important motivating factor for completing training. A further aspect of this category was the 
theme of ambiguity as an aspect of psychology. It was anticipated that future roles would 
incorporate some of the ambiguity experienced during training due to the inherent ambiguity 
of the role of a psychologist and the process of continual professional development.
166
Qualitative Research Project
Appendix 6
Example of a category card
Category 31 Future expectations
A lines 130-132 A wanting to be a clinician when finishes rather than academic.
B lines 143-148 B wanting to be a clinician, not an academic or a research psychologist 
B lines 159-160 B wanting to be a clinician
C lines 25-28 C liking different aspects of roles and wanting to pursue this in the future.
C lines 90-96 C wanting to do research but clinical as well.
Links with -  Impact of past experience
-  Conflict arising from research role
Earlier labels Future aspirations
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Appendix 7 Map of the process of analysis Qualitative Research Project
Showing how the initial categories were integrated into the final model
Note: Numbers denote the original 19 categories identified from the data
1. Previous experience
Key:
Tentative causal link interpreted 
by researchers
An association grounded by 
participants’ comments
Strong causal link grounded by 
participants’ comments
Definitions and experience of the role of the Trainee 
Clinical Psychologist
Integrated categories:
2. Defining roles
3. Experience of the roles
4. Experience of the research role
5. Experience of the student role
6 . Experience of the professional/ clinical role
■
■
▼
Managing the roles
r ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Integrated categories:
! 7. Identifying with a specific role 
| 8. Role development 
! 9. Role adjustment
10. Imposed structure of Coping strategies
Integrated categories:
11. Wearing different hats
12. Peer support
13. Role amalgamation
14. Resigned to the role
15. Conflict
Integrated categories:
15. Conflict resulting from perceptions of competence
16. Conflict resulting from environmental expectations
17. Conflict resulting from the student role
18. Conflict resulting from ambiguity of role
*
19. Future expectations
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Major Research Project
Can an implicit traumatic response be observed on a modified Stroop paradigm in 
patients who have suffered a closed head injury following a road traffic accident 
with amnesia for the traumatic event?
Year 3
July 2003
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Abstract
A modified Stroop task was used to investigate the suggestion that implicit memory may be a 
possible mechanism for the development of acute stress disorder (ASD) in patients who have 
suffered a closed head injury. Three groups of hospital patients were compared within 1 
month post-trauma: road traffic accident (RTA) patients with a head injury (n = 15), RTA 
patients without a head injury (n = 13), and a control group of orthopaedic and plastics 
patients (n = 15). Participants named colours of 5 types of words: RTA-related words (e.g. 
emergency), words related to hospitalisation (e.g. treatment), obsessive-compulsive disorder 
(OCD) words (e.g. contamination), positive words (e.g. kindness), and neutral words (e.g. 
maintenance). Participants were administered the Acute Stress Disorder Interview (Bryant, 
Harvey, & Dang, 1998) and the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger, Gorsuch, 
Luchene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983). Both RTA patients with and without a head injury 
demonstrated greater interference on words related to a RTA, than words related to 
hospitalisation, or positive words. Significant interference was also unexpectedly observed 
for OCD words in RTA patients. Control patients did not display significant interference 
effects. No significant correlations between interference, severity scores for ASD, or state and 
trait anxiety were observed. Findings suggested that both patients with and without explicit 
recall for a RTA, responded similarly on a task involving implicit memory for trauma. 
Evidence may exist for implicit memory for trauma in closed head injury. Possible 
implications for ASD and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder are discussed.
Acknowledgements
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Introduction
It is now widely recognised that individuals can be traumatised by exposure to threatening 
situations, for example, rape, disasters, and events such as road traffic accidents. However, 
controversy exists as to whether someone can be traumatised by an event that they cannot 
remember. This debate is particularly applicable to patients who incur a closed head injury 
with amnesia for the event, such as a road traffic accident. If you cannot remember an event, 
how can you be traumatised by it? However, the literature suggests that patients who have 
sustained a closed head injury and cannot remember the accident can be at risk of developing 
psychiatric conditions such as Posttraumatic Stress Disorder and Acute Stress Disorder. The 
present study aims to further investigate this question. Posttraumatic Stress Disorder and 
Acute Stress Disorder are first briefly described before moving on to their empirical status in 
the area of closed head injury.
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)
PTSD as a diagnostic category emerged from the traumatic experiences of war. It developed 
from early descriptions of “shell shock” during the time of World War II to more substantial 
recognition following the Vietnam War (Yule, 1999). Formal diagnostic recognition occurred 
with its inclusion in the third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM-III, American Psychiatric Association, 1980). A diagnosis of PTSD is now 
applied to exposure to traumatic events that include assault, rape, and road traffic accidents. 
Current diagnostic criteria are listed in Table 1.
Research into the epidemiology of trauma, suggests that exposure to traumatic events may be 
reasonably common. Norris (1992) found that 69% of a sample of 1000 Americans had 
experienced at least one traumatic event in their lifetime and 21% had done so in the previous 
year. Tragic death was the most frequent. Sexual assault gave rise to the highest levels of 
PTSD and road traffic accidents presented the most adverse combination of frequency and 
impact. For road traffic accidents, there was an estimated lifetime frequency of 23%, giving 
rise to 28 seriously distressed people per 1,000 in the United States. Lifetime exposure was 
higher amongst males than females, and exposure in the past year was higher amongst 
younger adults. Previous traumatic experience was also found to be important in determining 
current levels of perceived stress, particularly with events occurring in the last year.
171
Major Research Project
Table 1. DSM-IV diagnostic criteria for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (American 
Psychiatric Association, 1994).
DSM-IV Diagnostic Criteria for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder
Criterion A
The person has been exposed to a traumatic event in which both the following were
present:
1. the person experienced, witnessed or was confounded with an event or events
that involved actual or threatened death or serious injury, or a threat to the
physical integrity of self or others.
2. the person’s response involved intense fear, helplessness, or horror.
Criterion B
The traumatic event is persistently re-experienced in one (or more) of the following ways:
1. recurrent and intrusive distressing recollections of the event, including images,
thoughts, or perceptions.
2. recurrent distressing dreams of the event.
3. acting or feeling as if the traumatic event were recurring (includes a sense of
reliving the experience, illusions, hallucinations, and dissociative flashback
episodes, including those that occur on awakening or when intoxicated).
4. intense psychological distress at exposure to internal or external clues that
symbolise or resemble an aspect of the traumatic event.
5. physiological reactivity on exposure to internal or external cues that symbolise
or resemble an aspect of the traumatic event.
Criterion C
Persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with the trauma and numbing of general
responsiveness (not present before the trauma), as indicated by three or more of the
following:
1. efforts to avoid thoughts, feelings, or conversations associated with the
trauma.
2. efforts to avoid activities, places, or people that arouse recollections of the
trauma.
3. inability to recall an important aspect of the trauma.
4. markedly diminished interest or participation in significant activities.
5. feeling of detachment or estrangement from others.
6. restricted range of affect (e.g. unable to have loving feelings).
7. sense of foreshortened future (e.g. does not expect to have a career, marriage,
children, or a normal life span).
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Criterion D
Persistent symptoms of increased arousal (not present before the trauma), as indicated by 
two (or more) of the following:
1. difficulty falling or staying asleep.
2. irritability or outbursts of anger.
3. difficulty concentrating.
4. hypervigilence.
5. exaggerated startle response.
Criterion E
Duration of the disturbance (symptoms in Criteria B, C, and D) is more than 1 month. 
Criterion F
The disturbance causes clinically significant distress or impairment in social, 
occupational, or other important areas of functioning.
Recent interest has developed in the early stages of reactions to trauma, within the first month. 
This has culminated in the new inclusion of Acute Stress Disorder as a diagnostic category in 
DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association, 1994). Acute Stress Disorder entails subtle 
differences in diagnostic criteria, however the origins are not new.
Acute Stress Disorder (ASD)
The earliest theorising can be dated back to 1887. Charcot (1887: cited in Bryant & Harvey, 
2000) postulated that a traumatic experience could evoke a reaction similar to a hypnotic state 
or state of “dissociation.” Janet (1907: cited in Bryant & Harvey, 2000) hypothesised that 
“dissociation” from the trauma served to reduce discomfort, but paradoxically resulted in 
decreased psychological functioning. Reintegration of the traumatic memories was required 
for adaptation to the event. It was not until the 1980s that this interest in “dissociation” re- 
emerged. ASD was formally recognised in 1994 (American Psychiatric Association, 1994), 
which enabled recognition of the significant distress that people experience in the first month 
following a trauma (Koopman, Classen, Cardena, & Spiegel, 1995).
Particular differences from PTSD include an emphasis on “dissociative” features, such as 
depersonalisation, emotional numbing, and derealisation. Diagnostic criteria for ASD are 
presented in Table 2.
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Table 2. DSM-IV diagnostic criteria for Acute Stress Disorder (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1994).
DSM-IV Diagnostic Criteria for Acute Stress Disorder
Criterion A
The person has been exposed to a traumatic event in which both the following were 
present:
1. the person experienced, witnessed or was confounded with an event or 
events that involved actual or threatened death or serious injury, or a 
threat to the physical integrity of self or others.
2. the person’s response involved intense fear, helplessness, or horror.
Criterion B
Either while experiencing or after the distressing event, the individual has three (or 
more) of the following dissociative symptoms:
1. a subjective sense of numbing, detachment, or absence of emotional
responsiveness.
2. a reduction in awareness of his or her surroundings (e.g. “being in a
daze”).
3. derealisation.
4. depersonalisation
5. dissociative amnesia (i.e. inability to recall an important aspect of the
trauma).
Criterion C
The traumatic event is persistently reexperienced in at least one of the following 
ways: recurrent images, thoughts, dreams, illusions, flashback episodes, or a sense of 
reliving the experience; or distress on exposure to reminders of the traumatic event.
Criterion D
Marked avoidance of stimuli that arouse recollection of the trauma (e.g. thoughts, 
feelings, conversations, activities, places, people).
Criterion E
Marked symptoms of anxiety or increased arousal (e.g. difficulty sleeping, irritability, 
poor concentration, hypervigilence, exaggerated startle response, motor restlessness).
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Criterion F
The disturbance causes clinically significant distress, or impairment in social, 
occupational, or other important areas of functioning or impairs the individual’s ability to 
pursue some necessary task, such as obtaining necessary assistance, or mobilising 
personal resources by telling family members about the traumatic experience).
Criterion G
The disturbance lasts for a minimum of 2 days and a maximum of 4 weeks and occurs 
within 4 weeks of the traumatic event.
Criterion H
The disturbance is not due to the direct physiological effects of a substance (e.g. a drug 
of abuse, a medication) or general medical condition, is not better accounted for by Brief 
Psychotic Disorder, and is not merely an exacerbation of an existing Axis I or Axis II 
disorder.
Closed head injury
Closed head injury usually involves an alteration of consciousness, neurological impairment, 
and cognitive deficits. It is a process that evolves not only hours and days after injury, but 
also weeks and months later (Lucas, 1998). Involvement in a high velocity impact such as a 
road traffic accident may lead to a variety of brain damage. Brain rotation in closed head 
injury may cause both focal and diffuse lesions that are independent of the site of impact 
(Richardson, 2000). Brain areas particularly susceptible are the frontal and temporal lobes 
(Courville, 1950: cited in Richardson, 2000), which are involved in executive functioning and 
memory amongst other functions. This is largely due to the soft brain accelerating inside the 
skull on impact and hitting bony projections of the base of the skull. Brain rotation also exerts 
pressure on axons, leading to axonal straining, which can lead to downregulation of 
biochemical functioning of the neuron, or axonal shearing, where axons can be severely 
damaged and lead to degeneration of surrounding brain areas. This is termed “diffuse axonal 
injury” (Richardson, 2000). White matter is particularly susceptible (Bigler, 2001), often 
producing slowed processing and inefficiency. As well as primary injury to the brain, 
secondary injury can occur as a result of brain swelling, due to raised intracranial pressure and 
intracranial bleeding (Richardson, 2000). Closed head injury can result in varied and 
extensive areas of brain injury and dysfunction.
Approximately 70% of closed head injuries result from road traffic accidents (Ponsford, 
1995). The incidence of hospitalisation following closed head injury in Britain and the United
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States is estimated at 200-300 per 100,000 of the population (Jennett & MacMillan, 1981). 
The gender ratio is roughly two to three males for every female, with the majority of victims 
aged between 15 to 24 years of age (Andersen & McLaurin, 1980: cited in Ponsford, 1995). 
This population has been found to have higher than average pre-morbid psychological 
problems, including a history of psychopathology, substance abuse, especially heavy alcohol 
consumption and poor academic performance (Bond, 1984; Haas, Cope & Hall, 1987; Rimel 
& Jane, 1984). Closed head injury has also been found to be more prevalent amongst the 
lower socioeconomic classes and amongst people who are unemployed (Rimel & Jane, 1984).
There are several important sequelae of closed head injury that are pertinent to the area of 
ASD and PTSD. These are posttraumatic amnesia and post-concussional syndrome. 
Posttraumatic amnesia can be used as a guide to the severity of closed head injury, whilst 
post-concussional syndrome can have many similar symptoms to Acute Stress Disorder or 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder.
Posttraumatic amnesia
This presents as a state of confusion and disorientation with particular memory disturbance for 
events occurring immediately after the head injury (anterograde amnesia), (Lucas, 1998). 
Behavioural disturbance includes agitation, restlessness, confabulation, fatigue, and 
occasional serious affective and psychotic symptoms (Ahmed, Bierley, Sheikh, & Date, 
2000). Length of posttraumatic amnesia has been defined as from the time of injury to when 
“the patient can give a clear and consecutive account of what was happening around him...by 
careful questioning after recovery of full consciousness and normal orientation (Symonds & 
Russell, 1943: cited in Ahmed et al., 2000).” Some variation exists in calculating the length 
of posttraumatic amnesia. The traditional definition includes length of coma. However, 
Levin, Benton, and Grossman (1982) propose that posttraumatic amnesia should be measured 
from the end of coma, because otherwise someone who has been in a lengthy coma can have 
the same level of posttraumatic amnesia as someone with a shorter coma and greater period of 
post-traumatic confusion. This definition is not universally adhered to in the literature. In 
support of the latter definition, the duration of posttraumatic amnesia is more useful in 
determining outcome following head injury than length of coma, with longer posttraumatic 
amnesia associated with more severe head injury (Greenwood, 1997).
Retrograde amnesia, or a lack of memory for events preceding the head injury has previously 
been considered as a measure of the severity of outcome following head injury (Lishman, 
1998). However, the period of retrograde amnesia in most head injuries is very brief, usually
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accounting for a few seconds, or a minute. The brief nature of retrograde amnesia renders it 
less useful as a guide to severity of head injury than the variable nature of posttraumatic 
amnesia (Lishman, 1998).
Typical classifications of posttraumatic amnesia (PTA) are: -
■ PTA less than one hour (mild head injury),
■ PTA for 1-24 hours (moderate head injury),
■ PTA greater than 24 hours (severe head injury) (Lucas, 1998).
However, the Mild Traumatic Brain Injury Committee of the Special Interest Group of the 
American Congress of Rehabilitation Medicine (1993) classify mild head injury as 
posttraumatic amnesia of less than 24 hours.
The majority of head injuries sustained are mild. Jennett and MacMillan (1981) estimated 
that only one in five patients with closed head injury sustain a moderate to severe injury.
Memory deficits in posttraumatic amnesia, such as anterograde amnesia are well documented, 
as well as orientation difficulties. Memory storage is not affected as such, but rather the 
temporal sequencing of memories (Schnider & Gutbrod, 1999). In the acute stages of head 
injury, deficits in all areas of attention can usually be observed, such as sustained, selective 
and divided attention, but in the chronic stages it is usually only divided attention that remains 
impaired (Schnider & Gutbrod, 1999).
Neurotransmitter upregulation, especially of acetycholine has been implicated in the 
development of posttraumatic amnesia. Acetylcholine rapidly increases in areas such as the 
hippocampus and thalamus following closed head injury (Saija, Hayes, Lyeth, Dixon, 
Yamamoto, & Robinson, 1988). In the acute phase post head injury, posttraumatic amnesia is 
associated with increased levels of acetylcholine and paradoxically with decreased levels of 
acetylcholine maintaining memory deficits after a greater period of time (Dixon, Liu, Jenkins, 
Bhattachangee, Whitson, Yang, & Hayes, 1995). Nissen, Knopman, and Schacter (1987) 
have demonstrated that the use of an acetylcholine inhibitor (scopolamine) has induced 
memory deficits in normal volunteers. In addition, deficits were in explicit declarative 
memory, but not implicit memory, such as procedural memory. Cohen and Squire (1980) 
have also found intact procedural memory in patients with posttraumatic amnesia.
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Post-concussional syndrome
Post-concussional syndrome refers to symptoms that emerge following head injury that 
include: dizziness, headaches, fatigue, reduced concentration, irritability, memory
dysfunction, sleep disturbance, sensitivity to noise / light, double or blurred vision, anxiety 
and depression (Jacobson, 1999). These symptoms are typically reported following mild or 
moderate head injury (Jacobson, 1999; King, 1996). Symptoms usually resolve by 3 months 
post-injury, although a significant number can persist at 3 months and some at 12 months 
(Jacobson, 1999).
There may be many overlaps in symptoms of post-concussional syndrome and PTSD or ASD, 
such as reduced concentration, irritability, and sleep disturbance. In addition, dissociative 
symptoms such as reduced awareness, derealisation, depersonalisation, and amnesia for the 
event may be caused by either PTSD or post-concussional syndrome (Grigsby & Kaye, 1993).
The traditional view of post-concussional syndrome as solely organic is now outmoded. 
Organic and psychosocial factors have been found to be involved in both the onset and 
maintenance of post-concussional syndrome (Fenton, McClelland, Montgomery, MacFlynn, 
& Rutherford, 1993; Montgomery, Fenton, McClelland, MacFlynn, & Rutherford, 1991). 
Bryant and Harvey (1999a) found that patients with mild head injury and PTSD were more 
likely to report post-concussional syndrome symptoms than those without PTSD.
Head injury and posttraumatic stress disorder
The co-existence of head injury and PTSD is an area of particular controversy. Some studies 
suggest that head injury may be protective against developing PTSD.
Mutual exclusivity of head injury and posttraumatic stress disorder?
Mayou, Bryant, and Duthie (1993) assessed 188 road accident victims aged 18-70, with 
multiple injuries or whiplash. They excluded anyone who was unconscious for more than 15 
minutes. On hospital admission, victims were given a semi-structured interview, covering 
demographic information, details of the accident, and social and psychiatric history in the 
month prior to the accident. The Eysenck Personality Inventory (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1992), * 
the Beck Depression Inventory (Beck, 1978) and the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory 
(Spielberger et al., 1983) were also used. A semi-structured interview was conducted at three 
months and one year post-accident, based on DSM-III-R criteria1 for posttraumatic stress
1 DSM-IV criteria differ to DSM-III-R criteria in that “physiological reactivity” has been moved from 
the arousal criterion to the intrusion criterion.
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disorder (American Psychiatric Association, 1987). PTSD was associated with “horrific 
memories” of the accident, which were not present in those who had been knocked 
unconscious. They further reported that 31 (18%) initially presented with an “acute stress 
reaction,” associated with horrific memories and emotional disturbance. It is uncertain 
whether this would constitute ASD retrospectively. People with “acute stress reactions” had a 
poor prognosis, with nine developing PTSD 1 year after the event. Only 5/31 had no 
psychiatric consequences. Their reaction was associated with neuroticism and no loss of 
consciousness. However, there are many criticisms. No formal diagnostic interview was 
used for both the acute stages following the accidents and at three months and one year. In 
addition, by excluding all patients with a loss of consciousness of greater than 15 minutes, 
more severe head injuries were excluded.
Further support against the co-existence of PTSD and head injury was found by Warden, 
Labbate, Salazaar, Nelson, Sheley, Staudenmeier, and Martin (1997). They assessed 47 (46 
male, 1 female) active-duty service members who had sustained a moderate brain injury 
through a variety of means, including motor vehicle accidents, assault or an industrial 
accident. They used a psychiatric interview, the Present State Examination (Wing, Cooper, & 
Sartorius, 1974: cited in Warden et al., 1997), adapted for use in head injury, from which 
questions related to DSM-III-R (American Psychiatric Association, 1987) diagnostic criteria 
for PTSD were extracted. Two additional questions were added to meet the re-experiencing 
and avoidance criteria. No participants met full criteria PTSD and only 6 met reduced criteria 
(A, C and D) that did not include re-experiencing phenomena. However, time intervals for 
assessment varied considerably, ranging from 4 months post-injury to 2 years. The reliability 
and validity of the adapted Present State Examination is furthermore unclear.
However, there are a number of group studies and case reports that suggest that PTSD and 
head injury may co-exist, but may be less likely as head injury severity increases.
Co-existence of head injury and nosttraumatic stress disorder?
Feinstein, Hershkop, Ouchterlony, Jardine, and McCullagh (2002) examined the relationship 
between posttraumatic amnesia and PTSD symptoms. They assessed 282 (66% male) 
participants attending a head injury clinic. Diagnosticians were blind to the patient’s history. 
A clinical co-ordinator collected demographic data and details of the injury via interview and 
case note examination. A neuropsychiatrist examined patients separately and administered the 
15-item Impact of Events Scale (Horowitz, Wilner, & Alvarez, 1979) and the 28-item General 
Health Questionnaire (Goldberg & Hillier, 1979). The Impact of Events Scale measures
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symptoms of PTSD related to re-experiencing and avoidance. The General Health 
Questionnaire was used as an overall measure of psychological distress. Participants were 
divided according to levels of posttraumatic amnesia. 147 participants had posttraumatic 
amnesia less than 1 hour (mild), 70 with posttraumatic amnesia of 1-24 hours (moderate), 40 
with posttraumatic amnesia of 24 hours to 1 week (severe) and 25 with a posttraumatic 
amnesia greater than 1 week (very severe). No statistical differences were found between the 
four groups in terms of intrusive and avoidance symptoms and scores on the General Health 
Questionnaire. Symptoms of PTSD were present even when posttraumatic amnesia exceeded 
24 hours and in some cases 1 week. However, when the groups were collapsed into 
posttraumatic amnesia less than 1 hour and posttraumatic amnesia greater than 1 hour, 
intrusive and avoidant symptomatology significantly decreased when posttraumatic amnesia 
was greater than 1 hour, yet General Health Questionnaire scores remained constant. They 
suggest that the decrease in PTSD symptomatology cannot therefore be explained by affective 
factors. However, the Impact of Events Scale is not a diagnostic instrument, neglecting 
arousal posttraumatic stress disorder symptoms. The results were also based on head injuries 
of mixed aetiology.
Turnbull, Campbell, and Swann (2001) found that PTSD could be present in head injury 
patients, although less severe in nature. They specifically examined the nature of memory in 
relation to the traumatic event. They used the Impact of Events Scale (Horowitz et al., 1979) 
as a screening measure to identify participants with possible PTSD from patients admitted to 
an Accident and Emergency Unit. Patients with a cut-off score greater than 20 on either the 
intrusion or avoidance subscale on the Impact of Events Scale were followed up by telephone 
interview using the Clinician Administered Posttraumatic Stress Disorder scale for DSM-IV 
(CAPS-DX, Blake, Weathers, Nagy, Kaloupek, Gusman, Chamey, & Keane, 1996). The 
CAPS-DX is a structured clinical interview and was used for a definite diagnosis of PTSD. 
The 17 possible symptoms of PTSD of DSM-IV were examined for frequency and intensity 
scores. Criteria 8 (difficulty in remembering parts of the event) were excluded, due to the 
overlap of amnesia resulting from the head injury. The Hospital Anxiety and Depression 
Scale (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) was used as a measure of psychological distress. On the 
basis of a questionnaire developed by the authors to establish memory for the event, the 55 
(48 male, 7 female) respondents were divided into those who had no memory of the event, 
untraumatic memories of the event and traumatic memories.
Memory of the event and the affective nature of the memories were important in the reporting 
of PTSD symptoms. Participants with either no memory of the event or traumatic memories
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were more likely to meet criteria for PTSD, than those with untraumatic memories. Both the 
no memory group and the traumatic memory group additionally had significantly higher 
ratings of psychological distress on the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale than the 
untraumatic group. However, head injury did appear associated with decreased levels of 
PTSD symptomatology. In terms of severity, ratings of PTSD symptoms were less in the 
group without memory than in patients with traumatic memories. In particular, intrusive 
symptoms were less in the no memory group. Flashbacks, distressing dreams, avoidance of 
people or places that reminded them of the event and hypervigilence were the least reported 
symptoms. The most reported intrusive symptoms in the no memory group were 
psychological or physical distress in response to reminders of the event, suggesting a very 
different profile of PTSD. However, not all those who returned the questionnaires were 
interviewed. Only the four highest scores below the cut-off were interviewed, assuming that 
the rest would not meet criteria for PTSD. The nature of the traumatic event was also non­
specific.
A prospective study of head injury and PTSD was undertaken by Wright and Telford (1996), 
assessing 50 patients at three months and three years post head injury. Unlike previous 
studies, patients were not carefully selected or screened out if they had a past psychiatric 
history, alcohol consumption prior to the accident or previous head injury. The study was 
designed to be representative of the head injured population. Assessment measures included a 
semi-structured interview, the General Health Questionnaire (Goldberg & Hillier, 1979), and 
the Impact of Events Scale (Horowitz et al., 1979). Recurrent intrusive thoughts and 
avoidance behaviour were reported by over half the patients, as well as emotional numbing, 
with decreased interest in usual activities. 83% reported at least one symptom of increased 
arousal. Three years later, there was no significant decrease in PTSD symptoms, with only 
“diminished interest” being significantly less reported. PTSD symptoms were also 
significantly higher than a control group matched according to age, sex, socio-economic 
status, marital status and psychiatric history. However, the control group did not have the 
additional experience of being admitted to hospital and consisted of people known on a formal 
and informal basis to the authors.
Rattock and Ross (1993), used the Penn Inventory for Post-traumatic Stress Disorder 
(Hammarberg, 1993), designed to examine PTSD in head injury. In a sample of 40 patients 
with head injury, 8 (20%) scored above the cut off for PTSD. Patients with brain injury 
scored significantly higher than normal controls, but significantly lower than Vietnam 
veterans with PTSD. No significant differences were found for age, sex, level of education, or
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physical functionality. Outpatients who had less severe head injury (mild to moderate) had 
higher levels of PTSD than inpatients. Those patients who had more awareness of the their 
difficulties also had higher ratings of PTSD. However, brain injuries were of mixed 
aetiology, including stroke, tumour and anoxia.
Similar findings were observed for patients who sustained a very severe head injury (mean 
posttraumatic amnesia: 36.97 days). Bryant, Marosszeky, Crooks, and Gurka (2000) using the 
PTSD Interview (Watson, Juba, Manifold, Kucala, & Andersen, 1991) found that six months 
post-injury 26 (27.1%) of 96 patients in a brain injury rehabilitation unit met PTSD criteria. 
Again, Bryant et al. (2000) suggest that the profile of PTSD may be different in head injury. 
Only 19.2% (N=5) reported intrusive memories of the trauma, whereas 96.2% (N=25) 
reported emotional and physiological reactivity, which had very strong predictive power with 
PTSD.
Case studies
Several case studies have further been reported in the literature, describing patients who have 
developed PTSD symptoms despite amnesia for the event and ranging in severity of head 
injury, from mild to very severe (Horton, 1993; King, 1997; Layton & Wardi-Zonna, 1995; 
McGrath, 1997; McMillan, 1996; McMillan, 1991; and McNeil & Greenwood, 1996).
Head injury and acute stress disorder
Recent research has also reported that acute stress disorder can co-exist with head injury.
A prospective study by Bryant and Harvey (1999b) assessed mild head injury patients for 
ASD within one month of the trauma, with later follow up. Consecutive patients admitted to a 
trauma hospital following a road traffic accident were assessed. They compared those who 
had sustained a mild head injury (N=79), against patients without a head injury (N=92). A 
diagnosis of acute stress disorder was reached using the Acute Stress Disorder Interview 
(Bryant et al., 1998), which has reported good reliability, sensitivity, and specificity for 
clinician-based DSM-IV diagnosis (Bryant & Harvey, 1999b). Patients were then reassessed 
six months post-trauma (mild head injury: N=63, non-head injury: N=72) using the PTSD 
module from the Composite International Diagnostic Interview (Peters, Andrews, Cottier, & 
Chatteijii, 1996), which has adequate internal consistency and concurrent validity for DSM- 
m-R.
182
Major Research Project
Levels of acute stress disorder were comparable in the mild head injury group (14%, N=11) 
and the non-head injury group (13%, N=12). In the acute stages, the mild head injury group 
were less likely to report fear, helplessness, or intrusive memories, although by six months 
reporting of intrusive symptoms had increased in the mild head injury group, but deceased in 
the non-head injury group. Dissociative amnesia was excluded from diagnosis, due to the 
overlap with amnesia associated with head injury.
Predictive power of acute stress disorder for posttraumatic stress disorder 
There is reasonable evidence to support the link between ASD and the development of PTSD. 
Harvey and Bryant (1999b) followed up patients at two years from the previous study (Bryant 
& Harvey, 1999a). 80% (N=8) of patients diagnosed with ASD were diagnosed with PTSD 
two years later. In comparison, 8% of those not diagnosed with ASD were diagnosed with 
PTSD. All symptoms of ASD had fairly strong negative predictive power, i.e. PTSD was not 
present when ASD symptoms were absent. Those symptoms with the strongest predictive 
power, i.e. PTSD was present when these symptoms of ASD were, were motor restlessness, 
depersonalisation, recurrent images / thoughts, a sense of reliving the traumatic experience, 
nightmares, avoidance, reduced awareness and numbing.
Conclusions of acute stress disorder / nosttraumatic stress disorder and head injury literature 
Early research suggested that head injury and the associated amnesia for the traumatic event 
was protective against the development of PTSD (Mayou et al., 1993; Sbordne and Liter, 
1995; Warden et al., 1997). However, there is now evolving evidence to support the co­
occurrence of ASD / PTSD amongst patients who have experienced a head injury (Bryant & 
Harvey, 1999a,b; Feinstein et al., 2002; Turnbull et al., 2001) in a proportion of patients. In 
addition, research has suggested that there seem to be important differences in the profile of 
ASD / PTSD with head injury compared to ASD / PTSD alone. In particular, arousal is a key 
feature, with emotional and physiological reactivity more commonly observed than other 
symptoms, although intrusive and re-experiencing phenomenon can also be present. There are 
several theoretical explanations that have been proposed to support these findings for the 
development of ASD / PTSD with head injury.
183
Major Research Project
Theoretical explanations of acute stress disorder / posttraumatic stress disorder in head 
injury
“Islands of memory”
Brief episodes of memory recall, “islands of memory” for the traumatic event have been 
reported by some patients with head injury, for example recalling lying in pain, hearing others 
scream and feeling close to death. All ten case studies reported by McMillan (1996) described 
such recollection. Other cases report similar findings (Horton, 1993; McGrath, 1997). It is 
suggested that people who are otherwise amnesic may experience intrusive symptomatology 
from these fragments of memory, which may then lead to development of PTSD (King, 1997). 
This is more likely if the period of posttraumatic amnesia is short (Harvey & Bryant, 2001).
Reconstruction of memories
Reconstruction of the traumatic memories is a further possibility. This may be through 
secondary sources, such as eye witness accounts, police reports or photographs (Harvey & 
Bryant, 2000).
Patients may then develop traumatic “pseudomemories” for the event. Bryant (1996) 
describes two patients with severe head injury and PTSD, who despite amnesia for the road 
traffic accident developed “pseudomemories,” based on photographs and reports of the event. 
One patient experienced intrusive images, similar to a newspaper photograph of his car.
Trauma of hospitalisation
Patients may additionally have traumatic experiences associated with the hospitalisation 
process. Jones, Griffiths, Humphries, & Skirrow (2001) reported that patients with delusional 
memories of intensive care at 2 weeks post-rehabilitation, such as believing that someone was 
trying to kill them (doctors and nurses) were predictive of PTSD symptoms at 8 weeks post­
hospitalisation. However, patients admitted with head injury were excluded from this study. 
However, McMillan (1991) described a patient with severe head injury, who avoided a range 
of situations connected with her accident, including hospitals.
Implicit memory
Early work that described an inability to recall the traumatic event as being inconsistent with 
PTSD was based on a unitary memory theory (Layton & Wardi-Zonna, 1995). When 
independent memory systems of declarative and non-declarative (or implicit) memory 
(Squire, 1992) are considered, the theoretical stance of PTSD and amnesia for the event is no
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longer incompatible. Declarative memory refers to stored experience that is potentially 
accessible to conscious recollection, whereas implicit memory is not accessible to 
consciousness (Parkin, 1997). The declarative memory system may be disrupted in amnesia, 
without disrupting implicit memory. For example, the implicit memory system involves 
learning of motor skills, priming, classical conditioning, and habituation and sensitisation 
(Squire, 1992). Patients with amnesia are able to learn new skills, such as, reading words that 
are reversed in a mirror, despite having no conscious recall of learning the skill (Squire, 
Knowlton, & Musen, 1993).
Implicit memory for the traumatic event in ASD / PTSD can be explained by the biological 
principal of “fear conditioning.” The role of the limbic structures, in particular the amygdala 
and the hippocampus are discussed.
Fear conditioning
Animals that are exposed to an intensely fearful event, such as an electric shock rapidly 
develop fear responses: flight or fight emergency reactions, in order to evade the threatening 
situation. Research suggests that the limbic system, especially the amygdala has a special role 
(van der Kolk, 1994).
The amygdala
The amygdala is believed to be involved in adding the emotional significance to incoming 
sensory stimuli (LeDoux, 1995) and to guide emotional behaviour through its 
interconnections with the hypothalamus, basal forebrain, and hippocampus (Gallager & 
Holland, 1994; LeDoux, 1995). It is able to activate fear responses, such as changes in heart 
rate, freezing behaviour, and potentiated startle (Rosen & Schulkin, 1998). The majority of 
sensory processing occurs rapidly below the level of conscious awareness. Only novel, 
significant, or threatening information is passed on to the neocortex for greater attention. 
Emotional information about sensory stimuli is then combined with contextual information 
about the sensory input from memory, involving the hippocampus (LeDoux, 1995).
There are a number of pathways conveying information to the amygdala that affect the 
emotional response attributed to the incoming stimuli. The direct pathway flows from the 
thalamus to the amgdala, whereas the indirect pathway flows from the thalamus to the cortex 
to the amygdala (LeDoux, 1995). The direct thalamo-amygdala pathway is faster, but more 
limited in terms of representation of incoming stimuli (Bordi & LeDoux, 1994a,b: cited in 
LeDoux, 1995), and is able to trigger an emotional response by simple stimulus features. The
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slower thalamo-cortico-amygdalo pathway involves several cortico-cortical links before 
reaching the amygdala (Romanski & LeDoux, 1993a,b: cited in LeDoux, 1995). These 
cortical links involve unimodal sensory cortex, association cortex and the hippocampus, 
which in turn all have projections to the amygdala (LeDoux, 1998). Figure 1. shows the 
circuits involving the amygdala.
THALAMUS
AMYGDALA
PREFRONTAL
CORTEX
HIPPOCAMPUS
ASSOCIATION
CORTEX
SENSORY CORTEX
Figure 1. Diagram o f direct thalamo-cortical pathway ) and indirect thalamo-cortico-
amygdalo pathway (  — ^  ). Incoming stimuli (  5 '*").
Animal lesion studies of the amygdala demonstrate a failure to develop a fear response to a 
threatening stimulus (LeDoux, 1995). Similar results have been found in humans with 
unilateral temporal lobectomy including the amygdala (LaBar, LeDoux, Spencer, & Phelps,
1995).
The hippocampus
The hippocampus is considered to have a key role in explicit memory for events (Squire, 
1992). In particular, it is believed to be involved in categorising and storing incoming stimuli 
into memory (van der Kolk, 1994), evaluating whether events that are spatially and 
temporarily unconnected are associated with each other, with novelty, or reward and 
punishment. This allows the organism to distinguish between those situations in which it is 
appropriate to respond in an emergency fashion and those in which it is not, for example, a 
tiger in the wild against a tiger in the zoo (LeDoux, 1995).
Interaction o f amygdala and hippocampus
Research suggests that high level stimulation of the amygdala as a result of exposure to a 
traumatic event, may leave an indelible memory trace (LeDoux, Romanski, & Xagoraris,
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1991). Such memory traces can only be inhibited from activating fear responses, rather than 
erasing them altogether. The hippocampus is considered to play an important role in 
inhibiting amygdaloid fear responses through it connections with the prefrontal cortex 
(Brewin, 2001). Hippocampal damage is linked with hyperresponsiveness to environmental 
stimuli (Altman, Bruner, & Bayer, 1973: cited in van der Kolk, 1994).
The fast and direct thalamo-amygdala pathway is believed to carry perceptual information 
about a stimulus pertaining to threat and is able to quickly activate defensive reactions. The 
slower indirect thalamo-cortico-amygdala pathway allows for more detailed processing of the 
incoming stimuli and can inhibit the fear response.
Exposure to a traumatic event differentially affects these two elements of the fear network and 
subsequent explicit and implicit memory for the trauma.
Fear and memory formation
Hippocampal memory systems have been found to be variably affected by stress hormones 
released in response to an acutely traumatic event, with cognitive performance affected in line 
with the Yerkes-Dodson inverted-U shape: when exposed to glucocorticoids, hippocampal 
neurone activation first increases, but then declines, resulting in impaired functioning under 
high levels of stress (Metcalfe & Jacobs, 1998). Subsequently, there is less contextual binding 
of sensory information (Brewin, 2001). Conversely, the function of the amygdala increases 
with raised stress levels, allowing for increasing conditioned fear responses to threatening 
stimuli (Pitman, Shalev, & Orr, 2000). Reduced explicit recall for the event results in reduced 
contextual information about the event, which prevents inhibition of the amygdala and the fear 
response, which can be rapidly activated by stimuli perceptually similar to the original 
traumatic stimuli (Brewin, 2001). This means that even without head injury, explicit recall of 
the traumatic event is reduced, although implicit memory for the event is enhanced. In other 
words, the effects of the traumatic response on memory impairment even without head injury 
may be similar to that which occurs in head injury, although more severe in nature.
Explicit and implicit memory and head injury
Significant deficits in explicit memory for the traumatic event even when there is no loss of 
consciousness may suggest a stronger theoretical stance for the co-existence of ASD / PTSD 
and head injury. Indeed, there is evidence that the main re-experiencing symptoms that occur 
after severe head injury are psychological distress or physiological reactivity when exposed to 
reminders of the trauma (Bryant et al., 1996; Turnbull et al., 2001). These features of arousal,
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could be rapidly activated by fear conditioning and emotional memory connected with the 
amygdala. Additionally, the finding by Cohen and Squire (1980) of intact procedural, or 
implicit memory in patients with posttraumatic amnesia, adds further support to the possibility 
of memory consolidation for the trauma at the level of implicit memory.
Previous research has investigated the role of implicit memory in PTSD without head injury.
Measuring implicit memory
Cognitive theories of PTSD propose that people with PTSD selectively attend to threat-related 
material, because fear networks are activated as a result of the traumatic event (Foa, Steketee, 
& Rothbaum, 1989). Research suggests that people with PTSD like other anxiety disorders 
may selectively attend to information of a threatening nature, demonstrating hypervigilence 
(DSM-IV, American Psychiatric Association, 1994), due to the priming of the fear network.
The main cognitive approach used to examine this attentional bias has been the modified 
Stroop paradigm (Stroop, 1935). People are required to name the colour of words printed in 
different colours that are emotionally significant to a traumatic event. This necessitates 
inhibiting the automatic response to reading the word out. The correct response in the 
example below is: -
t r a p p e d  saying “red” rather than “trapped”
People with PTSD are believed to take longer to colour-name trauma related words, because 
the meaning of the word becomes activated despite the participants’ attempts to selectively 
attend to the colour. The trauma-related words may reflect an inability by the person to 
inhibit trauma-related information once it is activated (Metzger, Orr, Lasko, McNally, & 
Pitman, 1997). This could be seen to link with the theory of biological fear networks. 
Emotionally significant perceptual information could rapidly activate fear systems, such as the 
amygdala, without inhibition of response from hippocampal-prefrontal connections.
Stroop words can be presented on a single piece of card. The person is then timed on naming 
all the colours of the trauma-related words on the card (McNally, Kaspi, Riemann, & Zeitlin,
1990). Time to colour name trauma-related words is usually compared against the time to 
colour name words of neutral emotionality (matched for syllables and frequency of usage in 
the English language). The Stroop paradigm has been investigated with victims of combat
Major Research Project
(McNally et al., 1990), rape (Cassiday, McNally, & Zeitlin, 1992) and ferry disaster 
(Thrasher, Dalgleish, & Yule, 1994). Anxiety specific Stroop interference has also been 
found in other anxiety disorders, such as generalised anxiety disorder (Matthews & MacLoed, 
1985), panic disorder (Ehlers, Magraf, Davies, & Roth, 1988) and social phobia (Hope, 
Rapee, Heimberg, & Dombeck, 1990).
However, some research has suggested that the emotional intensity of the words alone 
whether positive or negative may cause greater interference (Martin, Williams, & Clark,
1991). McNally et al. (1990) investigated the emotionality hypothesis in Vietnam combat 
veterans with (n=15) and without (n=15) PTSD using trauma-related words, positive words, 
and words related to another anxiety disorder: obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD). PTSD 
words had been given very high stress ratings by Vietnam veterans with PTSD in previous 
research (McNally, Luedke, Besyner, Peterson, Bohn, & Lips, 1987). Trauma-related words 
(bodybags, nam, firefight, medevac, charlie) were compared against neutral words (mix, 
millionaire, fingertips, concrete, input), positive words (love, pleasant, loyal, happy, 
friendship) and OCD-related words (germs, filthy, faeces, urine, dirty). PTSD participants 
demonstrated significantly greater interference on trauma-related words than neutral, positive, 
or OCD-related words. This suggested that Stroop interference was threat specific rather than 
attributable to the emotionality of words.
Alternatively each Stroop word can appear individually on a computer screen. Voice 
activation is then used to record the response latency for each word (Harvey & Bryant, 1996). 
Latency of responding to trauma-related words is compared against words of neutral 
emotionality.
Bryant and Harvey (1995) used the computer-based format with people who had been 
involved in a road traffic accident. Trauma-related words previously rated for emotionality in 
pilot work by road traffic accident victims were presented to participants. Participants with 
PTSD (n=15) showed greater interference on strong threat words related to the RTA 
(emergency, smash, scream, trapped, death, blood) that those participants with simple phobia 
of driving (n=15), or low anxiety (n=15). Participants with simple phobia did not show an 
interference effect. Strong threat related words were further compared against mild threat 
words (traffic, wheel, bridge, intersection, truck, driver) positive words (love, worthy, 
kindness, excitement, nice, smile), and neutral words (record, pause, sail, deer, blanket, 
pasture). No interference effect was found for PTSD participants using mild threatening or
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positive words. This suggests that Stroop interference increases as the similarity between the 
trauma words and the participants’ concerns does (Riemann & McNally, 1995).
Does the Stroop effect reflect interference at an implicit level?
It has been questioned whether the Stroop paradigm reflects interference at a pre-attentive 
stage, because the nature of the task allows for conscious identification of the words 
(MacLeod & Hagan, 1992). To test this hypothesis Harvey, Bryant, and Rapee (1996) used 
the same computer format with road traffic accident victims. Words were presented for a very 
short period of time (20ms), followed by a backward-mask consisting of a string of “X” letters 
in the same colour and screen location as the stimulus words, to prevent conscious awareness 
of the words. Masked words were compared against unmasked words. Participants did not 
show significant conscious awareness of the trauma-related words, when asked to identify 
them as real words or non-words. Participants with PTSD demonstrated greater interference 
in both the masked and unmasked conditions than participants who had been involved in a 
road traffic accident without PTSD, and controls who had never been in a road traffic 
accident. This suggests that threat-related information may be processed at an implicit level. 
Patients who had suffered a suspected head injury as suggested by reports of posttraumatic 
amnesia were however excluded from the study.
Stroop interference and self-report measures of trauma
Cassiday et al. (1992) have compared the computerised emotional Stroop against self-report 
measures of cognitive intrusion, such as the Impact of Events Scale (Horowitz et al., 1979). 
Interference for high threat-related words was significantly associated with self-reported 
intrusive symptoms (r=.41), but not with self-reported avoidance and numbing symptoms 
(r=.19). This suggests that the emotional Stroop may reflect disturbances to cognitive 
processes at an implicit level that are reported by the individual on a conscious level. It 
therefore seems that there is a connection between implicit measures of trauma and explicit 
self-report measures.
Trait anxiety, as measured by the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger et al., 1983) has 
also been found to exert an important influence over Stroop interference, with individuals 
with high trait anxiety demonstrating interference on anxiety-related words (MacLeod & 
Rutherford, 1992).
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The original Stroop paradigm and head injury
The emotional Stroop paradigm has not been used before in the head injury population. 
However, the original Stroop paradigm is commonly used as a measure of selective attention, 
to test the ability of patients to inhibit responding to distracting stimuli (Malloy, Cohen, & 
Jenkins, 1998). In its original form, colour names are presented in different coloured inks, for 
example the word red is presented in blue ink. Patients are required to inhibit the automatic 
response to read the colour word “red” and to name the colour of the ink “blue” instead. In 
the head injury population, some studies have failed to find differences between patients with 
severe head injury and controls on the Stroop task (Van Zomeran & Brower, 1987), leading 
other to suggest that the task is not challenging enough in its original form (Bohnen, Jolles, & 
Twijnstra, 1992). Another explanation has been that emotional disturbance, such as anxiety 
resulting from heightened autonomic arousal may impede performance. Testing this 
hypothesis, Batchelor, Harvey, & Bryant (1992) found that patients with mild head injury 
performed more slowly than control participants on this task, although anxiety did have some 
influence. Differences between the two groups emerged when trait anxiety was controlled for, 
but not state anxiety. However, participants were not experiencing clinical levels of anxiety. 
It therefore seems plausible that the emotional Stroop paradigm will be a useful assessment 
tool in the measurement of emotional reaction to a traumatic event, in addition to the 
cognitive impact of a head injury.
Self-report measures of acute stress disorder
Existing self-report measures used in ASD were developed for measuring PTSD symptoms 
and have been adapted for use with ASD, e.g. Impact of Events Scale (Horowitz et al., 1979) 
and the PTSD Symptom Scale (Foa et al., 1993). Such scales do not incorporate the 
dissociative criteria of ASD and the Impact of Events Scale also omits arousal symptoms. 
Certain dissociative scales have additionally been used e.g. Dissociative Experiences Scale 
(Bernstein & Putnam, 1986), but it does not incorporate other ASD criteria (Bryant et al., 
1998).
The self-report measure for ASD with the most adequate data is the Acute Stress Disorder 
Interview (ASDI, Bryant et al., 1998). The ASDI was developed as a specific self-report 
measure of ASD based on DSM-IV diagnostic criteria (American Psychiatric Association, 
1994). The reliability and validity of the ASDI are discussed in the Method section. The 
ASDI has good predictive validity for PTSD. 78% to 82% of patients diagnosed with ASD 
using the ASDI were diagnosed with PTSD at six months (Bryant & Harvey, 1998; Harvey & 
Bryant, 1998).
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Gaps in the literature
In summary, the existing literature suggests that ASD, PTSD and head injury are not mutually 
exclusive as previously suggested. Although patients may lack explicit memory of the event 
due to the head injury, implicit memory has been suggested as having a role in the 
development of ASD / PTSD. This is based on theoretical positions, empirical evidence from 
non-head injury patients with ASD / PTSD, and experimental evidence of the differential 
effects of posttraumatic amnesia on implicit and explicit memory. Implicit memory for the 
traumatic event in patients has not been investigated empirically in patients with a head injury.
Aims
The modified emotional Stroop has been widely used as a measure of implicit memory for 
trauma in PTSD, but has not been used with patients with head injury. The primary aim of 
this research was to examine the existence of implicit memory for a road traffic accident in 
patients who have suffered a head injury, through the use of a modified emotional Stroop. 
The research focused on patients who were involved in a road traffic accident, using objective 
measures of head injury. Stroop interference for words related to a road traffic accident were 
compared against existing conscious self-report measures of trauma and anxiety, within the 
first month following the event. The role of hospitalisation and amnesia for the event as 
potentially confounding traumatic events was also considered, based on findings by Jones et 
al. (2001) and McMillan (1991), by using Stroop words related to hospitalisation associated 
with head injury. The confounding effect of word emotionality was taken into account, by 
using Stroop words of a positive emotionality and words related to another anxiety disorder 
(obsessive compulsive disorder, OCD).
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Hypotheses
1. Road traffic accident (RTA) patients with a head injury will take significantly longer to 
colour name all Stroop words than RTA patients without a head injury, or control patients.
2. RTA patients with and without a head injury will show significantly more interference for 
words related to a RTA than for interference related to positive words, OCD related 
words, or words related to hospitalisation.
3. Control patients will show no significant differences in interference scores between 
positive words, OCD related words, words related to hospitalisation, or words related to a 
RTA.
4. RTA patients with and without a head injury will show significant correlations between 
RTA interference scores and arousal ASD severity scores and state anxiety.
5. State and trait anxiety will be significantly correlated with interference scores.
6. State and trait anxiety will be significantly correlated with severity scores for acute stress 
disorder.
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Method
Design
A cross-sectional approach was used. A mixed between participants and within participants 
design was used. The three groups were road traffic accident patients with a head injury, road 
traffic accident patients without a head injury, and a control group. The between factors were 
demographic information (age, level of education); time since accident; ASD severity score; 
state and trait anxiety; time to complete Stroop words: neutral, positive, OCD, hospital, and 
RTA words. Within group factors were interference scores (positive words, OCD words, 
hospital words and RTA words). An a priori power analysis using G*POWER indicated that 
a total of 39 participants would be needed for sufficient power (Erdfelder, Faul, & Buchner,
1996). See Appendix 1 for power calculations.
Ethics
Ethics approval was obtained from the hospital trust ethics committee and subsequent 
approval from the University of Surrey Advisory Committee on Ethics. Research indemnity 
was obtained through the hospital trust. (See Appendix 2 for ethics committee and research 
and development correspondence).
Participants
Adult road traffic accident admissions to a major hospital were assessed over a 5-month 
period. Inclusion criteria were a) proficiency in English; aged 18-65 years old; assessment 
within 1 month of trauma. Exclusion criteria were: people not proficient in English (n=3); 
people unable to communicate verbally as a result of head injury; history of repeated 
admissions associated with alcoholism (n=3), or repeated head injury; patients with extended 
posttraumatic amnesia associated with severe head injury (n=4); patients with colour 
blindness, agnosia (unable to recognise words / colour), dyslexia; significant recent psychiatric 
history (n=3), and intravenous drug abuse (N=2). hi total, 15 patients (9 male and 6 female) 
with a head injury and 13 patients (11 male and 2 female) with no head injury were included 
in the study. Assessments took place between 2 and 28 days post-trauma (median = 7, S= 
6.80). The mean length of estimated posttraumatic amnesia for head injury participants was 
19.63 hours (SD= 26.75) with a range of 1 minute to 90 hours. Of the 15 participants in the 
head injury group 3 had been drivers in their accidents, 1 had been a passenger, 5 had been 
motorbike riders, 4 had been pedestrians and 1 had been a cyclist. Of the 13 participants in 
the non-head injury group 2 had been drivers, 0 had been passengers, 7 had been motorbike 
riders, 3 had been pedestrians, and 1 had been a cyclist.
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Matched orthopaedic and plastics admissions, based on age and gender were recruited as 
control participants. Inclusion criteria were: patients admitted to hospital as a result of a 
traumatic orthopaedic or plastics injury not as a result of a road traffic accident, and not 
involving head injury; aged 18-65; and proficiency in English. Exclusion criteria were: 
people not proficient in English (n=l); significant history of head injury or alcoholism; recent 
history of road traffic accident requiring medical treatment; colour blindness; dyslexia; and 
significant psychiatric history (n=2). In total 15 control patients (8 male and 7 female) were 
included in the study. Assessments took place between 2 and 25 days post-injury (median = 
4, SD = 7.79).
Participants were also identified at follow-up outpatient appointments if they had already been 
discharged. 42 patients were assessed as inpatients and 1 patient was assessed whilst 
attending an outpatient appointment.
Participant Characteristics
Descriptive data
Descriptive statistics in relation to gender, ethnicity, occupation, years of education, previous 
psychiatric history, previous road traffic accident history, and previous head injury can be 
found in Tables 1 to 5.
Table 1: Frequencies by sex
RTA with head RTA without head Control
Sex injury injury
Male 9 11 8
Female 6 2 7
195
Major Research Project
Table 2: Frequencies by ethnicity
RTA with head RTA without head Control
injury injury
Ethnicity
White British 6 7 10
White Irish 1 1 0
White Other 2 1 2
Asian or British 4 3 2
Asian
Black or Black 2 1 1
British
Table 3: Frequencies by occupation level (Department o f Employment, 1980)
RTA with head RTA without head Control
injury injury
Occupation
Non-manual 11 6 9
Manual 4 7 6
Table 5: Frequencies ofpsychiatric history, previous RTA, and previous head injury
RTA with head 
injury
RTA without head 
injury
Control
Psychiatric history 2 1 2
Previous RTA 6 3 0
Previous head 
injury
0 2 1
Measures
Emotional Stroop tasks
The modified emotional Stroop task used words based on previous research. RTA words and 
matched neutral words (matched for syllables, word frequency in English language and word 
length) had been used by Bryant and Harvey (1995) and Harvey et al. (1996) in a 
computerised emotional Stroop task. RTA words had been developed from prior consultation 
with RTA patients (Harvey & Bryant, 1995). Words of a positive emotionality, and related to
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OCD were obtained from previous emotional Stroop tasks (Biyant & Harvey, 1995; McNally 
et al., 1990) and were slightly adjusted to enable them to be matched by word frequency, 
length and syllables to the RTA and neutral words. Words related to hospitalisation following 
a head injury were suggested by professionals working in the area of PTSD and head injury. 
Words were matched for frequency, length and syllables. Word matching was achieved using 
Leech, Rayson, & Wilson (2001).
Acute Stress Disorder Inventory (ASDI)
The ASDI (Bryant et al., 1998) is a structured dichotomous scale that indexes the symptoms 
of ASD rather than requiring people to describe the symptoms, making it easy to administer in 
post-trauma situations (Bryant et al., 1998) (see Appendix 3). As well as obtaining a 
diagnostic decision, a total score of acute stress severity can be derived from individual item 
scores (0 = symptom absent, 1 = symptom present).
The ASDI has good internal consistency (r=.90); sensitivity in diagnosing ASD [percentage 
diagnosed by clinical interview with ASD and by ASDI (91%)]; and specificity [percentage 
not diagnosed with ASD by clinical interview and ASDI (93%)]. Test-retest reliability based 
on a sample of 60 trauma survivors is good (r=.88) over a period of 2 to 7 days, despite the 
fluctuating nature of symptoms (Bryant et al., 1998). 84% diagnosed with ASD using the 
ASDI on the first occasion also did on the second occasion and 94% not diagnosed with ASD 
at initial assessment were not diagnosed at second assessment.
The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI)
The STAI (Spielberger et al., 1983) was used to provide a measure of state and trait anxiety 
(see Appendix 4). This inventory consists of forty 4-point Likert items, with 20 items 
measuring state anxiety and 20 items measuring trait anxiety. Higher scores reflect greater 
state and trait anxiety. Test-retest reliability varies for state anxiety as would be expected (.16 
to .62), but is more stable for trait anxiety from .65 to.75. (Spielberger et al., 1983).
Stimulus materials
Six types of Stroop words — practice words {apple, cup, pencil, chimney, moustache, 
envelope)’, neutral {blanket, maintenance, sail, pause, game, garden), positive {lovely, worthy, 
praise, dearest, kindness, nice)’, OCD related {germs, filthy, faeces, dirty, contaminate, urine), 
hospital related {lights, mask, confused, amnesia, treatment, doctor)’, and RTA related 
{emergency, trapped, scream, smash, death, blood) -  were used in the colour naming task. 
Each type was presented 36 times and consisted of 6 words that were presented once each in 6
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colours (red, black, green, blue, pink, and yellow). Words were printed by computer and 
presented on individual A4 sheets of paper that were laminated. Font style was set to Times 
New Roman at size 16 and colours were in bold type. There were six words to a line, with a 
two-line gap in between. Word colours were chosen in a random order for each line, although 
no colour was the same as the previous colour (McNally et al., 1990). See Appendix 5 for 
Stroop cards.
Procedure
The modified emotional Stroop tasks were first piloted on 5 individuals of different ages, 
gender and levels of education. Eyeballing of completion times did not suggest any obvious 
differences in colour naming the different word categories. Participants reported no 
noticeable difficulty with specific categories.
Participants for the study were identified through contact with nursing staff on inpatient wards 
(orthopaedics, neurology / neurosurgery). Informed consent was obtained from the 
participants following a complete description of the study. The whole assessment was 
undertaken by the trainee clinical psychologist. Participants were assessed at their bedside, 
due to orthopaedic or spinal injuries that often prevented mobility. Demographic information 
was obtained from the medical notes and the patient (see Appendix 6). Psychiatric history 
was determined from the medical notes and asking patients whether they had “ever seen a 
psychiatrist, psychologist, or any other mental health professional before?” For patients with 
a head injury, objective evidence for the head injury was sought from the medical notes, such 
as loss of consciousness, or evidence of head impact. Posttraumatic amnesia was calculated 
using the Galveston Orientation and Amnesia Test (GOAT, Levin, O’Donnell, & Grossman,
1979). Extent of posttraumatic amnesia was estimated by calculating the time from the 
trauma to the onset of continuous memory reported by the patients (Gronwall & Wrightson,
1980). Additionally the GOAT was used to determine that patients with head injury were no 
longer in posttraumatic amnesia. Patients with head injury were only involved in the study 
when they were not in posttraumatic amnesia. This was based on a cut-off score on the 
GOAT of 75 or above (Levin et al., 1979).
Patients were first administered the modified emotional Stroop tasks in the following order: 
practice words, neutral words, positive words, OCD words, hospital words and RTA words. 
RTA words were presented last, as it has been suggested that early presentation of trauma 
words may result in continued interference with subsequent Stroop words (McNally et al., 
1990). Patients were given standardised instructions for the Stroop tasks. For the practice
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Stroop patients were told: “I would like you to look at this page which shows words printed in 
different coloured inks. For example, do you see how this word (apple) is printed in black ink 
and this word (cup) is printed in red ink? I want you to name the colour of the ink that the 
words are printed in and not to read the word. So, what would you say for this one (pointing 
to the third word, correct any mistakes). Good. (Continue with two further practice items and 
correct any mistakes). Good. Now carry on until the end. When you finish this line go onto 
this line (show participant).” This involved the patient reading the lines form left to right and 
when reaching the end of the line starting the line below from the left.
Once it was established that the patient could manage the task, then the neutral word Stroop 
was presented with the instructions: “As before I want you to name the colour of the ink and 
not to read the word. Try to work as quickly as you can without making any mistakes or 
missing any out. Start here (point to first word on first line) and finish here (show sweeping 
left to right motion across lines and point to last word on last line). Ready? Go.” The 
experimenter used a stopwatch to record the time (in whole seconds) to complete each card. 
Colour naming errors were recorded, for example, participants reading the word or giving a 
different colour, due to possible errors occurring particularly in the head injury group. These 
instructions and recording of errors were based around the Interference subtest of the Delis- 
Kaplan Executive Functioning Systems (D-KEFS, Delis, Kaplan, & Kramer, 2001). Patients 
with head injury were then administered the ASDI. Dissociative amnesia was excluded as a 
possible symptom of ASD, because of the inability to recall aspects of the event due to 
amnesia associated with the head injury, or due to dissociation during the traumatic 
experience (Bryant & Harvey, 1999b). The STAI was then administered. Following the 
assessment, the patient was given a standard letter explaining that if they felt traumatised 
about the accident after leaving hospital to contact their GP (see Appendix 7). The procedure 
for RTA patients without a head injury and control participants was the same apart from the 
administration of the GOAT. RTA patients without a head injury and control patients were 
initially asked what their memories were of the event. This information was recorded, but 
was not used for analysis. This was done to be consistent in approach.
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Analyses
Descriptive statistics were used to examine the characteristics of the sample. Where possible 
parametric statistics (ANOVA) were used to test for between and within group differences. 
Chi-square was used to compare group categorical data. Time since injury and time to colour 
name positive Stroop words had significant skewness and kurtosis (see Appendix 8). 
Therefore, a log transformation was applied when analysing participant characteristics and an 
inverse transformation was applied to colour naming times. Interference scores for the head 
injury group had significant skewness and kurtosis (see Appendix 8). Significant skewness 
and kurtosis remained despite recoding and transformation of the data. As a result, non- 
parametric statistics (Friedman test, Mann Whitney U, Wilcoxon and Kruskal Wallis) were 
used to test for differences between and within groups for interference on the Stroop tasks. 
Correlations were examined using Pearson’s Test, except for correlations concerning 
interference scores, where Spearman’s Rank Order Test was used.
Results
Recoding
Before all analyses, negatively reversed items for state and trait anxiety were recoded, so that 
higher scores indicated high anxiety for all items.
Participant Characteristics
Participant characteristics are presented in Table 6.
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6: 
Participant characteristics
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As far as possible, participants in the three groups were matched for age, sex, years of 
education, and occupation. Statistical analyses were carried out to establish that there were no 
significant differences between the three groups for these variables. In addition, levels of 
ASD severity and state and trait anxiety for the three groups was included in the analysis.
A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) indicated that there were no significant 
differences between the three groups for age, years of education, time since injury, ASD 
severity scores for criterion B, C, D, E, ASD severity total, or state and trait anxiety (F(20, 64) 
= 1.42, p = 0.15). Chi-square tests indicated that groups did not differ significantly in terms of 
sex (%2 (2, n=43) = 3.27, p = 0.20), or occupation (%2 (2, n=43) = 2.15, p = 0.34) (see Tables 1 
and 3 in Method section).
Emotional Stroop
Descriptive data for emotional Stroop completion times for each group and in each condition 
are presented in Table 7.
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7: Colour-naming 
completion 
times 
(in 
seconds) for the three groups
Major Research Project
A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted to establish differences 
between the three groups for colour-naming times for neutral, positive, OCD, hospital, and 
RTA Stroop tasks. The MANOVA indicated that there were no significant differences in 
Stroop completion times across the three groups for neutral, positive, OCD, hospital, or RTA 
Stroop tasks (F(10,74) = 1.38, p = 0.21).
Although errors in colour naming were monitored, very few errors were observed in the head 
injury and non-head injury groups and therefore no statistical comparison was made.
Interference
To investigate interference caused by trauma-related words, interference scores were 
calculated by subtracting the time to respond to the neutral words from the time to respond to 
the road traffic accident related words, positive words, OCD related words, and hospitalisation 
related words. For example, trauma related interference = time to colour name road traffic 
accident related Stroop words minus time to colour name neutral Stroop words.
Within comparisons (overall grow)
Within comparisons of the overall groups were conducted to assess for differences between 
the four Stroop interference scores.
Table 8. shows the descriptive data for interference scores for word type.
Table 8: Interference scores for word type
Interference M Md SD Range
Positive -1.53 -1.00 4.40 -19-8
OCD 0.37 1.00 5.58 -15-12
Hospital -1.47 -1.00 8.87 -42 -19
RTA 1.72 2.00 9.15 -37-21
M  = mean, Md = median, SD = standard deviation
A Friedman’s Test indicated that interference scores were significantly different for the four 
word types (positive, OCD, hospital, and road traffic accident) (x2 (3, N=43) = 22.55, 
p<0.001) (see Appendix 10 for mean ranks).
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A Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed Ranks Test indicated that participants overall had 
significantly greater interference for RTA words than positive words (z(43) = -2.99, p<0.01, 
2-tailed test) and hospitalisation words (z(43) = -3.57, p<0.01, 2-tailed test); and significantly 
greater interference was indicated for OCD words than positive words (z(43) = -3.31, p<0.01, 
2 -tailed test) and hospitalisation words (z(43) = -2.21, p<0.05,2-tailed test).
There were no significant differences between positive interference and hospital interference 
(z(43) = -0.55, p = 0.58, 2-tailed test), and between OCD interference and RTA interference 
(z(43) = -1.55, p = 0.12,2-tailed test).
Within comparisons o f individual grouvs
Within comparisons of individual groups were conducted to assess for differences between the 
four Stroop interference scores, within each group. Table 9. shows the descriptive data for 
interference scores for positive, OCD, hospital, and RTA words for the three groups.
205
206
a*
o
OJ
Cu
OJ
00
0000
OJ to
to 00
O J
to
00
ON oooo 00
ON
to
ON
OJ
y*boOh 00
to to
NO O n
Table 9: Interference scores for emotional Stroop 
words for the three groups
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RTA with head injury group
A Friedman’s Test indicated that there was a significant difference between interference 
scores in the RTA with head injury group (%2 (3, N=15) = 10.11, p<0.05) (see Appendix 10 
for mean ranks).
A Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed Ranks Test indicated that participants had significantly 
greater interference for RTA words than positive words (z(15) = -2.21, p<0.05, 2-tailed test) 
and hospitalisation words (z(15) = -2.23, p<0.05); and significantly greater interference was 
indicated for OCD words than positive words (z(15) = -2.04, p<0.05, 2-tailed test).
There were no significant differences between positive interference and hospitalisation 
interference (z(15) = -0.46, p = 0.65, 2-tailed test), hospitalisation interference and OCD 
interference (z(15) = -0.57, p = 0.57, 2-tailed test), and RTA interference and OCD 
interference (z(15) = -1.35, p = 0.17, 2-tailed test).
RTA without head injury group.
A Friedman’s Test indicated that there was a significant difference between interference 
scores in the RTA without head injury group (%2 (3, N=13) = 15.05, p<0.01) (see Appendix 10 
for mean ranks).
A Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed Ranks Test indicated that participants had significantly 
greater interference for RTA words than positive words (z(13) = -2.35, p<0.05, 2-tailed test), 
and hospitalisation interference words (z(13) = -2.21, p<0.05, 2-tailed test); significantly 
greater interference was indicated for OCD words than positive words (z(13) = -2.51, p<0.05, 
2-tailed test), and hospitalisation words (z(13) = -2.21, p<0.05,2-tailed test).
There were no significant differences between interference for positive words and 
hospitalisation words (z(13) = -1.20, p = 0.23, 2-tailed test), and for RTA words and OCD 
words (z(13) = -1.50, p = 0.14,2-tailed test).
Control group
A Friedman’s Test indicated that there were no significant differences between interference 
scores in the control group (%2 (3, N=T5) = 2.94, p = 0.40).
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Between 2roup comparisons
A Kruskall-Wallis Test was conducted to establish whether there were any significant 
differences for interference scores between the three groups. The Kruskall-Wallis Test 
indicated that road traffic accident interference scores were significantly different across the 
three groups (%2 =2, N=43) = 7.85, p<0.05). There were no significant differences across the 
three groups for positive interference (%2 =2, N=43) = 3.59, p = 0.17), OCD interference (%2 
=2, N=43) = 1.27, p = 0.53), or hospital interference (%2 -2, N=43) = 4.83, p = 0.09) (see 
Appendix 10 for mean ranks).
A Mann-Whitney U Test indicated that road traffic accident interference scores were 
significantly higher for the RTA with head injury group than for controls (z(15,15) — 50.00, 
p<0 .01, 2-tailed test).
Relationship between Stroop interference, acute stress disorder and anxiety 
Combined groups
The correlation between Stroop interference, severity of ASD symptoms, and state and trait 
anxiety for all three groups combined were examined using a Spearman’s Rank Order Test, 
which is presented in Table 10.
Table 10: Correlations between interference on Stroop tasks, severity o f ASD symptoms and 
state and trait anxiety
Severity B Severity C Severity D Severity E Severity 
(dissociation) (re-experience) (avoidance) (arousal) total
State Trait 
anxiety anxiety
Positive
interference
0.18 0.13 0.11 0.18 0.22 0.18 0.09
OCD
interference
0.05 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.07 0.08
Hospital
interference
0.27 0.02 0.10 0.13 0.18 0.12 0.09
RTA
interference
0.12 0.04 0.14 0.11 0.15 0.01 0.04
Significance * p< 0.05
** p< 0.01
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Spearmans’ Rank Order Tests indicated that there were no significant correlations between 
interference (positive, OCD, hospital, and RTA) and ASD severity scores, or state and trait 
anxiety.
Individual groups
Spearmans’ Rank Order Tests were used to examine the association between interference 
scores, ASD symptoms and state and trait anxiety within each group separately.
RTA with head injury group
Spearman’s Rank Order Test correlations for interference scores, severity of ASD symptoms, 
and state and trait anxiety for the RTA with head injury group alone are shown in Table 11.
Table 11. Correlations between interference scores, ASD symptoms, and state and trait 
anxiety for the RTA with head injury group.
Severity B Severity C Severity D Severity E Severity 
(dissociation) (re-experience) (avoidance) (arousal) total
State Trait 
anxiety anxiety
Positive
interference
0.14 0.25 0.32 0.24 0.30 0.16 0.23
OCD
interference
0.05 0.25 -0.06 0.04 -0.05 -0.02 0.24
Hospital
interference
0.31 -0.05 0.25 0.17 0.25 0.08 0.14
RTA
interference
0.03 0.06 0.36 0.22 0.22 -0.27 -0.29
Significance * p< 0.05
** p< 0.01
A Spearman’s Rank Order Test indicated that there were no significant correlations between 
interference (positive, OCD, hospital, and RTA) and ASD severity scores, or state and trait 
anxiety for the RTA with head injury group.
RTA without head injury group
Spearman’s Rank Order Test correlations for interference scores, severity of ASD symptoms, 
and state and trait anxiety for the RTA without head injury group alone are shown in Table 
12.
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Table 12. Correlations between interference scores, ASD symptoms, and state and trait 
anxiety for the RTA without head injury group.
Severity B Severity C Severity D Severity E Severity 
(dissociation) (re-experience) (avoidance) (arousal) total
State Trait 
anxiety anxiety
Positive
interference
0.37 0.28 0.01 0.31 0.44 0.45 0.22
OCD
interference
0.20 0.33 0.16 0.17 0.38 0.28 0.08
Hospital
interference
0.32 0.13 0.12 0.38 0.37 0.27 0.33
RTA
interference
-0.13 0.18 0.16 0.08 0.14 -0.01 0.06
Significance * p< 0.05
** p< 0.01
A Spearman’s Rank Order Test indicated that there were no significant correlations between 
interference (positive, OCD, hospital, and RTA) and ASD severity scores, or state and trait 
anxiety for the RTA without head injury group.
Control sroup
Spearman’s Rank Order Test correlations for interference scores, severity of ASD symptoms, 
and state and trait anxiety for the control group alone are shown in Table 13.
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Table 13. Correlations between inteiference scores, ASD symptoms, and state and trait 
anxiety for the control group.
Severity B Severity C Severity D Severity E Severity 
(dissociation) (re-experience) (avoidance) (arousal) total
State Trait 
anxiety anxiety
Positive
interference
0.07 -0.02 0.05 0.08 0.16 0.15 -0.10
OCD
interference
-0.20 -0.24 -0.16 -0.28 -0.16 -0.03 -0.22
Hospital
interference
-0.10 -0.38 -0.40 -0.17 -0.11 -0.04 -0.17
RTA
interference
-0.01 -0.27 -0.42 -0.30 -0.15 -0.03 0.09
Significance * p< 0.05
** p< 0 .0 1
A Spearman’s Rank Order Test indicated that there were no significant correlations between 
interference (positive, OCD, hospital, and RTA) and ASD severity scores, or state and trait 
anxiety for the control group.
Relationship between severity of acute stress disorder symptoms and anxiety 
Pearsons’ Tests were conducted to examine the relationship between severity of Acute Stress 
Disorder symptoms and state and trait anxiety for the combined groups and also for each 
group alone.
Table 14. shows the Pearson’s Test correlations for ASD severity scores and state and trait 
anxiety for the combined groups.
Table 14: Correlations between ASD severity scores and state and trait anxiety for combined 
groups
Severity B Severity C Severity D Severity E Severity 
(dissociation) (re-experience) (avoidance) (arousal) total
State anxiety 0.62*** 0.70*** -0.38* 0.56*** q 7 4 ***
Trait anxiety 0.25 0.12 -0.17 0.38* 0.31*
Significance * p< 0.05
** p< 0 .0 1 *** p< 0 .0 0 1
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Combined groups 
State Anxiety
Pearsons’ Tests indicated that there was a significant positive correlation between state 
anxiety and criterion B (dissociation) severity (r(43) = 0.62, p<0.001), criterion C (re- 
experiencing) severity (r(43) = 0.70, p<0.001), criterion E (arousal) severity (r(43) = 0.56, 
p<0.001), and total severity score (r(43) = 0.74, p<0.001).
A Pearson’s Test indicated that there was a significant negative correlation between state 
anxiety and criterion D (avoidance) severity (r(43) = -0.38, p<0.05).
Trait anxiety
Pearsons’ Tests indicated that there was a significant positive correlation between trait anxiety 
and criterion E (arousal) severity (r(43) = 0.38, p<0.05), and severity total (r(43) = 0.31, 
p<0.05).
There was no significant correlation between trait anxiety and criterion B (dissociation) 
severity (r(43) = 0.25, p = 0.10), criterion C (re-experiencing) severity (r(43) = 0.12, p = 
0.46), and criterion D (avoidance) severity (r(43) = -0.17, p = 0.29).
RTA with head injury srouv
Correlations between ASD severity scores and state and trait anxiety for the head injury group 
alone are shown in Table 15 for the RTA with head injury group.
Table 15: Correlations between state and trait anxiety and ASD severity scores for the RTA 
with head injury group.
Severity B Severity C Severity D Severity E Severity
(dissociation) (re-experience) (avoidance) (arousal) total
State anxiety 0.67** 0.78** 0.47 0.41 0.67**
Trait anxiety 0.25 0.13 0.15 0.05 0.08
Significance * p< 0.05
** p<0.01
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State anxiety
A Pearson’s Test indicated that there was a significant positive correlation between state 
anxiety and criterion B (dissociation) severity (r(43) = 0.67, p<0.01), criterion C (re- 
experiencing) severity (r(43) = 0.78, p<0.01), and total severity score (r(43) = 0.67, p<0.01). 
There was no significant correlation between state anxiety and criterion D (avoidance) (r(43) 
= 0.47, p = 0.08), criterion E (arousal) severity (r(43) = 0.56, p = 0.13).
Trait anxiety
A Pearson’s Test indicated that there was no significant correlation for trait anxiety and 
criterion B (dissociation) severity (r(43) = 0.25, p = 0.38), criterion C (re-experiencing) 
severity (r(43) = 0.13, p = 0.63), criterion D (avoidance) (r(43) = 0.15, p = 0.61), criterion E 
(arousal) severity (r(43) = 0.05, p = 0.87), and total severity score (r(43) = 0.09, p = 0.76).
RTA without head injury group
Correlations between ASD severity scores and state and trait anxiety for the RTA without 
head injury group alone are shown in Table 16.
Table 16: Correlations between state and trait anxiety and ASD severity scores for the RTA 
without head injury group.
Severity B 
(dissociation)
Severity C Severity D Severity E Severity 
(re-experience) (avoidance) (arousal) total
State anxiety 0.51 0.65* -0.15 0.40 0.60*
Trait anxiety 0.03 -0.36 -0.11 0.54 -0.04
Significance * p< 0.05
** . p< 0.01
State anxiety
A Pearson’s Test indicated that there was a significant positive correlation between state 
anxiety and criterion C (re-experiencing) severity (r(43) = 0.65, p<0.05), and total severity 
score (r(43) = 0.60, p<0.05).
There was no significant correlation between state anxiety and criterion B (dissociation) 
severity (r(43) = 0.51, p = 0.07), criterion D (avoidance) (r(43) = -0.15, p = 0.62), and 
criterion E (arousal) severity (r(43) = 0.40, p = 0.18).
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Trait anxiety
A Pearson’s Test indicated that there was no significant correlation for trait anxiety and 
criterion B (dissociation) severity (r(43) = 0.03, p = 0.92), criterion C (re-experiencing) 
severity (r(43) = -0.38, p = 0.23), criterion D (avoidance) (r(43) = -0.11, p = 0.73), criterion E 
(arousal) severity (r(43) = 0.54, p = 0.06), and total severity score (r(43) = -0.04, p = 0.90).
Control srouv
Correlations between ASD severity scores and state and trait anxiety for the control group 
alone are shown in Table 17.
Table 17: Correlations between state and trait anxiety and ASD severity scores for the 
control group.
Severity B 
(dissociation)
Severity C Severity D Severity E Severity 
(re-experience) (avoidance) (arousal) total
State anxiety 0.59* 0.76* 0.50 0.64* 0.79**
Trait anxiety 0.38 0.59* 0.49 0.61* 0.64**
Significance * p< 0.05
** p< 0.01
State anxiety
A Pearson’s Test indicated that there was a significant positive correlation between state 
anxiety and criterion B (dissociation) severity (r(43) = 0.59, p<0.05), criterion C (re- 
experiencing) severity (r(43) = 0.76, p<0.05), criterion E (arousal) severity (r(43) = 0.64, 
p<0.05), and total severity score (r(43) = 0.79, p<0.01).
There was no significant correlation between state anxiety and, criterion D (avoidance) (r(43) 
= 0.50, p = 0.06).
Trait anxiety
A Pearson’s Test indicated that there was a significant positive correlation between trait 
anxiety and criterion C (re-experiencing) severity (r(43) = 0.59, p<0.05), criterion E (arousal) 
severity (r(43) = 0.61, p<0.05), and total severity score (r(43) = 0.64, p<0.01).
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A Pearson’s Test indicated that there was no significant correlation for trait anxiety and 
criterion B (dissociation) severity (r(43) = 0.38, p = 0.17), and criterion D (avoidance) (r(43) = 
0.49, p = 0.06).
Qualitative information
During the course of the study information was reported by participants that was of clinical 
and theoretical interest. Information from both the RTA with a head injury and RTA without 
a head injury group is recorded in this section.
RTA with head injury group
Two patients in the RTA with a head injury group reported very brief memories of the road 
traffic accident. One female patient recalled briefly screaming at her boyfriend shortly after 
the accident and then remembered nothing until two hours later in hospital. A male patient 
reported having a single memory of a drop of blood dripping down his motor bike helmet and 
no other recall of the accident. He experienced intrusive images of this isolated memory. A 
further male patient reported no explicit recall of his motorbike accident. He had retrograde 
amnesia for approximately one minute and posttraumatic amnesia for approximately 30 
minutes. However, he reported that he had been shown a map of the place where he had his 
accident by his wife. He said that he had a sudden feeling of extreme tiredness come over 
him, that he could not explain and felt very surprised at.
RTA without head injury 2roup
Two patients reported that sensation of pain related to their orthopaedic injuries served as a 
trigger for intrusive thoughts and images of their accident.
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Discussion
Although early research suggested mutual exclusivity of ASD / PTSD and head injury 
(Mayou et al., 1993; Sbordne & Liter, 1995; Warden et al., 1997), recent research has 
suggested that ASD / PTSD may co-exist with head injury (Bryant, 2001a; Bryant & Harvey, 
1999; Feinstein et al., 2002; Turnbull et al., 2001; Wright & Telford, 1996), although its 
presentation may be more at the level of emotional and physiological reactivity (Bryant et al., 
1996; Turnbull et al., 2001), rather than at the level of conscious re-experiencing in the form 
of thoughts and flashbacks. This suggests that implicit memory traces for the trauma may 
exist, despite a lack of explicit recall for the event. Implicit memory for the event, involving 
systems such as the amygdala (LeDoux, 1995) has been implicated as one possible 
mechanism in the development of ASD / PTSD with head injury (Bryant, 2001b). However, 
this hypothesis has not been empirically tested in the head injury population.
The emotional Stroop paradigm has been commonly used as an implicit measure of 
posttraumatic stress, in rape victims (Cassiday et al., 1992), Vietnam veterans (McNally et al., 
1990), victims of ferry disaster (Thrasher et al., 1994) and road traffic accident victims 
(Bryant & Harvey, 1995; Harvey et al., 1996). It has not previously been investigated with 
patients who have sustained a head injury.
In this study, the intention was to utilise the emotional Stroop paradigm in the head injury 
population, to investigate the existence of implicit memory for a road traffic accident and its 
relationship with explicit self-report measures of trauma and anxiety. Three groups of patients 
were compared on Stroop performance: patients involved in a road traffic accident who had 
sustained a head injury; patients involved in a road traffic accident who had not sustained a 
head injury, and a control group of patients admitted to hospital through events not related to a 
road traffic accident.
Findings
Hypothesis 1
The first hypothesis that RTA patients with a head injury would take significantly longer to 
colour name Stroop words than RTA patients without a head injury, or controls was 
unsupported. However, previous studies have failed to find significant differences between 
patients with and without a head injury on the original Stroop (Van Zomeran & Brower, 
1987). It has been argued that it is not sufficiently challenging in its original form to detect 
cognitive impairment (Bohnen et al., 1992).
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Hvvothesis 2
Consistent with the second hypothesis, patients with a head injury demonstrated a significant 
interference effect for words related to a road traffic accident, as well as patients without a 
head injury. This study suggests that it is even possible for patients with reduced explicit 
recall for an event, in this case a road traffic accident, to show an interference effect for 
trauma-related words. Previous research has demonstrated that the emotional Stroop 
paradigm operates at an implicit and not just explicit level (Bryant & Harvey, 1995). It is 
therefore possible that interference in the head injury group for road traffic accident words 
may represent implicit memory for the accident. Additional qualitative evidence for implicit 
memory traces of trauma also came from the reporting of one patient who had no recall of his 
accident, post traumatic amnesia for approximately 30 minutes and retrograde amnesia for 
approximately one minute before the accident. He reported suddenly feeling lethargic 
immediately after being shown by his wife the point on a map where his accident occurred. 
He was puzzled by the nature and speed of his body’s reaction to the stimulus. Experimental 
evidence already exists for intact implicit memory in the form of procedural memory in 
patients with posttraumatic amnesia (Cohen & Squire, 1980). Furthermore, Nissen, 
Knopman, and Schacter (1987) have demonstrated that inducing posttraumatic amnesia with 
the use of an acetylcholine inhibitor (scopolamine) has induced explicit declarative memory 
deficits in normal volunteers, but not implicit memory deficits, such as procedural memory. 
This study may suggest evidence for implicit memory for trauma in head injury.
Emotionality hypothesis
Previous research in the non-head injury population has suggested that the Stroop interference 
effect may not be threat-specific and may be more related to word emotionality. The finding 
that both the road traffic accident groups had significantly more interference for road traffic 
accident related words than words of a positive emotionality, goes against the emotionality 
hypothesis that that Stroop interference might be more reflected in the emotionality of the 
words, rather than their threat-related content (Martin et al., 1991). This finding supports the 
second hypothesis and previous research (Bryant & Harvey, 1995; McNally et al., 1990). 
However, in this study, it is less conclusive that the threat-content is specific, as both road 
traffic accident groups did not differ significantly on interference for road traffic accident 
words from interference with OCD related words. Furthermore, OCD interference was 
significantly different from positive interference and hospitalisation interference. 
Nevertheless, this failure to significantly differentiate OCD and RTA interference may have 
been due to low levels of clinical psychopathology amongst the participants. Only one person 
in the study met full criteria for Acute Stress Disorder and only 5 people met subsyndromal
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criteria (all criteria apart from one). However, previous research failed to find significant 
interference for OCD words in Vietnam veterans who did not meet diagnostic criteria for 
PTSD (McNally et al., 1990). The question therefore remains whether the OCD words 
(germs, contamination, urine, faeces, dirty, filthy) were similarly threatening to RTA patients, 
as much as RTA related words (emergency, smash, death, scream, trapped, bang).
There are several possible explanations for these findings. It could be argued that the nature 
of the OCD words might be associated with particular elements of the traumatic situation, for 
example, incontinence (faeces, urine) as a bodily reaction to a fearful situation, or resulting 
from loss of consciousness. Therefore, these words might be associated with the actual 
accident scene. Levels of dependency on hospital staff for removal of bodily fluids may also 
have been more of a problem for RTA patients who tended to be less physically mobile than 
orthopaedic controls. Obsessive tendencies could additionally be interpreted as a way of 
gaining control over a situation that has been uncontrollable, such as a road traffic accident. 
Assumptions about responsibility and harm are also commonly observed in OCD (Salkovskis, 
Wroe, Gledhill, Morrison, Forrester, Richards, Reynolds, & Thorpe, 2000). It is possible that 
particularly for patients who have been involved in a RTA accident that they may be 
preoccupied about responsibility for the accident, for example why did it happen to them. 
Obsessive-compulsive symptoms have been described to follow head injury, in susceptible 
individuals. Usually the patient is ruminative and tense and focusing their doubts, 
preoccupation, concerns, on their head injury (Andersen, 1942). Measuring levels of 
obsessionality both for the time preceding and post-accident would have been a useful 
comparison. Of course, it could be argued that it is the negative emotionality of the words 
that causes the interference rather than the threat specific nature. It would have been 
interesting to see whether words related to another anxiety disorder would have had a similar 
effect.
Hospitalisation
In addition, no significant interference was observed for words associated with hospitalisation 
for the RTA groups with and without a head injury, suggesting that this was not a significant 
factor in this sample of patients. This hypothesis has not been formally investigated in 
patients with a head injury, although previous research has found that patients without a head 
injury can have PTSD symptomatology associated with memories of intensive care (Jones et 
al., 2001). However, hospitalisation words used in this study were based on words associated 
with memory for the admission and the head injury (lights, mask, amnesia, confusion, doctor, 
treatment), rather than delusional memories of intensive care reported by Jones et al., (2001),
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such as believing someone was trying to kill you (medical team providing treatment). The 
finding that the control group of hospital patients also showed no significant interference for 
hospitalisation words, despite being as anxious as the road traffic accident groups would also 
seem to refute the hospitalisation hypothesis. Previous research using the Stroop paradigm 
with RTA patients has not used a hospital control. For example, Harvey et al. (1996) used 
undergraduate students for a control group and Bryant and Harvey (1995) only used road 
traffic accident patients.
Hypothesis 3
The results of the control group would seem to go against the general emotionality hypothesis. 
There were no significant differences in interference scores for positive, OCD, hospital, or 
road traffic accident related words in the control group. Patients in the control group had been 
admitted as emergency cases as a result of injuries not related to a road traffic accident and 
did not differ significantly in terms of severity of Acute Stress Disorder symptoms, or state or 
trait anxiety from the two RTA groups. This suggests that interference for threat-related 
words was not genetically related to anxiety, but to the nature of the trauma itself.
Hypotheses 4 and 5
Research into the head injury population has also suggested that the ASD / PTSD profile may 
differ from the non-head injury population, with trauma being expressed more at the level of 
emotional and physiological reactivity, such as the arousal criterion and state anxiety. The 
findings of no correlations at all for ASD severity scores and state anxiety also meant that 
there was no support for the hypothesis that interference scores in the head injury group would 
be correlated with ASD arousal severity scores and state anxiety. There were also no 
significant correlations between interference, ASD severity scores and state and trait anxiety 
in the non-head injury group and control group. Previous research with the non-head injury 
population has found correlations between self-report measures for PTSD and interference 
scores. For example, Cassiday et al. (1992) in a study of rape victims with PTSD found that 
high threat words were significantly associated with self-reported intrusive symptoms, but not 
with self-reported avoidance and numbing symptoms. Studies have identified additional 
influences of trait anxiety on interference. For example, MacLeod and Rutherford (1992) 
found higher levels of interference for threat words in normal participants with high trait 
anxiety. Trait anxiety has also been found to have some affect on performance on the original 
Stroop paradigm (Batchelor et al., 1992) in patients with and without a head injury. There 
was no support for these findings in this study.
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Low levels of ASD severity, with few people meeting diagnostic criteria for Acute Stress 
Disorder prevented an adequate analysis of the relationship between Stroop interference, ASD 
severity and state and trait anxiety. Previous research has only found significant interference 
for trauma related words in groups with PTSD, and not in control groups without PTSD (for 
example, McNally et al., 1990; Harvey & Bryant, 1995). Importantly, existing studies have 
not investigated Stroop interference in the acute stages of ASD. It is unclear whether this lack 
of association actually reflects a lack of consistency between implicit and explicit measures of 
trauma in the acute stages. Comparison of initial acute interference scores with interference in 
the post-acute phase would be useful to examine this further. The contribution of the 
environment to ratings of Acute Stress Disorder symptoms is also uncertain. It could be 
argued that the hospital environment could be a protective environment for patients, sheltering 
them from exposure to stimuli associated with the trauma, in other words, traffic, and it is 
only on exposure to traumatic stimuli, for example trauma-related Stroop words that an effect 
is seen.
Hypothesis 6
However, there were significant correlations between severity of ASD symptoms and state 
and trait anxiety, in support of hypothesis six and previous research into the development of 
the Acute Stress Disorder Interview (ASDI) used in this study (Bryant et al., 1998). 
Interestingly, ASD severity scores for dissociation, re-experiencing, arousal, and total severity 
score had significant positive correlations with state anxiety overall, whereas avoidance had a 
significant negative correlation, suggesting that those people who were more avoidant were 
less anxious. Trait anxiety was significantly associated with re-experiencing, arousal, and 
total severity scores for ASD in the control group, although there were no such correlations in 
the two experimental road traffic accident groups.
Conclusion
In conclusion, there is some suggestive evidence for the existence of implicit memory for 
trauma in patients with head injury who lack explicit recall for the event: as implicated by 
interference for trauma-related words. However, the additional significant interference for 
OCD words confuses the picture, for example whether OCD and RTA interference is due to 
the negative emotionality of the words, or that OCD words are also central to the road traffic 
accident scene, or thoughts of responsibility related to the traumatic event. Therefore, the role 
of implicit memory for trauma in the development of ASD / PTSD remains unclear from this 
study.
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Clinical implications
Suggesting even slight support for the existence of implicit memory for trauma, despite 
amnesia for the event has important clinical implications. Greater acceptance of the possible 
co-existence of ASD / PTSD and head injury would lead to enhanced awareness and 
assessment in the acute phase. Subsequent early intervention to prevent chronic development 
of PTSD, particularly in mild cases of head injury would be a beneficial outcome. Indeed, 
Harvey, Brewin, Jones, and Kopelman (2003) suggest that assessment for ASD and PTSD 
should be routine post head injury.
Treatment for ASD /PTSD in head injury
One early intervention study has already suggested some efficacy of this approach. Bryant, 
Harvey, Dang, Sackville, and Basten (1998) provided five sessions of either cognitive 
behaviour therapy (CBT) or supportive counselling to civilian trauma survivors who met 
criteria for ASD. CBT involved cognitive therapy, prolongued imaginal exposure, and 
anxiety management, whereas supportive counselling involved nondirective counselling and 
general problem solving. The study found that 17% of the CBT group and 67% of the 
supportive counselling group met criteria for PTSD 6-months later.
Recognition of the role of ASD / PTSD in the interaction with physiological results of head 
injury has important implications for the rehabilitation of patients with head injury. The 
increased risk of psychiatric diagnosis in the head injury population, such as depression is 
well established (Deb, Lyons, Koutzoukis, Ali, & McCarthy, 1999). However, the interaction 
of psychological trauma and cognitive deficits appears equally important. In particular, there 
appears to be a significant overlap between symptoms of PTSD and post-concussional 
syndrome not only diagnostically, but also clinically. Post-concussional syndrome is now 
considered to involve a combination of organic, psychological and social factors (Fenton et 
al., 1993). Furthermore, Bryant and Harvey (1999a) found that patients with mild head injury 
and PTSD were more likely to report post-concussional symptoms that those patients without 
PTSD. Therefore, treatment for PTSD symptoms may have therapeutic benefit for patients 
with persistent post-concussional syndrome. In addition, therapeutic interventions for PTSD 
may have a significant impact on behaviour post head injury. For example, McNeil and 
Greenwood (1996) describe a patient who sustained a severe head injury in a RTA, who 
presented with irritability and problems of reduced anger control. This was originally 
attributed to the effects of the head injury. Further examination revealed that he avoided 
talking about the accident, became anxious when asked directly about the accident, and had
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nightly nightmares. Following treatment for PTSD, behaviour problems, which were 
attributed solely to the head injury reduced.
Monitoring treatment
The Stroop task may also have direct clinical benefit. Previous research has used it to monitor 
the effects of treatment. Foa, Feske, Murdock, Kozak, and McCarthy (1991) found that an 
interference effect for rape related words in patients with PTSD disappeared following 
successful treatment with CBT. Theoretically, this would suggest that once an explicit 
coherent processed memory for the trauma is formed, then this inhibits triggering of implicit 
memory for the trauma. In the same way implicit interference triggered by trauma-related 
stimuli on the Stroop is also inhibited.
Medico-le£al avvlications
The Stroop task may also prove useful in medico-legal work, being less open to manipulation 
than self-report measures. It is likely that people will find it harder to fake responses on the 
Stroop than to falsely report symptoms. Indeed, Burges and McMillan (2001) demonstrated 
that when using a symptom checklist alone, 94% of naive participants meet diagnostic criteria 
for PTSD, probably through guessing. Recently, Buckley, Galovski, Blanchard, and Hickling 
(2003) have demonstrated that even professional actors given coaching about PTSD fail to 
mimic performance on a emotional Stroop that is observed in clinical PTSD patients.
Use in other populations
Given the significant results in the present study, the emotional Stroop may also be an 
effective implicit measure of trauma in other populations, such as people who believe they 
have been victims of childhood sexual abuse, but do not have any memories of the event.
Critique
Positive aspects
This study has several positive aspects that previous research in ASD / PTSD and head injury 
have not had. Including only patients with supportive documentation of head injury from the 
accounts of the medical professionals at the site of the accident, such as physical injury to the 
head, evidence of impact of the head, or loss of consciousness is one example. The nature of 
the neurological trauma was also specific to closed head injury sustained in a road traffic 
accident, and did not include people with mixed aetiologies, such as vascular, or anoxic 
events. Psychological trauma was also specific for the head injury group, by not including
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patients with closed head injury through other traumatic experiences, for example, physical 
assault.
However, there are also several negative aspects to the study.
Cross-sectional design
Due to the limited time available and anticipated difficulty in following patients up after 
discharge from hospital, the present study was resigned to being cross-sectional rather than 
longitudinal in nature. A longitudinal design would have allowed detailed examination of the 
relationship between initial interference scores for road traffic accident patients with and 
without a head injury, with interference scores when discharged. The lack of longitudinal data 
means that the predictive validity of interference for trauma-related words is unknown. 
Follow-up would also have helped to further investigate the significant interference for OCD 
words in the RTA group, for example whether OCD interference remained in the post-acute 
stage on discharge from hospital. A longitudinal study would also have examined the 
relationship with self-report measures of trauma and anxiety, to see whether there is any 
relationship between these measures and interference scores once patients leave the secure 
environment of the hospital. In particular, in light of these results, do interference scores 
predict chronic functioning in terms of PTSD severity, despite having no relationship with 
ASD severity?
Sample
There are several criticisms about the sampling of the data. For example, a larger sample size 
may have led to a more normal distribution of interference scores, thereby allowing more 
powerful examination of the data with parametric analysis. The head injury sample was also 
not restricted to one severity level of head injury, for example mild head injury. Only patients 
with a head injury severe enough to have prolonged post-traumatic amnesia were excluded 
from the study, hi addition, unlike the experimental groups who were restricted to patients 
who had been involved in a road traffic accident, the control group consisted of patients who 
had been admitted through multiple aetiologies, to allow for sufficient suitably matched 
participants. Lastly, only a small number of patients met full or subsyndromal criteria for 
ASD, which has left some ambiguity about the significance of the interference for trauma 
related words in the two road traffic accident groups, and the additional significant 
interference for OCD words. Future investigations of patients with a head injury should focus 
on larger groups of patients with a diagnosis of ASD to compare against patients with a head 
injury who do not meet diagnostic criteria for ASD.
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Presentation o f Stroop tasks
There can be several criticisms of the results obtained with the head injury group. In repeated 
measure designs, it is normal to alter the order of item presentation for different participants to 
prevent order effects. In this study, the different Stroop tasks were presented in identical 
order to patients (practice, neutral, positive, OCD, hospital, RTA). This change from normal 
procedures was based on previous research (McNally et al., 1990) that kept the presentation of 
Stroop tasks consistent, due to concerns raised by pilot participants that early presentation of 
trauma-related words interfered with the presentation of subsequent Stroop categories, 
because they could not stop thinking about the trauma-related words. One possible argument 
in this study is that the head injury group showed greater interference on the RTA Stroop task, 
due to the effects of cognitive fatigue, thereby taking longer on each Stroop task following the 
neutral words. However, the profile of RTA patients in the head injury group was very 
similar to RTA patients in the non-head injury group for interference. There was also 
significant interference for OCD words, which were third in order of presentation, but not for 
hospitalisation words, which were fourth in order of presentation. In addition, in the normal 
population, a practice effect is usually observed, where people increase speed with subsequent 
presentations (Connor, Franzen, & Sharp, 1988). Even patients with panic disorder have been 
found to show small but significant practice effects (McNally, Rieman, & Kim, 1990).
Other explanations for the interference effect
It is also possible that the interference observed on the emotional Stroop may not reflect 
processing at an implicit level. Patients with a head injury have been informed by the hospital 
staff that they have been in a road traffic accident, have been asked repeatedly for details 
about the accident, and will have been informed about some aspects of the accident from some 
police and witness reports. Some patients may develop traumatic “pseudomemories” (Bryant, 
1996) for the event, for example constructed from fragments of memory, “islands of 
memory,” (King, 1997), or from secondary sources of the event, which could be argued may 
have led to intrusive interference on the Stroop task. Two patients in this study described 
what have been termed “islands of memory”. One female reported recalling herself screaming 
briefly following the accident at her boyfriend and then remembering nothing until two hours 
later when she was in hospital. A male patient had a brief recall of blood dripping down his 
motor bike helmet, which he experienced as an intrusive image. All other patients in the head 
injury had no recall for the event.
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Factors not considered
There were other important factors that were not examined by this study. Rates of psychiatric 
disorder have been found to be higher in patients with brain injury than the general population 
(Deb et al., 1999). In particular, PTSD has a high co-morbidity rate with other psychiatric 
diagnoses, for example depression (Shalev, Freedman, Peri, Brandes, Sahar, Orr, & Pitman, 
1998; Shore, Vollmer, & Tatum, 1989). Depression as a factor in interference scores was not 
assessed in this study, due to not wanting to overwhelm patients in the acute stages with a 
lengthy assessment. The role of depression in Stroop interference is somewhat uncertain. 
Previous studies (Bryant & Harvey, 1995; Harvey et al., 1996) additionally did not examine 
the relationship between interference and depression. However, McNally et al. (1990) found 
that there were significant correlations between interference for trauma related words and 
depression on the Profile of Mood States (POMS, McNair, Lorr, & Droppleman, 1971: cited 
in McNally et al., 1990). Furthermore, Bradley, Mogg, Millar, and White (1995) found that 
patients with generalised anxiety disorder and depression failed to show interference effects at 
the subliminal level on negative words, unlike patients with generalised anxiety disorder 
without depression. They suggested that depression may negate interference at the subliminal 
level.
Additionally, the influence of pain on cognitive performance on the Stroop and on severity 
ratings of ASD symptoms and state and trait anxiety was also not considered. Some road 
traffic accident patients in the non-head injury group described pain as serving as a trigger for 
intrusive memories and thoughts about the accident. Pain and related problems, such as 
affective distress, sleep disturbance and medication use can have a negative effect on 
cognitive performance (Nicholson, 2000; Nicholson, Martelli, & Zassler, 2001). However, all 
patients including controls were orthopaedic inpatients and in some physical discomfort. 
Whether they experienced similar subjective levels of discomfort was not assessed though. 
The effects of analgesic medication on interference and psychiatric rating scales was also a 
potentially confounding factor, as most patients were on some analgesic medication. 
However, patients were not assessed if they had taken morphine medication within the last 24 
hours, due to problems related with euphoria and difficulty with concentration, in the form of 
confusion and disorientation (Kessler, 1998). The relationship between patient ratings of pain 
severity, level of analgesia, interference, trauma, and anxiety ratings would be an important 
comparison, particularly as pain in the form of persistent headache can be a focal concern in 
patients with persistent post-concussional syndrome (Nicholson et al., 2001). As previously 
mentioned, significant overlap has been found with PTSD symptoms and post-concussional 
syndrome (Bryant et al., 1996).
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Dia2nostic utility o f Acute Stress Disorder
The diagnostic usefulness of Acute Stress Disorder in its present form has also come into 
question (Harvey & Bryant, 2002). A major criticism of the ASD diagnosis has been the 
emphasis placed on dissociation, which was theoretically rather than empirically driven 
(Bryant & Harvey, 1997). Although the predictive power of a diagnosis of ASD in the 
development of PTSD has been reported (Harvey & Bryant, 2000), the emphasis on 
dissociation in ASD has been criticised (Harvey & Bryant, 2002), largely because acute 
dissociation is not a prerequisite for the development of chronic PTSD. Instead, multiple 
pathways to developing PTSD may exist, which may or may not include dissociation (Harvey 
& Bryant, 2002).
Future directions
There are many further research questions that arise from this study. Firstly, a longitudinal 
study of the predictive power of trauma interference scores for patients both with and without 
head injury is essential, to examine the predictive validity of trauma-related interference with 
chronic psychopathology.
Comparisons with patients with head injury and ASD or PTSD against patients with head 
injury without ASD or PTSD would also be important, to investigate the combined effects of 
psychological trauma and cognitive deficit on trauma-related interference.
Other methods have examined the predictive power of acute emotional and physiological 
reactivity in relation to the development of PTSD. In particular, heart rate of patients on 
admission to hospital has been found to predict prognosis for PTSD (Bryant, Harvey, Guthrie, 
& Moulds, 2000; Shalev, Sahar, Freedman, Peri, Glick, Brandes, Orr, & Pitman, 1998). The 
predictive power of heart rate could also be tested in the head injury population, as a possible 
measure of implicit emotional response to the trauma. It could be incorporated with the 
Stroop paradigm, to see if Stroop interference correlates better with autonomic measures of 
arousal than self-report measures of arousal in this study.
The relationship with explicit memory would also be an interesting area to investigate further. 
For example, some patients with mild head injury recall memories for the event after a period 
of time. Harvey and Bryant (2001) found that 40% of patients who were initially significantly 
amnesic for their accident were able to remember their accident at two years post-trauma, 
particularly patients with shorter periods of posttraumatic amnesia. Patients may develop 
recall for the accident through various means, for example through reconstructing partial
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memories of the event, through secondary sources, such as photographs, police and witness 
statements, or repeated discussion of the accident during treatment or compensation. 
Regardless of whether these memories represent real or “pseudomemories” (Bryant et al., 
1996), it would be of interest to see whether interference scores believed to tap implicit 
memory decrease as explicit memory recall increases, in line with cognitive and 
psychoanalytic theories and treatments of PTSD (Brewin, 2001, Moore & Fine, 1990).
Implicit memory shortly after trauma could also be examined to ascertain further evidence for 
the implicit-explicit distinction following trauma. Patients with a head injury could be tested 
for implicit recall of events related to the trauma. For example, patients could be asked to 
recognise an important paramedic involved in their early care from pictures of distracters, or 
identify the name of the lead paramedic from multiple choice answers. Similar tests have 
been employed in the area of implicit memory and anaesthesia (Charlton, Wang, & Russell, 
1993, Wang, 2003).
Anaesthesia research suggests that patients may show signs of implicit memory during 
periods of wakefulness during inadequate anaesthesia, but do not following full sedation 
(Russel & Wang, 2001). This research has looked at recall for factual information (lists of 
fruits, vegetables). In addition, Gidron, Barak, Henik, Gurman, & Steiner (2002) investigated 
implicit learning of emotional information under anaesthesia. Patients were presented with 
word-associates, half with negative emotionality and half with neutral emotionality. Patients 
responded significantly faster to negative emotional cues presented during anaesthesia than 
newly presented negative emotional cues. Transferring research from this area into the 
domain of head injury would suggest that patients with head injury may show no implicit 
memory during complete unconsciousness, but may demonstrate implicit learning during 
periods of fluctuating wakefulness, for example during posttraumatic amnesia following the 
head injury.
Lastly, incorporating functional neuroimaging data of patients carrying out the emotional 
Stroop task would be a useful further study. In particular, comparing neural activation of the 
brain regions identified in the development and maintenance of PTSD, such as the amygdala, 
hippocampus, association cortex and prefrontal cortex (Brewin, 2001; LeDoux, 1995), in 
patients with and without a head injury would be of particular interest.
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Appendix 1
Power calculations (G*POWER. Erdfelder et al.. 1996)
Effect size f  = 0.5266 (Calculated from mean and standard deviation scores from (Bryant & 
Harvey, 1995)
Alpha 0.05
Power 0.8
Groups 3
Total sample required =39
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Appendix 2
Aneurin Bevan H ouse  
81 Commercial R oad  
London E1 1RD
Tel: 020 7655 6600  
Fax: 020 7655 6666
Richard Coates
PsychD in Clinical Psychology
Departm ent of Psychology
University of Surrey
Guildford
Surrey G U 2 7X U  3 1 st July 2002
O ur ref: D O /S G /N /02 /076
D ear M r Coates
Re: N/02/076 - How are people affected by a road traffic accident
Thank you for your letter of 18th July 2002  addressing the points of the Sub­
com m ittee ’s earlier letter. I am  happy to tell you that I am now able to approve
this study on Chairm an’s action to be noted at future meeting of the Sub-
Com m ittee.
P lease note the following conditions to the approval:
1. The Committee's approval is for the length of time specified in your
application. If you expect your project to take longer to complete (i.e. 
collection of data), a letter from the principal investigator to the Chairman  
will be required to further extend the research. This will help the 
Com m ittee to maintain comprehensive records.
2. Any changes to the protocol must be notified to the Com m ittee. Such
changes m ay not be im plemented without the Com m ittee or Chairman's  
approval.
3. The Com m ittee should be notified immediately of any serious adverse
events or if the study is terminated prematurely.
4. You are responsible for consulting with colleagues and/or other groups
who m ay be involved or affected by the research, such as extra work for 
laboratories.
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5. You must ensure that, where appropriate, nursing and other staff are  
m ade aw are that research in progress on patients with whom they are  
concerned has been approved by the Committee.
6. The Com m ittee should be sent one copy of any publication arising from  
your study, or a sum m ary if there is to be no publication.
I should be grateful if you would inform all concerned with the study of the above  
decision.
Your application has been approved on the understanding that you comply with 
Good Clinical Practice and that all raw data is retained and available for 
inspection for 15 years.
Please quote the above study number in any future related 
correspondence.
Yours sincerely
^  DORA OPOKU
Chair
N ELH A  Research Ethics Sub-Com m ittee
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NHS Trust
18lh July 2002
PsychD in Clinical Psychology 
Dept of Psychology 
University of Surrey 
Guildford 
Surrey 
GU2 7XH
Dear Mr Coats.
Re: How are people who have experienced a head injury affected by a road traffic accident?
Thank you for your letter and enclosures relating to the above project. I  will issue a letter on behalf of the Trust 
for Indemnity against negligence once conditional or full approval from the ELCHA Local Research Ethics 
Committee (LREC) has been received. I will hold on to the copy of your application until I receive a copy of the 
letter from the chairman granting conditional or full ethical approval for the project. It is better if you can send 
this letter to us promptly as it can take some time to come through from the LREC.
I would like to let you know that the R&D Office offers a comprehensive Research Project administration 
service which covers costing and pricing of the project, contract and price negotiation with Sponsors and the 
administration of your Project through the R&D Office. Please do feel free to make the most of the services 
available to you.
Please note that all NHS and social care research is now subject to the DoH Framework for Research 
Governance. If you are unfamiliar with the standards contained in this document, or the BLT policies that 
reinforce them, you can obtain details from the Trust R&D Office (14-2010/2403) or from the DoH Internet site. 
The address http://www.doh.gov.uk/researclT/rd3/nhsrandd/researchgovemance/main.htm will take you directly 
to the Research Governance Homepage.
The R & D  Office is required to maintain a comprehensive database of all R & D projects with an NHS element 
by the Department of Health. To ensure that the database is continually updated Investigators are required to 
complete the attached registration form and return it to the R & D Office. If we do not have your project 
registered it does not exist as far as the DoH are concerned and this, therefore, affects the level of R&D Support 
Funding we can claim for the relevant clinical Directorate.
The joint Trust and Medical School Clinical Research Centre is now open for business. It is designed to 
accommodate anyone planning a funded clinical study, who might lack resources or facilities. A leaflet is 
attached for your further information and if you need support please do not hesitate to contact the Centre 
Manager on (020) 7882 7181.
If you wish to discuss any aspects with me or any members of my staff, please do not hesitate to contact the 
R&D Office on (020) 7377 7097.
With best wishes.
Yours truly,
Gerry Leonard, Assistant Director R&D-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The R°yal Hospital of St. Bartholomew. The Royal London Hospital. Assistant Director of R&D: Gerry Leonard
*|TJH The London Chest Hospital. The Queen Elizabeth Children’s 241
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23 August 2002 University 
of Surrey
R e g is t r y
Mr Richard Coates 
Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
Department of Psychology
Guildford
Surrey GU2 7XH, UK 
Telephone
+44 (0)1483 300800
Facsimile
+44 (0)1483 683811
University of Surrey
Dear Mr Coates
How are people who have experienced a head in jury  affected by a road traffic 
accident? (ACE/2002/66/Psvch) -  FAST TRACK
I am writing to inform you that the University Advisory Committee on Ethics has 
considered the above protocol under its ‘Fast Track’ procedure and has approved it on the 
understanding that the Ethical Guidelines for Teaching and Research are observed. For 
your information, and future reference, the Guidelines can be downloaded from the 
Committee’s website at http://www.surrey.ac.uk/Surrey/ACE/.
This letter of approval relates only to the study specified in your research protocol 
(ACE/2002/66/Psych) - Fast Track The Committee should be notified of any changes to 
the proposal, any adverse reactions and if the study is terminated earlier than expected, 
with reasons.
Date of approval by the Advisory Committee on Ethics: 23 August 2002
Date of expiry of approval by the Advisory Committee on Ethics: 22 August 2007
Please inform me when the research has been completed.
Yours sincerely
Catherine Ashbee (Mrs)
Secretary, University Advisory Committee on Ethics
cc: Chairman, ACE
Mr A Moss, Supervisor, Dept of Psychology
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A P P E N D I X  A
ACUTE STRESS DISORDER INTERVIEW
Name: DOB Sex: M F
Interviewer: Referral Source:
Date of trauma: Date of Assessm ent
Description of trauma:
Comments about client presentation:
CRITERION A NO
1) When (Trauma) happened did you think that you or 
someone else was going to be seriously injured or 
die? 0
2a) When (Trauma) happened, did you feel very
frightened? 0
2b) When'(Trauma) happened, did you feel that there
was nothing you could do about it? 0
YES
1
1
1
If Item (1) is coded 1 AND Item (2a) and/or Item (2b) are coded 1, Criterion A 
is met.
Criterion A met: Yes No
CRITERION B NO YES
1) During or since the (Trauma), have you felt numb
or distant from your own emotions? 0 1
2) During or since the (Trauma), have you felt less
aware of your surroundings? 0 1
3) During or since the (Trauma), have things around
you seemed unreal? 0 1
4) During or since the (Trauma), have you felt distant
from your normal self or have you felt as though
you were looking at yourself from the outside? 0 1
5) Have you been unable to recall some important
aspect of the (Trauma)? 0 1
For those items coded 1, ask:
How soon after the (Trauma) did you first start
having these problems?
When was the last time you had any of these
problems?
If 3 or more of Criterion B items are coded 1, Criterion B is met.
Criterion B met: Yes No
CRITERION C NO YES
1) Have you kept remembering the (Trauma)
even when you have not wanted to? 0 1
2) Have you kept having bad dream s or nightmares
about the (Trauma)? 0 1
3) Have you suddenly acted or felt as though the
(Trauma) were about to happen again, even though
it wasn’t? 0 1
4) Do you feel very upset when you are reminded of
the (Trauma)? 0 1
For those items coded 1, ask:
How soon after the (Trauma) did you first start
having these problems?
When was the last time you had any of these
problems?
If any of Criterion C items are coded 1, Criterion C is met.
Criterion C met: Yes _ No
CRITERION D NO YES
1) Have you deliberately tried not to think about the
(Trauma)? 0 1
2) Have you deliberately tried not to talk about the
(Trauma)? 0 1
3) Have you avoided places or people or activities that
may remind you of the (Trauma)? 0 1
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4) Have you tried, not to feel upset or distressed about
the (Trauma)? t 0 1
For those items coded 1, ask:
How soon after the (Trauma) did you first start
having these problems? '
When was the last time you had any of these
problems? _______
If any of Criterion D items are coded 1, Criterion D is met.
Criterion D met: Y es_______  No
CRITERION E
1) Since the (Trauma), have you had trouble sleeping?
2) Since the (Trauma), have you felt unusually irritable 
or have you lost your temper a lot more than 
usual?
3) Since the (Trauma), have you had difficulty 
concentrating?
4) Since the (Trauma), have you become much more 
concerned about danger or very much more 
careful?
5) Since the (Trauma), have you become jumpy or do 
you get easily startled by ordinary noises or 
movements?
6) When you are reminded of the (Trauma), do you 
sweat or tremble or does your heart beat fast?
For those items coded 1, ask:
How soon after the (Trauma) did you first start
having these problems?__________________________ _______
When was the last time you had any of these
problems?______________________________________ _______
If any of Criterion E items are coded 1, Criterion E is met.
Criterion E met: Y e s_______  No
NO YES
0 1
0 1
0 1
0 1
0 1
0 1
CRITERION F NO YES
1) Have you felt very upset by the symptoms you
have experienced since the (Trauma)? 0 1
2) Have the problems which occurred as a  result of 
the (Trauma) kept you from normal socializing or
talking with people? 0 1
3) Have the problems which occurred as a  result of 
the (Trauma) kept you from completing your normal
work? 0 1
4) Have the problems which occurred as a  result of 
the (Trauma) kept you from doing other things you
need to do? o 1
For those items coded 1, ask:
How soon after the (Trauma) did you first start
having these problems?---------------------------------------------------
When was the last time you had any of these
problems?---------------------------------------------------------------------
If any of Criterion F items are coded 1, Criterion F is met.
Criterion F met: Y es----------  No
CRITERION G
1) Have you taken medication or used drugs or alcohol at the time or since 
the (Trauma)? Y e s_______ N o ________
If yes, specify which ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
If yes, specify when was the last time
2) Have you suffered any medical conditions, including head injuries or 
losing consciousness, at the time or since the (Trauma)?
Y es______  N o ________
If yes, specify which__________________________ :_______ _ ____________
If yes, specify when was the last time
If any Criterion G items are coded 1, consider if the substance use or medical 
condition may account for the previously described symptoms. If there is no 
evidence of substance use or medical condition accounting for the previously 
described symptoms, Criterion G is met.
Criterion G met:_______________________________ Y es_______  N o ________
CRITERION H
Have the symptoms reported in the following criteria lasted longer than 2 days 
and less than 4 weeks after the trauma? This information is based on 
responses obtained in the relevant sections of the interview. [Note. Criterion B 
can occur during or following the trauma.]
Criterion C: Y es  N o _______
Criterion D: Y es______ _ No
Criterion E: Yes No
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If all Criterion H items are coded 1, Criterion H is met.
Criterion H met: <Yes________ No
SUMMARY SCORES
CRITERION MET TOTAL SCORE 
(Sum of items coded 1)
Criterion A Yes .. No NA
Criterion B Yes No
Criterion C Yes _ No
Criterion D Yes No
Criterion E Yes .____ No
Criterion F Yes . . . No . . .
Criterion G Yes . No
Criterion H Yes . . . No
ASD Criteria met: Yes No . . TOTAL:
Note. © i 999 by Richard A. Bryant.
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Practice words
apple
pencil
Appendix 5
cup pencil chimney
moustache envelope cup
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envelope
chimney
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Neutral words
blanket maintenance sail pause game
sail game pause maintenance garden
garden pause maintenance sail blanket
game blanket garden pause maintenance
sail blanket game garden maintenance
blanket game garden sail pause
251
Major Research Project
Positive words
lovely worthy praise dearest nice
lovely nice kindness dearest worthy
nice praise worthy dearest kindness
lovely kindness dearest nice praise
worthy lovely praise dearest kindness
worthy lovely praise kindness nice
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OCD words
filthy faeces urine dirty contaminate
faeces contaminate dirty filthy germs
urine contaminate dirty germs filthy
filthy germs contaminate urine faeces
germs urine faeces dirty filthy
contaminate germs dirty urine faeces
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Hospitalisation words
lights mask confused amnesia treatment
confused doctor mask lights amnesia
doctor amnesia lights mask treatment
lights mask doctor treatment confused
treatment amnesia mask doctor confused
treatment lights amnesia confused doctor
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RTA words
emergency trapped scream death blood
smash scream blood emergency death
death scream smash trapped emergency
trapped blood emergency scream smash
death emergency blood smash trapped
blood smash death trapped scream
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Stroop scoring sheet
Practice
black (ap) red (cu) green (pe) blue (ch) yellow (mo) pink (en) 
blue (pe) pink (pi) red (en) green (cu) black (ch) yellow (ap)
Neutral words
black (bl) red (ma) green (sa) blue (pa) pink (gam) yellow (gar)
pink (sa) blue (gam) yellow (bl) red (pa) green (ma) black (gar)
green (gar) pink (pa) black (ma) yellow (gam) red (sa) blue (bl)
red (gam) green (bl) blue (gar) yellow (sa) black (pa) pink (ma) 
yellow (pa) black (sa) red (bl) green (gam) pink (gar) blue (ma)
pink (bl) yellow (ma) black (gam) red (gar) blue (sa) green (pa)
Time (seconds)
Positive words
green (lo) red (wo) black (pr) blue (de) yellow (ki) pink (ni)
yellow (pr) black (lo) green (ni) red (ki) pink (de) blue (wo)
red (ni) blue (pr) pink (wo) green (de) yellow (lo) black (ki) 
blue (lo) green (ki) red (de) yellow (wo) black (ni) pink (pr)
green (wo) pink (lo) yellow (ni) red (pr) black (de) blue (ki)
black (wo) red (lo) green (pr) pink (ki) blue (ni) yellow (de)
Time (seconds)
OCD words
yellow (ge) blue (fi) black (fa) green (ur) red (di) pink (co) 
red (fa) green (co) yellow (ur) pink (di) black (fi) blue (ge)
black (ur) red (co) blue (di) green (ge) pink (fi) yellow (fa)
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green (fi) pink (ge) yellow (di) black (co) red (ur) blue (fa)
black (ge) blue (ur) pink (fa) green (di) red (fi) yellow (co)
yellow (fi) blue (co) red (ge) black (di) pink (ur) green (fa)
Time (seconds)
Hospital words
pink (li) green (ma) red (co) blue (am) black (tr) yellow (do)
blue (co) yellow (tr) pink (do) red (ma) green (li) black (am)
green (do) red (am) black (li) yellow (co) blue (ma) pink (tr)
red (li) pink (ma) blue (do) yellow (am) green (tr) black (co)
blue (tr) yellow (li) green (am) black (ma) red (do) pink (co)
yellow (ma) red (tr) blue (li) pink (am) green (co) black (do)
Time (seconds)
RTA words
red (em) blue (tr) green (sc) yellow (sm) pink (de) black (bl)
blue (sm) black (sc) red (bl) pink (em) green (de) yellow (tr)
black (de) blue (sc) red (sm) pink (tr) yellow (bl) green (em)
red (tr) green (bl) blue (em) yellow (de) pink (sc) black (sm)
yellow (sc) red (de) black (em) blue (bl) pink (sm) green (tr)
pink (bl) yellow (em) green (sm) blue (de) black (tr) red (sc)
Time (seconds)
257
Major Research Project
Appendix 6
Patient details
DATE:
Age
Sex
Ethnicity
Date of injury
Details of accident
PTA
Neurological consequences 
/ specific lesions
Medication
Occupation
Highest Educational 
Attainment
Psychiatric history?
Traumatic history? 
R TA /H I
Alcoholic history?
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How are people affected by a road traffic accident?
Dear Participant,
You will be aware that we have talked about the road traffic accident that you were involved in durinn 
this research project. A few people who have been in an accident feel traumatised afterwards If you
S S p S .'S ,” ■l“  ~  « - V S :
Yours sincerely,
^-<•0
Richard Coates
Trainee Clinical Psychologist
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Appendix 8
Significant skewness and kurtosis for time since injury 
RTA with head injury group
Skewness Kurtosis
S Ss Z K Kk Z
Time since injury 1.983 0.580 3.42 5.080 1.121 4.53
S = skewness, Ss = standard error of skewness 
K = kurtosis, Kk = standard error of kurtosis 
Z = z score
Significant skewness or kurtosis = z scores greater than or equal to +/- 3.29.
Significant skewness and kurtosis for positive Stroop words 
RTA without head injury group
Skewness Kurtosis
S Ss Z K Kk Z
Positive words 2.199 0.616 3.57 5.666 1.191 4.76
S = skewness, Ss = standard error of skewness 
K = kurtosis, Kk = standard error of kurtosis 
Z = z score
Significant skewness or kurtosis = z scores greater than or equal to +/- 3.29.
Significant skewness and kurtosis for interference scores
RTA with head injury group
Interference Skewness Kurtosis
S Ss Z K Kk Z
Positive interference -2.105 0.580 -3.63 6.792 1.121 6.06
Hospital interference -2.096 0.580 3.61 5.994 1.121 5.35
RTA interference -2.290 0.580 -3.95 7.316 1.121 6.53
S = skewness, Ss = standard error of skewness 
K = kurtosis, Kk = standard error of kurtosis 
Z = z score
Significant skewness or kurtosis = z scores greater than or equal to +/- 3.29.
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How are people who have experienced a head injury affected by a road traffic
accident?
Hospital
Invitation to Participate in a Research Project
We invite you to take part in a research study, which we think may be important. 
The information, which follows, tells you about it. It is important that you 
understand what is in this leaflet. It says what will happen if  you take part and what 
the risks might be. Try to make sure you know what will happen to you if  you 
decide to take part. Whether or not you do take part is entirely your choice. Please 
ask any questions you want to about the research and we will try our best to answer 
them.
What is the research about?
The research concerns people who have been involved in a road traffic accident and 
have experienced a period of unconsciousness. The research aims to investigate how 
people are affected by their accident even if  they don’t remember the accident.
What would the research involve?
The research would involve carrying out a short series of tasks, completing two short 
questionnaires and a short interview. The whole process should last 40 minutes in total. 
Details about the accident will also be sought from your medical notes. You will only 
be required to take part once in this research. It will not require you to come back to 
hospital. The research will take place during your stay in hospital, or at the time o f an 
outpatient appointment.
What are the negative effects / benefits of taking part in the research?
There is a chance that talking about the accident may bring up some painful memories. 
However, if  this occurs, it is very unlikely to be hazardous. Taking part in the research 
will be of benefit to people who have been involved in road traffic accidents, by seeing 
to what extent people are affected by the accident. It may help to treat anybody who 
has been affected at an early stage. A possible benefit to you would be an assessment 
o f how you have reacted to the road traffic accident and an offer o f treatment if  
required.
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What about confidentiality?
The research is completely anonymous and confidential. No names will be included 
with the data. Only the researcher and their supervisors will have access to the research 
records.
Will this affect my treatment?
You don’t have to join the study. You are free to decide not to be in this study or to 
drop out at any time. If  you decide not to be in the study, or drop out, this will not put 
at risk your ordinary medical care.
What happens if you are worried or if there is an emergency?
You will always be able to contact an investigator to discuss your concerns and/or 
to get help:
Name: Mr (Chartered Clinical Psychologist)
Address: Department o f Psychology, , Hospital,
Telephone number:
We believe that this study is basically safe and do not expect you to suffer any harm 
or injury because of your participation in it. However, Trust has
agreed that if  your health does suffer as a result o f your being in the study then you 
will be compensated. In such a situation, you will not have to prove that the harm or 
injury which affects you is anyone’s fault. If  you are not happy with any proposed 
compensation, you may have to pursue your claim through legal action.
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WRITTEN CONSENT FORM:
Title of research: How are people who have experienced a head injury affected by a road 
traffic accident?
REC Number:
Name of Patient/Volunteer (Block Capitals):
• The study organisers have invited me to take part in this research.
• I understand what is in the leaflet about the research. I have a 
copy of the leaflet to keep.
• I have had the chance to talk and ask questions about the study.
• I know what my part will be in the study and I know how long it will take.
• I know how the study may affect me. I have been told if there are possible risks.
• I understand that I should not actively take part in more than 1 research study at a time. §
• I know that the local East London and The City Health Authority 
Research Ethics Committee has seen and agreed to this study.
• I understand that personal information is strictly confidential: I know the
only people who may see information about my part in the study are the research 
team or an official representative of the organisation which funded the research.
• I understand that my personal information may be stored on a computer. If this 
is done then it will not affect the confidentiality of this information. All such storage 
of information must comply with the 1998 Data Protection Act.
• I freely consent to be a subject in the study. No-one has put pressure on me.
• I know that I can stop taking part in the study at any time.
• I know if I do not take part I will still be able to have my normal treatment.
• I consent to my GP being informed about my participation in the study.
• I know that if there are any problems, I can contact:
Mr (Chartered Clinical Psychologist)
Tel. No. Bleep No./Ext...................................
Patient’s/Volunteer’s: Signature .....................................................
Witness’s Name ' .....................................................
Witness’s Signature: .....................................................
Date .....................................................
As the Clinician/Investigator responsible for this research or a designated deputy, I confirm that I 
have explained to the patient/volunteer named above the nature and prnpose of the research to be 
undertaken.
Clinician’s Name: ..................................
Clinician’s Signature: ..................................  Date: .....................................
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Appendix 10
Within comparisons (overall group)
Mean Rank
Positive interference 2.03
OCD interference 2.77
Hospital interference 2.09
RTA interference 3.10
Table I
Within comparisons (RTA with head injury group)
Mean Rank
Positive interference 1.93
OCD interference 2.67
Hospital interference 2.13
RTA interference 3.27
Table II
Within comparisons (RTA without head injury group)
Mean Rank
Positive interference 1.73
OCD interference 2.81
Hospital interference 2.04
RTA interference 3.42
Table III
Within comparisons (Control group)
Mean Rank
Positive interference 2.40
OCD interference 2.83
Hospital interference 2.10
RTA interference 2.67
Table IV
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Between group comparisons
group Mean rank
RTA interference RTA with head injury 28.77
RTA without head injury 21.08
Control 16.03
Table V
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